(Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú, 2019-10-03) Guillén Hernández, Renzo Alonso
This text tries to address the phenomenon of corruption, from the case of the "Cuellos Blancos del Puerto" from a novel approach of state capture that has the purpose of the Co-State Reconfiguration of the State (RCdE), based on structural factors and the specific particularity of the actors in the network and their activities demonstrated in the empirical evidence; In order to sustain this approach, a conceptual analysis of the notions of organized crime as opposed to that of illicit networks is carried out; the one of corrupt influences and capture of the State for which a brief review of the theories that support these phenomena is made. Thus, the text offers a formal response to a phenomenon of which very little is known and even less is analyzed: it is a first approximation, which is expected to generate more complex insights in other investigations.
(Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú, 2019-10-03) Martinez Encarnación, Kenyi
Currently, Odebrecht is the most emblematic case of corruption in Latin America, involving dozens of politicians, businessmen and public works, including Peru and Mexico. However, the problem is not only about corruption, but it is behind a little known system, where the concern has to do with the "rules of the game" and their "players". Therefore, this article aims to explain why Odebrecht was able to influence Peruvian and Mexican states’ decisions about awarding public contracts. In that line, it is argued that they were for three reasons. First, their timely delivery was attractive to politicians, because they were effective in finishing the works before they finished their term; and, therefore, they can inaugurate them with an additional incentive ("good side of the company"). Second, another factor was its influence on the State, because they created a corruption net with the highest levels of government through electoral financing, bribes, lobbies and local constructions to win tenders ("dark side of the company"). In particular, electoral financing was key, because it creates the basis for later building a dangerous network in order to seek more power in politics through money. Third, a final factor was institutional weakness, because the Brazilian firm took advantage of a context of "tailor" laws that not only avoided audits and accountability, but also facilitated corruption as if they were made to the measures of the "client ". Finally, it explains these three factors from two megaprojects in Peru and Mexico: Metro de Lima Line 1 and Miguel Hidalgo Tula I Refinery.
(Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú, 2019-10-03) Jaramillo, Cristhian
Between 2014 and 2015, 19 of 25 Peruvian regional authorities were being investigated for activities related to corruption. At the end of 2018, 10 of the 19 involved were tried with custodial sentences as a result of their illegal actions. But, despite this apparent effectiveness at the judicial level, certain cases with a significant number of reports and a similar background to those convicted escaped the sentences against them.Thus, the question addressed in this paper is: what variables explain the evasion of effective sentences in processes linked to corruption by subnational governments? The investigation focuses on the figure of the regional governor (formerly regional president), the crimes for which is accused and the judicial outcome between 2015 and 2018. For this, a comparative study of Tumbes and Callao cases was made, which share interesting similarities such as the imputed crimes, lack of a significant budget and the absence of media nationalization during 2014 and later years.The results of the investigation show the presence of two variables: state efficiency and the sophistication of criminal network. The combination of both is what distinguishes judicial differences in both cases, highlighting how can be generalized and analyzed for the creation of policies in favor of the fight against corruption.
