Gobierno corporativo: relación entre la dualidad CEO-Chairman y la eficacia del control del directorio
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2020-05-13
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Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú
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El propósito de esta investigación fue analizar el gobierno corporativo desde la perspectiva de
la dualidad CEO-Chairman y su relación con la eficacia del control del directorio. Esta
relación se analizó a través de un enfoque cuantitativo de diseño no experimental, usando
fuentes de datos primarias y secundarias. Se seleccionó una muestra de 347 empresas con
ventas mayores a US$ 5’000,000, a las cuales se les suministró un cuestionario para medir la
variable eficacia del control del directorio. Para medir la variable dualidad CEO-Chairman se
hizo uso de información secundaria; así mismo, se realizó una verificación sobre el
funcionamiento de la dualidad. Se encontró que la dualidad CEO-Chairman se relaciona de
forma significativa con los constructos de la eficacia del control del Directorio reflejada
como el desempeño de directorios independientes y la supervisión de riesgo. El resultado de
la relación de dualidad CEO-Chairman y desempeño de directores independientes se muestra
inverso, mientras que con la supervisión de riesgo este se vuelve directo. En conclusión, los
resultados obtenidos aportan teóricamente al conocimiento respecto a las prácticas del buen
gobierno corporativo.
The purpose of the present investigation was to analyze the CEO-Chairman duality and its relationship with the effectiveness of the control over the board of Directors; This was done through a quantitative approach to non-experimental design, using data from primary and secondary sources. A sample of 347 companies with sales over US$ 5’000,000 was selected, and a questionnaire was applied to their members of the board of directors, in order to measure the variable effectiveness of the control over the board. On the other hand, to measure the CEO-Chairman duality variable, secondary information was used, as well as a verification on the operation of said duality. It is concluded that the duality is significantly related to the performance evaluation constructs of independent directories and to risk supervision. With these results, new knowledge is generated about the principal-agent relationship in large Ecuadorian companies, which will help shareholders to make decisions about whether or not to adopt duality in their companies.
The purpose of the present investigation was to analyze the CEO-Chairman duality and its relationship with the effectiveness of the control over the board of Directors; This was done through a quantitative approach to non-experimental design, using data from primary and secondary sources. A sample of 347 companies with sales over US$ 5’000,000 was selected, and a questionnaire was applied to their members of the board of directors, in order to measure the variable effectiveness of the control over the board. On the other hand, to measure the CEO-Chairman duality variable, secondary information was used, as well as a verification on the operation of said duality. It is concluded that the duality is significantly related to the performance evaluation constructs of independent directories and to risk supervision. With these results, new knowledge is generated about the principal-agent relationship in large Ecuadorian companies, which will help shareholders to make decisions about whether or not to adopt duality in their companies.
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Eficacia de control, Gobierno corporativo, Investigación cuantitativa