Davidson, verdad y correspondencia
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Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú. Fondo Editorial
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En este artículo el autor se propone analizar la posición de Davidson respecto de la verdad como correspondencia a lo largo de su obra. Pueden establecerse dos períodos en su obra, un primero que va desde sus trabajos iniciales hasta sus "Afterthoughts” de 1987 y un segundo que va desde esa fecha hasta sus últimos trabajos. Lo que caracteriza a esos períodos es que durante el primero Davidson se proclama correspondentista, en el segundo se arrepiente de haber adoptado esa denominación, a lo cual caracteriza como un error terminológico. La intención del autor aquí es considerar cuál puede haber sido la razón para dicho error terminológico y cuánto de la aceptación de algo como la correspondencia persiste en los trabajos posteriores de Davidson. Se propone para ello establecer una distinción entre dos modos en que debe entenderse la correspondencia, que se encuentran emparentados con dos modos de entender el análisis filosófico y con lo que Wright llama el debate tradicionalacerca de la verdad, y el nuevo giro que el mismo debería tomar.
"Davidson, Truth and Correspondence”. In this paper the A. proposes to analyze Davidson’s position regarding truth as correspondence, in all of his works. Two periods may herewith be detached: a first one from his first works until his 1987 "Afterthoughts”, and a second one, from that date until his last works. What characterizes them is that during his first period Davidson proclaims himself a correspondist, and in a second period he regrets having adopted that denomination, which he characterizes as a terminological error. The A. attempts to examine which was the reason for that terminological error and how much of correspondence elements would persist in Davidson later works. For that purpose he proposes to establish a distinction between two modes of understanding correspondence, related to two modes of understanding philosophical analysis and to what Wright calls the traditional debate concerning truth, and the new turn the latter should undertake.
"Davidson, Truth and Correspondence”. In this paper the A. proposes to analyze Davidson’s position regarding truth as correspondence, in all of his works. Two periods may herewith be detached: a first one from his first works until his 1987 "Afterthoughts”, and a second one, from that date until his last works. What characterizes them is that during his first period Davidson proclaims himself a correspondist, and in a second period he regrets having adopted that denomination, which he characterizes as a terminological error. The A. attempts to examine which was the reason for that terminological error and how much of correspondence elements would persist in Davidson later works. For that purpose he proposes to establish a distinction between two modes of understanding correspondence, related to two modes of understanding philosophical analysis and to what Wright calls the traditional debate concerning truth, and the new turn the latter should undertake.
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