¿Es correcto que los operadores de justicia determinen la misma pena para autores y cómplices primarios en el delito de colusión?
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2023-04-18
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Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú
Abstract
El presente trabajo académico posee como finalidad cuestionarnos si es adecuado
que los operadores de justicia determinen la misma pena para autores y cómplices
primarios en el delito de colusión, ya que por su naturaleza bilateral, existen
mínimamente dos implicados -servidor o funcionario público e interesado- en donde
el primero tendrá el título de autor y el segundo de cómplice primario.
Ahora bien, es relevante destacar que, para establecer el quantum de pena en un
hecho ilícito, se debe de asociar la afectación del bien jurídico y el acto ilícito,
respetando los principios de proporcionalidad e igualdad. En el caso del delito que
analizamos, solo el servidor o funcionario público pueden afectar directamente y con
mayor intensidad el bien jurídico, pues la protección de este bien jurídico está en la
esfera de este último, dado que tiene un deber especial que lo diferencia de los demás
sujetos.
Por otro lado, tras un análisis jurisprudencial sobre la determinación de pena del delito
de colusión, se advierte que las decisiones judiciales carecen de predictibilidad,
generando inseguridad jurídica. Por lo que, evidenciando este aspecto, consideramos
que, aunque erróneamente se interprete que artículo 25 del Código Penal establece
que el autor y el cómplice primario deben tener la misma pena concreta, los autores
deben tener mayor reproche penal que los interesados, ello en marco del artículo 45
del Código Penal y de los principios de proporcionalidad e igualdad.
The purpose of this academic work is to question whether it is appropriate that the operators of justice determine the same penalty for perpetrators and primary accomplices in the crime of collusion, since due to its bilateral nature, there are at least two parties involved, public servant or official and interested party, where the former will have the title of perpetrator and the latter of primary accomplice. Now, it is relevant to point out that, in order to establish the quantum of punishment in an illicit act, the affectation of the legal right and the illicit act must be associated, respecting the principles of proportionality and equality. In the case of the crime we are analyzing, only the public servant or official directly and excessively affects the legal good, since the protection of this legal good is in the sphere of the latter, given that he has a special duty that differentiates him from the other subjects. On the other hand, after a jurisprudential analysis on the determination of the penalty for the crime of collusion, it is noticed that judicial decisions lack predictability, generating legal insecurity. Therefore, evidencing this aspect, we consider that, although it is erroneously interpreted that article 25 of the Criminal Code establishes that the perpetrator and the primary accomplice must have the same specific penalty, the perpetrators must have a greater criminal reproach than the interested parties, in the framework of article 45 of the Criminal Code and the principles of proportionality and equality.
The purpose of this academic work is to question whether it is appropriate that the operators of justice determine the same penalty for perpetrators and primary accomplices in the crime of collusion, since due to its bilateral nature, there are at least two parties involved, public servant or official and interested party, where the former will have the title of perpetrator and the latter of primary accomplice. Now, it is relevant to point out that, in order to establish the quantum of punishment in an illicit act, the affectation of the legal right and the illicit act must be associated, respecting the principles of proportionality and equality. In the case of the crime we are analyzing, only the public servant or official directly and excessively affects the legal good, since the protection of this legal good is in the sphere of the latter, given that he has a special duty that differentiates him from the other subjects. On the other hand, after a jurisprudential analysis on the determination of the penalty for the crime of collusion, it is noticed that judicial decisions lack predictability, generating legal insecurity. Therefore, evidencing this aspect, we consider that, although it is erroneously interpreted that article 25 of the Criminal Code establishes that the perpetrator and the primary accomplice must have the same specific penalty, the perpetrators must have a greater criminal reproach than the interested parties, in the framework of article 45 of the Criminal Code and the principles of proportionality and equality.
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Delitos de los funcionarios--Legislación--Perú, Autoría penal--Perú, Cómplices
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