(Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú, 2014) Ayo, Diego
Did the new Bolivian Constitution of 2009 influence a change on its democratic model? The thesis of the article claims that as a result of how the Constitution elaboration process was carried out on a frame of certain historical conditions, the product elaborated –The Constitution- by the Constituent Assembly had little substantial change in contrast to former Constitutions. Historical constrains of the Bolivian economy and the polarization of the actors involved on the elaboration process of the new Constitution had a great influence to prevent a substantially different new one. Progressive’s elements were introduced as a matter of result of the Bolivian revolution as Human Rights, Plurinationality, and Regional Autonomies, but certain constitutional prerogatives remained unchanged to preserve the status quo. The presence of corporatists, rentist and statist actors has been a trend along Bolivian history, which does allow the reproduction of the internal political relationships of the Bolivian model and inhibits the possibility of a substantial change or re-foundation. Furthermore, the pos-contitutional situation will consolidate a democracy that hardly would break the historical constrains thatrules its hybrid character.
(Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú, 2014) Mas Castillo, Luis
The article tries to explain the performance of peruvian incumbent parties in the immediate electoral process after their term. To do this, the limitations of two possible explanations are explored: retrospective voting and party institutionalization. Against this, the article proposes that, to explain the peruvian government parties poor performance, it is necessary to stressed the importance of the party leader and the presidential candidate. These are key factors that can affect the electoral chances of the Peruvian ruling party in a high caudillism.
(Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú, 2014) Del Águila, Alicia
This article presents a comparative analysis of the development of the citizenship and theright to vote concepts during the XIX century, in Andean countries’ constitutions, specifically in Bolivia, Ecuador and Peru. In a particular way, the question about the inclusion of the indigenous people in Peru and Bolivia was medullary in the constituent discussions, and was resolved in many ways in both countries: in Bolivia, the debate fluctuated around many solutions until the imposition of the decree for the restriction of the right to vote just for literate people on the decade of 1840 (excluding the big indigenous majority), while in Peru, that restriction would not have been implemented until 1896.Debate processes and redefinitions have not existes in Ecuador: since the first constitution, it was established the requirement of knowing read and write to exercise citizenship. The differences between Ecuador and the other two cases is related with socioeconomic and political processes, specifically the regional conflicts that difficult the consolidation of a national unity, and the relation between indigenous and plantations since the beginning of the XIX century in Ecuador. More precisely, this article tries to situate the constitutional and legislative solutions in more wide political debates, as well as the social and economic changes that they have been generating.
(Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú, 2014) Lansberg-Rodríguez, Daniela Melaré
The present paper seeks to establish some relationships between political regimes and constitutional design, putting into debate the notion of the Arab Spring and its extent to explain the regimes changes and authoritarian breakdown. This is why topics as the scope of political participation in constitutional processes and the context of constitutional drafting are reviewed on the lights of the dataset of the Comparative Constitutional Project. The article is divided in five main parts. Firstly, it is contextualized the Arab Spring centered in the process of decision making and the actors related to the process of constitutional design. In the second place, the notions of majority constitutions and constitution compromises are turning in a debate. In the third place, a review of comparative studies about constitutions is presented by emphasize the work of Ackerman and Arato. In the fourth part, the data collected from de Comparative Constitution Project and the Economist Intelligence Unit is presented.Finally, some conclusions are elaborated.
(Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú, 2014) Colomer, Josep M.
A favorable condition for good governance is that elected presidents obtain the support of both the median voter and the median legislator. Several electoral rules are evaluated for their results in 111 presidential and 137 congressional elections in 18 Latin American countries during the current democratic periods. The frequency of median voter’s or Condorcet-winner presidents appears to be higher under rules with a second-round runoff than under simple plurality rule. The victory of Condorcet-loser or the most rejected candidate is discarded under majority runoff rule. More than half of democratic presidents have not belonged to the median voter’s party in the presidential or the congressional elections. Many of them have faced wide popular and political opposition and entered into inter-institutional conflict.
(Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú, 2014) Vela, Estelí; Ruiz, Gabriela; García, Sebastián; Roca, Pablo
This article discusses the use of the mechanism of parliamentary control of interpellation to ministers in the Peruvian case, with the objective of stablish which factors determine the effectives of opposition groups to approve the motions of interpellations they present during the post- Fujimori goverrnments of Alejandro Toledo, Alan García and Ollanta Humala (2001-2013). Taking into account the size, discipline and the number of motions presented, this research argues that the most effective parliamentary groups have high levels of discipline and present a reasonable number of motions, in relation to their capacity to approve them. The levels of discipline and effectiveness of each parliamentary group were calculate through the recompilation ofdata from 85 motions and 36 debates about the admission of the process.