Heidegger y Hegel: distancia y proximidad
No hay miniatura disponible
Fecha
1996
Autores
Título de la revista
ISSN de la revista
Título del volumen
Editor
Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú. Fondo Editorial
Resumen
No siendo epígono ni refutador de Hegel, Heidegger inició muy pronto (desde su Tesis de habilitación en 1915) y continuó hasta muy tarde (la última referencia a Hegel es de 1969) un diálogo con el pensamiento de Hegel. En este breve artículo, se trata de mostrar la relación ambivalente que guarda Heidegger con Hegel a partir de tres temas fundamentales sobre los que su acuerdo es tan grande como su desacuerdo: la relación del seral pensamiento, la identidad del ser yla nada, la concepción de la historia. Por esta vía podrán aclararse las oposiciones entre la proposición especulativay la tautología fenomenológica, entre la lógica oposicional y la temáticade la diferencia ontológica, y entre la concepción dialéctica de la historia y la meditación sobre la historia del ser y el Ereignis.
Not being a mere epigonenor disprover ofHegel, Heidegger started a dialogue with Hegel's thought since his Habilitation thesis in 1915 until his last reference to Hegel in 1969. This brief paper intends to point out Heidegger' s ambivalent relationship to Hegel in three fundamental issues in which his agreementis as important as his disagreement: the relationship between being and thought, the identity of being and nothingness, the conception of history. Light is thus shed upon the oppositions between the speculative sentence and the phenomenological tautology, between the oppositional logic and the ontological difference, and between the dialectics of history and the meditation on the history of being and Ereignis.
Not being a mere epigonenor disprover ofHegel, Heidegger started a dialogue with Hegel's thought since his Habilitation thesis in 1915 until his last reference to Hegel in 1969. This brief paper intends to point out Heidegger' s ambivalent relationship to Hegel in three fundamental issues in which his agreementis as important as his disagreement: the relationship between being and thought, the identity of being and nothingness, the conception of history. Light is thus shed upon the oppositions between the speculative sentence and the phenomenological tautology, between the oppositional logic and the ontological difference, and between the dialectics of history and the meditation on the history of being and Ereignis.
Descripción
Palabras clave
Filosofía
Citación
Colecciones
item.page.endorsement
item.page.review
item.page.supplemented
item.page.referenced
Licencia Creative Commons
Excepto se indique lo contrario, la licencia de este artículo se describe como info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess