Game theory and the law: rule interactive interpretation

dc.contributor.author	Flores Borda, Guillermo
dc.date.accessioned	2018-11-12T23:38:14Z
dc.date.available	2018-11-12T23:38:14Z
dc.date.issued	2014
dc.identifier.uri	http://revistas.pucp.edu.pe/index.php/actualidadmercantil/article/view/13577/14201
dc.description.abstract	Until this point, most research works have focused on how bad design of legal rules ay lead to opportunistic strategic behavior. This paper intends to show that even well-designed rules may lead to opportunistic strategic behavior due to bad communication of the “reasonability” of the legal rule, as well as to provide a definition of “reasonability” (i.e., good design) of the legal rules.This paper also intends to show how the personal interpretation of each player with respect to the strategy set and payoff structure of a legal rule impacts social interac- tion producing suboptimal social outcomes.	en_US
dc.description.abstract	El artículo no presenta resumen	es_ES
dc.format	application/pdf
dc.language.iso	spa
dc.publisher	Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú	es_ES
dc.relation.ispartof	urn:issn:2523-2851
dc.rights	info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess	es_ES
dc.rights.uri	http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0	*
dc.source	Revista de Actualidad Mercantil; Núm. 3 (2014)	es_ES
dc.title	Game theory and the law: rule interactive interpretation	es_ES
dc.type	info:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.type.other	Artículo
dc.subject.ocde	https://purl.org/pe-repo/ocde/ford#5.05.00
dc.publisher.country	PE

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