Areté

URI permanente para esta comunidadhttp://54.81.141.168/handle/123456789/182087

ISSN: 1016-913X
e-ISSN: 2223-3741

Areté es la revista de filosofía editada por el Departamento de Humanidades de la Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú (PUCP), que cuenta con dos números anuales. En ella se publican trabajos de investigación, originales e inéditos, escritos en español y eventualmente en inglés, de autores que participan de modo significativo en la discusión filosófica contemporánea en todos los campos de la reflexión filosófica. Comprende, también, una sección permanente de reseñas y, de manera ocasional, publica documentos sobre importantes debates filosóficos, realizados en nuestro país o en el extranjero, así como entrevistas a filósofos de renombre internacional.

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2008 - 200912020 - 20221

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Temasearch.filters.applied.operator.equals: search.filters.subject.Critias

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    The Koinon Agathon of Plato’s Charmides
    (Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú. Departamento de Humanidades, 2022-03-28) Pichanick, Alan
    Given the number of references to koinōnia in Plato’s dialogues, it is striking that the phrase “common good” (koinon agathon) is used only once – at Charmides 166d. Socrates asks his interlocutor Critias a question, “Do you not think it is for the common good, almost (schedon), of all men, that how all the beings (tōn ontōn) are should be discovered?” The question emerges after Critias has claimed that sōphrosynē is self-knowledge, which he then specifies as a “knowledge of all other knowledges and of itself”. In this paper, I argue that it is no accident that Socrates mentions the “common good” at precisely this moment in his discussion with Critias. The notion of sōphrosynē that Critias defends is incoherent owing to what Critias claims to be its distinguishing feature – its reflexivity. Because of its total reflexivity, it points to no end beyond itself and thereby it is neither capable of disclosing “the beings” nor of being connected to any good outside of itself. The common good Socrates mentions here is therefore essentially related to an acknowledgment of ignorance that motivates one to wonder (thauma) at a good beyond one’s love of one’s own things. I thus suggest an explanation for the curious addition of “almost” (schedon) in Socrates’ remark here: Critias himself shows that unless he (or his young cousin Charmides) can admit ignorance and experience such wonder, then he is constitutionally not included in this common good.
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    La noción de hybris” en el Critias de Platón
    (Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú. Fondo Editorial, 2008) Picón Casas, Javier
    Se justifican tres tesis. Primera, el sentido mítico-religioso tradicional de la justicia como castigo de la [palabra en griego] quedó desacreditado durante la Guerra del Peloponeso, como bien lo muestra Tucídides. Segunda, en tiempos de Aristóteles, tal sentido ya habría desaparecido en favor de un nuevo paradigma basado en el concepto de [palabra en griego]. Tercera, la obra de Platón constituye uno de los últimos intentosde recuperar ese sentido mítico-religioso tradicional tratando de interpretar la Guerra del Peloponeso a través del mecanismo del castigo de la [palabra en griego] .---The notion of ‘hybris’ in Plato’s Critias”. The following theses are basically justified: (1) the traditional mythical-religious sense of justice as punishment of the [greek word] was discredited during the Peloponnesian War, as Thucydide shows. (2) In times of Aristotle such a sense had already disappeared in favour of a new paradigm based on the concept of [greek word]. (3) Plato’s work constitutes one of the last attempts to recover the traditional mythical-religious sense trying to interpret the Peloponnesian War through the mechanism of punishment of the [greek word].