¿Es la exigencia kantiana de universalización un procedimiento suiciente para establecer contenidos morales-éticos? Algunas consideraciones acerca de una respuesta negativa a esta pregunta
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Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú. Fondo Editorial
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Abstract
En este artículo se analiza la tesis acerca de la suficiencia del procedimiento de universalización presente en el imperativo categórico de la ley general (Fundamentación de la metafísica de las costumbres) para determinar el contenido de la moralidad, con el fin de sostener que esta tesis se contradice con la concepción final de la ética kantiana en la Metafísica de las costumbres, en la medida en que ella se estructura en base a la prioridad normativa del "fin de la humanidad”, cuya adopción efectiva por parte de los agentes es condición necesaria para la adscripción de moralidad y para la determinación del "contenido” de la "ley moral”. Con este propósito, se analizan críticamente dos de las lecturas más inluyentes que están a la base de tal tesis, a saber, la de John R.Silber en "Procedural Formalism in Kant’s Ethics”, y la de Henry E. Allison en "Morality and Freedom: Kant’s Reciprocity Thesis”.
"Is the Kantian Universalization Demand a Suficient Procedure for the Establishment of Moral-Ethical Contents? Some Considerations Regarding a Negative Answer to this Question”. In this article we analyze the thesis that claims the suficiency of the Kantian universalization procedure expressed in the categorical imperative of the general law (Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals) to determine the content of morality, with the aim of holding that this thesis contradicts Kant’s inal conception of Ethics as it is expounded in Metaphysicsof Morals, insofar as it is structured upon the normative priority of the "end of humanity”. The effective adoption of this end –or practical principle– is a necessary condition for the ascription of morality and for the determination of the "content” of the "moral law”. In order to achieve this aim, we analyze two of the most influential interpretations that are at the base of the aforementioned thesis, v.gr., John R. Silber’s, in "Procedural Formalism in Kant’s Ethics”, and Henry E. Allison’s in "Morality and Freedom: Kant’s Reciprocity Thesis”.
"Is the Kantian Universalization Demand a Suficient Procedure for the Establishment of Moral-Ethical Contents? Some Considerations Regarding a Negative Answer to this Question”. In this article we analyze the thesis that claims the suficiency of the Kantian universalization procedure expressed in the categorical imperative of the general law (Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals) to determine the content of morality, with the aim of holding that this thesis contradicts Kant’s inal conception of Ethics as it is expounded in Metaphysicsof Morals, insofar as it is structured upon the normative priority of the "end of humanity”. The effective adoption of this end –or practical principle– is a necessary condition for the ascription of morality and for the determination of the "content” of the "moral law”. In order to achieve this aim, we analyze two of the most influential interpretations that are at the base of the aforementioned thesis, v.gr., John R. Silber’s, in "Procedural Formalism in Kant’s Ethics”, and Henry E. Allison’s in "Morality and Freedom: Kant’s Reciprocity Thesis”.
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Philosophy, Kant, Universalizability, Humanity As An End, Morality, Filosofía, Kant, Universalizabilidad, Humanidad Como Fin, Moralidad
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