Estudios de Filosofía

URI permanente para esta comunidadhttps://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14657/175808

e-ISSN: 2409-1596

Estudios de Filosofía es una revista de periodicidad anual, editada por el Seminario de Filosofía del Instituto Riva-Agüero, escuela de altos estudios humanísticos de la Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú, y elaborada con el esfuerzo conjunto de profesores y estudiantes de Filosofía de esta universidad. Se publica por primera vez en 1975; a partir de 2009, la revista se publica de forma exclusivamente electrónica.

Su objetivo es difundir textos originales e inéditos, principalmente -aunque no de modo exclusivo- de quienes se inician en la investigación. Se incluyen artículos, traducciones, estudios críticos, reseñas, entrevistas, notas bibliográficas y noticias de actividades filosóficas diversas.

Todos los artículos presentados a la revista son sometidos a un proceso de arbitraje doble ciego realizado por pares nacionales.

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Mostrando 1 - 6 de 6
  • Ítem
    Placer e interés en Aristóteles y Husserl: ingredientes hiléticos para el despertar de la conciencia
    (Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú, 2023-12-11) Salas Matienzo, Mayra
    Increasingly vigorous research into the nature of consciousness contrasts with a loss of interest in the notion of life or in the conceptual delimitation of a living organism. They also contrast, either to refute or adhere to, with the assumption of a finished rational and mathematical model of the world reflected in the predominance of measurable properties over more sensible qualities of things. The treatment of pleasure and consciousness in Aristote and Husserl seems to restore and subvert, respectively, relegated and not so relegated models: in the first case, the notion of life and activity; in the second, the scheme of a neutral theoretical reason.
  • Ítem
    Responsabilidad y evidencia en la Crisis
    (Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú. Instituto Riva-Agüero, 2021-12-02) Alarcón, Vania
    This text links the concept of responsibility described by Husserl in the Crisis and the third meaning of evidence, which corresponds to the third moment of the delimitation between what is immanent and transcendent. First, the concept of evidence is examined. Second, the concept of intentionality is looked over. Third, the concept of responsibility is sketched, as well as those of freedom, the idea of humanity, history, and the task of philosophy.
  • Ítem
    El sentido en Deleuze a partir de la fenomenología
    (Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú. Instituto Riva-Agüero, 2015-12-01) Chávez, Juan Ignacio
    This paper intends to reflect on the genesis of the deleuzian notion of sense. I will start by demonstrating that Deleuze’s project, as well as Husserl’s, tries to revert Platonism by means of the concept of immanence. Secondly, I will criticise the concept of noema as exposed in Ideas I, in order to elucidate the features that Deleuze seeks to reformulate: good sense and common sense. Finally, based on the previous critique, I will carry out a description of sense as event.
  • Ítem
    El orden de fundación de actos según Husserl y Scheler: una revisión desde los valores
    (Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú. Instituto Riva-Agüero, 2018-12-10) Alarcón, Vania
    This paper deals with the hierarchical organization of the subject’s acts and their foundational ranking according to Husserl and Scheler, emphasizing emotional acts and their correlative objects –values. Husserl argues that cognitive (objectifying) acts (perception, thought-acts) found emotional acts (the evaluation or feeling of values), whereas Scheler holds that emotional acts found representations or objectifying acts. This difference refers back to key points in their own conceptions of the phenomenological method and the status of objective correlates.
  • Ítem
    El “gran cisma fenomenológico” y el “cisma fenomenológico-existencial”. Sobre la continuidad en la crítica contemporánea respecto del tránsito de Husserl hacia el idealismo trascendental
    (Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú. Instituto Riva-Agüero, 2016-12-01) Heffernan, George
    It is generally acknowledged that there were two schisms in the early historyof the phenomenological movement. The first, the Great Phenomenological Schism, started between 1905 and 1913, as many of his younger contemporaries, for example Pfänder, Scheler, Reinach, Stein, and Ingarden, rejected Husserl’s transformation of phenomenology from the descriptive psychology of the Logical Investigations (1900/19011) into the transcendental idealism of Ideas I (1913). The second, the Phenomenological-Existential Schism, happened between 1927 and 1933, as it emerged that with Being and Time (1927) Heidegger’s philosophy had moved away from Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology of consciousness toward an ontological analytic of human existence as the way to an interpretation of the question of the meaning of Being. This paper is about neither the first schism per se nor the second schism per se but about the relationship between the two. It suggests that the first schism anticipated the second and the second recapitulated the first, so that, although the first could have occurred without the second, the second would not have happened as it did without the first. It also indicates that the second schism lies temporally much closer to the first schism than has been hitherto appreciated. Above all, the paper seeks an answer to this question: How do the Great Phenomenological Schism and the Phenomenological-Existential Schism illuminate one another philosophically?
  • Ítem
    Hegel versus Husserl: dos consideraciones sobre la intersubjetividad y la normatividad
    (Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú. Instituto Riva-Agüero, 2020-12-16) Alarcón Castillo, Vania
    El presente artículo compara las consideraciones de Hegel y Husserl sobre la intersubjetividad en relación a la normatividad. Para esto, en una primera parte se discute la descripción de la conciencia del yo y el otro en cada uno de los autores; en la segunda, sus conceptos de libertad; y en la tercera, sus conceptos de normatividad, teleología e historia.