Derecho PUCP. Núm. 79 (2017)

URI permanente para esta colecciónhttp://54.81.141.168/handle/123456789/179988

Tabla de Contenido
Sección Principal
  • Neoconstitucionalismo y argumentación jurídica García Figueroa, Alfonso; 9-32
  • Desafíos para la filosofía del derecho del Siglo XXI Ródenas, Ángeles; 33-46
  • El formalismo jurídico: un cotejo entre Jori y Schauer Pintore, Anna; 47-75
  • Gracia y justicia: el lugar de la equidad Ruiz Miguel, Alfonso; 77-98
  • Las presunciones hominis y las inferencias probatórias Aguiló Regla, Josep; 99-110
  • Sobre la pobreza cultural de una práctica (judicial) sin teoría Ibáñez, Perfecto Andrés; 111-126
  • Intuicionismo y razonamiento moral Lariguet, Guillermo; 127-150
  • Emoción, racionalidad y argumentación en la decisión judicial Sotomayor Trelles, José Enrique; 151-190
  • Subsidiariedad y tribunales internacionales de derechos humanos: ¿deferencia hacia los estados o división cooperativa del trabajo? Iglesias Vila, Marisa; 191-222
  • Derecho transnacional o la necesidad de superar el monismo y el dualismo en la teoría jurídica Turégano Mansilla, Isabel; 223-265
  • Exigibilidad de los derechos sociales: algunas aportaciones desde la teoría del derecho Pacheco Rodríguez, Miguel Ángel; 267-286

    • Miscelánea
  • Derechos humanos en tiempos de inseguridad ciudadana: experiencia canadiense a la luz del derecho interamericano Provost, René; 289-309
  • La violencia de las leyes: el uso de la fuerza y la criminalización de protestas socioambientales en el Perú Saldaña Cuba, José; Portocarrero Salcedo, Jorge; 311-352

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    Temasearch.filters.applied.operator.equals: search.filters.subject.Positivismo jurídico

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    • No hay miniatura disponible
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      Derecho transnacional o la necesidad de superar el monismo y el dualismo en la teoría jurídica
      (Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú. Fondo Editorial, 2017-11-14) Turégano Mansilla, Isabel
      Law in a transnational context loses the features with which it has been configured since modernity. Classic distinctions between national and international, public and private, substantive and procedural, legal and political, social and legal lose their rigidity in a context of norms, orders, institutions and agents that interact and overlap in diverse and changing ways. A legal theory capable of explaining and evaluating this overflowing legal reality is lacking. A theoretical reflection on international law is not enough. Transnationalism appeals to a plurality of legal actors and spaces that interact to create, interpret and enforce rules which they mutually identify with. Transnationalism does not only refer to the global or the supranational, but to the interdependence of both with the local and transit spaces. And this translates into a change of focus or perspective that is required of each legal agent: management of the interrelation between diverse orders aimed to create spaces for approach, contestation and innovation is a normative requirement and it must be weighed against other legal values. Concepts to which legal theory must focus its attention change their meaning. The work refers to four of those concepts that I consider essential: social group or community, relations between orders and interlegality, coercion and normative diversity. The last part of the paper addresses the way in which these necessary changes have a place in our theories elaborated from the perspective of the great traditions of legal philosophy. What legal positivism, socio-legal theory and legal realism have in common might be an appropriate approach to the review of our discipline.
    • No hay miniatura disponible
      ÍtemTexto completo enlazado
      Desafíos para la filosofía del derecho del Siglo XXI
      (Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú. Fondo Editorial, 2017-11-14) Ródenas, Ángeles
      This paper shows a mismatch between a real and pressing demand for a philosophical analysis that allows us to explain the emergence of new phenomena in law, and the limited supply of theoretical tools to satisfy this demand by the traditional model of positivistic science of law. After an initial diagnosis of a mismatch between supply and demand, the resistance of legal positivism to accept practical rationality stands out as a core problem of the traditional model of positivistic science of law and the viability of this way of rationality is defended. The paper concludes with a proposal for the reinvention of the philosophy of law of the 21st century that incorporates new objectives and rethinks its method.