Journal of CENTRUM Cathedra. Vol. 04, Issue 01

URI permanente para esta colecciónhttp://54.81.141.168/handle/123456789/194730

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JCC Volume 4 - Issue 1 - 2011
  • A Model to Improve the Estimation of Baseline Retail Sales Jetta, Kurt; Rengifo, Erick W; 1
  • Conjoint Analysis and MDS Approach to Brand Improvement of an Aerosol Product Charles, Vincent; Kumar, Mukesh; Anad, Tulika; 2
  • U.S. News Spillover Effects: Sectoral Evidence Nguyen, Anh Tho Thi; 3
  • Periodic Integration and Cointegration of U.S. Stock Prices, Dividends, and Interest Rates: A New Test of the Present Value Model Shirwani, Hassan; Delcoure, Natalya; Wilbratte, Barry J; 4
  • Case-Study of Internationalization in Peruvian SMEs Vásquez, Fernando; Doloriert, Clair H; 5
  • Earnings Management and Contests for Control: An Analysis of European Family Firms Jara, Mauricio; López-Iturriaga, Félix J; 6
  • Management in Emerging versus Developed Countries: A Comparative Study from an Indian Perspective Nigam, Roli; Zhang, Su; 7

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    20111

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    Autorsearch.filters.applied.operator.equals: search.filters.author.López-Iturriaga, Félix J.Temasearch.filters.applied.operator.equals: search.filters.subject.Discretionary accruals

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      Earnings Management and Contests for Control: An Analysis of European Family Firms
      (Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú. CENTRUM, 2011) Jara, Mauricio; López-Iturriaga, Félix J.
      In this paper, the influence of large shareholders on earnings management in family-owned firms is analyzed using a sample of firms from nine European countries. How contests for control for the largest shareholder and the existence of a controlling coalition in family-owned firms affect earnings management is considered. It was found that increases in the contestability of control by the largest shareholder reduce earnings management in family-owned firms. The results also show that in firms in which the largest shareholder is a family member, a second or third family shareholder increases discretionary accruals.