Jara, MauricioLópez-Iturriaga, Félix J.2023-07-212023-07-212011https://repositorio.pucp.edu.pe/index/handle/123456789/194787In this paper, the influence of large shareholders on earnings management in family-owned firms is analyzed using a sample of firms from nine European countries. How contests for control for the largest shareholder and the existence of a controlling coalition in family-owned firms affect earnings management is considered. It was found that increases in the contestability of control by the largest shareholder reduce earnings management in family-owned firms. The results also show that in firms in which the largest shareholder is a family member, a second or third family shareholder increases discretionary accruals.enginfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0Corporate controlDiscretionary accrualsEarnings managementFamily firmsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/articlehttps://purl.org/pe-repo/ocde/ford#5.02.04