(Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú. Fondo Editorial, 2013) González de Requena, Juan Antonio
Our Tyrannies. Tocqueville on Democratic Despotism”. Although thelexicon of tyranny” and despotism” is subject to historical changes in meaning,we still keep on using those terms to refer to some types of illegitimate, unjust orindecent political regimes. So does Tocqueville, when he describes the new waysof despotism emerging from modern democratic revolution. In this article, weexplore the uses of tyranny” and despotism” in Tocqueville’s thought, and wealso try to discover the concrete models or social prototypes which could inspireTocqueville’s prognosis concerning a tutelary democratic despotism.
(Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú. Fondo Editorial, 2013) Giusti, Miguel
Can Hegel's Philosophy of Right do without the Science of Logic?”. The question posed by this paper’s title refers to the attempts of some contemporary authors, amongst them Axel Honneth, to update the central theses of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, though precisely (and deliberately) doing so without its alleged dependence on the Science of Logic. On account of several methodological and hermeneutical reasons, it is not easy to answer this question. It is well known that Hegel emphatically asserts that both works and philosophical projects depend on each other, but there is no consensus amongst specialists on how much the Logic actually influences the Philosophy of Right and in what way it does so. On the other hand, clearly any social philosophy needs a logical theory in a broad sense, whether it may be Hegelian or not. This is even more so if the aim is to update the Hegelian construction implicit in the notion of freedom. In any case, the discussion seems to bring forth the paradox of asserting both the current relevance and the obsolescence of the Hegelian notion of freedom.
(Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú. Fondo Editorial, 2013) Danón, Laura
Intentional Attributions to Animals without Language: Aspectuality and Referential Opacity”. It is generally accepted that intentional attributions are referentially opaque. But, as it is also stressed in the literature, referential opacity introduces difficulties to those who defend the attribution of intentionalmental states to non-human animals. In this paper: i) I identify one of these difficulties –which I call the problem of nonsense–; ii) I offer an answer to that problem. In order to accomplish ii), I begin by examining which are the behavioral and representational requisites that a creature has to satisfy so that our mental states attributions to it are referentially opaque but, at the same time, avoid the problem of nonsense. Secondly, I offer some empirical examples of non-human animals which seem to follow such requirements.
(Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú. Fondo Editorial, 2013) Palacio, Marta
Levinas’ standpoint in the hermeneutic turn: language as ethics”. This paper develops Emmanuel Levinas’ conceptions about language and its placein the linguistic-hermeneutic turn of contemporary philosophy. It examines the relations with the authors associated to this turn (Heidegger, Gadamer, Ricoeurand Derrida) due to the importance given to language and, at the same time, it sets him apart from them for his original ethical transmutation of language. This paper also considers the main philosophical notions by which Levinas treats the topic of language: desire, diachrony, the said and the saying, trace, absence, no-indifference, otherness.
(Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú. Fondo Editorial, 2013) Berrón, Manuel
The Cognitive Role of φαινόμενα and its Scientific Use in Aristotle’s Treatises of Science”. We examine a classical discussion about the meaning of the term φαινόμενα in Aristotle. We criticize G. E. L. Owen’s interpretation who identifies its meaning with that of opinion (ἔνδοξα). Based on Aristotle’s treatises of science we propound another interpretation about this topic. Thus, we may emphasize the cognitive role that φαινόμενα have; for this, we highlight the functionthat they have while there are source of the knowledge of principles (cf. APr. I 30) as well as that they are judges of theoretical proposal with which they are in contradiction. In effect, one of the problems to be resolved is how is it possible that a contradiction exists between the principles of a science and the φαινόμενα.
(Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú. Fondo Editorial, 2013) Lavagnino, Nicolás
Ontological Mislocations', Modes of Conciousness and History: Indiscernibles, Displacement and Horizons of Possibility in the Philosophy of Arthur Danto”. In this article my purpose is to trace the links between three key elements in Arthur Danto’s philosophy: first, the capital consideration, for philosophical purposes, of human beings as ens representans, departing from the elucidation of a type of cognitive episode that Danto called basic”. Secondly,I am concerned with the recurring appeal to a plane of consciousness that supports a dual characterization in terms of the pair inside/outside and enables alogical space that is characteristic of philosophy as a reflective mode. Finally, I will treat a form of cognitive failure that Danto considered fundamental to the philosophical perspective, which leads to a specific type of restructuring of our ordinary system of beliefs. What I contend is that in Danto’s philosophical system these three elements become intelligible from the postulation of an effectual background that the author calls objective historical structure”, which is characterized in terms of the horizons of possibility and impossibility that it delineates. These figures of historical-temporal possibility and impossibility constitute the matrix of historicity itself and also contribute decisively to shaping the permanent nucleus of dantean philosophical concerns.
