Pluralismo y éticas de la vida buena. Del Filebo de Platón a la Ética a Nicómaco de Aristóteles
Cargando...
Fecha
Autores
Título de la revista
ISSN de la revista
Título del volumen
Editor
Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú. Fondo Editorial
Acceso al texto completo solo para la Comunidad PUCP
Resumen
En este artículo intento responder a la pregunta de si son –o al menos pueden ser– pluralistas las éticas de la vida buena. Por tales se entienden las éticas teleológicas, centradas en el fin último o bien supremo del individuo humano. ¿Pueden, pese a su aparente individualismo, ser éticas pluralistas? Para responder, me circunscribo al Filebo de Platón, en que el autor, superando las visiones que identifican el bien humano con la vida de placer o con la vida del conocimiento, lo identifica con una vida mixta, que es una mezcla de las dos. Desarrolla, pues, a mi modo de ver, una ética estructuralmente pluralista: (1) por la actitud, eminentemente dialógica, de sus interlocutores; (2) por el método de la división que emplea, el cual va de la pluralidad indefinida a la unidad, y de esta a una pluralidad definida; (3) por el principio ontológico de lo Uno-Múltiple en que se funda; (4) por el contenido que asigna al bien de la existencia humana. Sobre todo por este contenido –esencialmente inclusivo– la ética del Filebo ha ejercido una influencia decisiva en la filosofía moral igualmente pluralista de la Ética a Nicómaco.
In this paper I seek to answer the question of whether the Good Life Ethics are -or could be- pluralistic. By Good Life Ethics we understand teleological ethics focused on the ultimate end or supreme good of the human individual. Could they be, in spite of their apparent individualism, pluralistic ethics? To answer this question, I limit myself to Plato’s Philebus, in which the author, overcoming the views that identify human good with the life of pleasure or knowledge, identifies it with a mixed life, which is a mixture of both. He develops, thus, as I see it, an structurally pluralistic ethics: 1) by the eminently dialogical attitude of their interlocutors, 2) by the division method employed, which goes from undefined plurality to unity, and from here to a defined plurality; (3) by the ontological principle of the One-Multiple in which it is founded; (4) by the content assigned to the good of human existence. Mainly due to this content –essentially inclusive– the Philebus’ ethics has exercise a decisive influence in the equally pluralistic moral philosophy of the Nicomachean Ehics.
In this paper I seek to answer the question of whether the Good Life Ethics are -or could be- pluralistic. By Good Life Ethics we understand teleological ethics focused on the ultimate end or supreme good of the human individual. Could they be, in spite of their apparent individualism, pluralistic ethics? To answer this question, I limit myself to Plato’s Philebus, in which the author, overcoming the views that identify human good with the life of pleasure or knowledge, identifies it with a mixed life, which is a mixture of both. He develops, thus, as I see it, an structurally pluralistic ethics: 1) by the eminently dialogical attitude of their interlocutors, 2) by the division method employed, which goes from undefined plurality to unity, and from here to a defined plurality; (3) by the ontological principle of the One-Multiple in which it is founded; (4) by the content assigned to the good of human existence. Mainly due to this content –essentially inclusive– the Philebus’ ethics has exercise a decisive influence in the equally pluralistic moral philosophy of the Nicomachean Ehics.
Descripción
Palabras clave
Filosofía, Pluralismo, Ética, Vida Buena, Placer, Ciencia
Citación
Colecciones
item.page.endorsement
item.page.review
item.page.supplemented
item.page.referenced
Licencia Creative Commons
Excepto se indique lo contrario, la licencia de este artículo se describe como info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess

