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THE ARMY OF PERU AND THE TUPAC AMARU REVOLT, 1780-1783

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During the period of Spanish American independence the Vice-royalty of Peru was considered a bulwark of Royalism due to the presence of an army which had been greatly strengthened by Viceroy José Fernando de Abascal y Sousa (1808-1816)¹. Some have viewed Abascal's efforts as the culmination of a program of military reform which began during the rule of Viceroy Manuel de Amat y Junient (1761-1776). Upon the outbreak of the Seven Years' War, Amat had created a large militia in Peru, an action which allegedly enabled the kingdom to withstand the furious Indian revolts which broke out during the period 1780-1783, the most famous of which was that led by José Gabriel Condorcanqui, or Tupac Amaru II².

A brief summary of the structure, distribution, and function of the Army of Peru prior to 1780 will help to explain the changes taking place after that time. It should first be recognized that Peru's enormous size, ten times that of Spain itself, made defense extremely difficult. The development of Peru's power as a vice-royalty rested on a civil and religious, rather than a military, base³. The small Austrian army's primary duty was to defend Lima, the capital city located on the central coast just east of the harbor of Callao, which served as the *entrepot* for all Pacific coast shipping and for shipments of silver overseas. Yet foreign military observers and Spanish officers alike agreed that the city was

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- 1 John Lynch, *The Spanish-American Revolutions, 1808-1826* (New York, 1973), p. 126.
 - 2 *Memoria de Gobierno del Virrey Amat*. Edición y estudio preliminar de Vicente Rodríguez Casado y Florentino Pérez Embid. (Seville, 1947), p. liii; Alfredo Saenz-Rico Urbina, *El Virrey Amat*. 2 vols. (Barcelona, 1967), pp. 238-239. Most historians reject the concept of Amat's militarization of Peru. See, for example, Rubén Vargas Ugarte, *Historia del Perú. Virreinato. (Siglo XVIII), 1700-1790*. (Lima, 1956), p. 324, note 6.
 - 3 Richard Koneztko, *Sud und Mittelamerika I: Die Indianerkulturen Altamerikas und die Portugiesische Kolonialherrschaft* (Frankfurt, 1965), 157-164.

never well-defended during the seventeenth century⁴. Factors of geography—contrary winds, shifting sandbars, an arid coastal desert, and the great distance from Europe acted to keep seaborne invaders away⁵.

Because the eighteenth century was one of almost uninterrupted European warfare, with several conflicts having American theaters of combat, the Spanish Bourbons paid closer attention to New World defenses than had their predecessors. Two separate events in Peru, British Admiral George Anson's capture of the northern port of Paita in 1740 and the revolt of Juan Santos Atahualpa in the *Gran Pajonals*, east of Lima resulted in the appointment of a military viceroy, José Antonio Manso de Velasco (1745-1761), who began the practice of appointing military as corregidores, or local officials, in the frontier provinces, and establishing two small presidios, or forts, in Tarma and Jauja. Besides, Manso rebuilt the Callao fortress which had been destroyed during the 1746 earthquake and regulated the garrison there⁶.

Under the Austrias defense was maintained by detachments of Spanish regular troops which rotated in overseas service and *fijo*, or fixed battalions, raised and trained in America, which were permanent to particular regions. The Fixed Battalion of Callao had been established during the seventeenth century. Detachments regularly were sent to the presidios of Chile leaving Lima defended by about 275 soldiers. Peru and Upper Peru together had 1362 fixed soldiers in 1771, charged with defense of the larger coastal towns and interior capitals⁷.

From the late sixteenth century it had been traditional to supplement

4 Jorge Juan and Antonio de Ulloa, *Noticias secretas de América sobre el estado naval, militar y político de los reynos del Perú y provincias de Quito, costas de Nueva Granada y Chile*. 2 vols. in one (London, 1826), I, 43-49, 122-123, 164-166, 178, 204-205.

5 Jorge Basadre, *La multitud, la ciudad, y el campo en la historia del Perú*. 2nd ed. (Lima, 1947), p. 113.

6 Anson's capture of Paita is described in Rubén Vargas Ugarte, *Historia del Perú*, 189-193. The Juan Santos revolt is recounted in Francisco A. Loayza, *Juan Santos, el invencible* (Lima, 1942).

7 AGI: Indiferente General (IG) 74 Estado que manifiesta el actual destino y fuerza de la Tropa que hay en América. Madrid, January 8, 1771. The vast majority of regular troops were located in the circum-Caribbean region where the threat of an English attack was most pronounced; Puerto Rico had 4,682 troops while New Spain had 6,196. The presence of eleven Portuguese regiments in Brazil required that 4,682 soldiers be stationed in the Plata. AGI: AL 1490 Extracto de la revista del Batallón del Callao. Callao, December 1, 1758.

fixed units with militiamen, or citizen-soldiers, who were organized into units during times of emergency. Residents of Lima were grouped according to social status or trade guild affiliation and organized into companies since the Crown was unwilling to provide funds to train and equip these units. Generally these were sponsored by municipal corporations which had a vested interest in seeing the capital defended from attack. In Peru, however, the expense of calling out the *limeño* militia was prohibitive because the companies lacked arms, uniforms, and training. For this reason it was not mobilized between Anson's attack in 1740 and the outbreak of war in 1762⁸.

Because of the low status and lack of attention to military affairs, a military career was unpopular with most Peruvians. Viceroy spoke frequently of the need to make forced levies in the interior to bring the fixed battalion to strength⁹. Persons joining the unit did so, according to Jorge Juan and Antonio de Ulloa, only in order to exercise their military privileges and were even allowed to reside in Lima to continue their employments¹⁰. Soldiers in the militia and fixed battalion were largely drawn, for these reasons, from the lowest social elements of Lima: Negroes, mixed-bloods, and transients, whose low birth allowed them no other opportunities¹¹.

This being the case, one can believe the statement of Alfonso Santa, the assessor of the Royal Tobacco Monopoly in Lima, that fear and hatred gripped most limeños upon hearing of the declaration of war with Great Britain announced in Peru in May, 1762, since it suggested the likelihood of military service¹².

Thanks largely to the dynamic Catalan Viceroy Amat this apprehension was soon dispelled. He began by improving the administration of the Callao fortress to protect the capital from surprise attack¹³. Amat's primary achievement, however, was in securing the support of the creole nobility of Lima in financing the raising, arming, and outfitting of a militia, both in the capital

8 Manuel Fuentes, ed., *Memorias de los virreyes que han gobernado el Perú durante el tiempo del coloniaje español*. 6 vols. (Lima, 1859), IV, 283-284.

9 *Memorias de los Virreyes*, IV, 110-112, 267-272.

10 *Noticias secretas*, I, 163-166.

11 *Descripción del virreinato del Perú. Crónica inédita del comienzo del siglo XVIII*. Edición, pologo, y notas de Boleslao Lewin. (Rosario, 1958), pp. 41-42, 69.

12 Cited in Saenz-Rico Urbina, *El Virrey Amat*, pp. 215-216.

13 Saenz-Rico Urbina, *El virrey Amat*, I, 213-278.

and elsewhere, which Charles III wished to assume a larger share of defensive responsibility. By providing wealthy creoles with officerships, military privileges, and membership in the military orders, he helped create a native officer corps, setting a personal example by creating and taking command of a militia cavalry Regiment of the Nobility whose first company was composed exclusively of persons holding Titles of Castile¹⁴. With this leadership, status-conscious members of the lower social groups rushed to the colors also.

The strength of the Army of Peru increased dramatically during the period 1760-1780, due largely to the militia buildup. Within a two-year period, 1761-1763, the militia buildup caused a tenfold increase in the size of the army to 50,000 men. Thereafter, provincial unit formations allegedly doubled this number of soldiers by 1773. The continued English presence after 1763 in the Malvinas (Falkland) Islands off Tierra del Fuego in the South Atlantic required that units be established throughout Peru to provide a defense against seaborne attack and internal rioting¹⁵.

There are several reasons why the militia created by Amat failed to develop into an effective tactical force prior to 1780. First, Amat's successor, Manuel de Guirior (1776-1780) neglected the militia. Nor did the Crown seem preoccupied with the military situation. With the outbreak of the North American Revolution in 1776 Peru was in less immediate danger of an attack than previously. Moreover, the creation of the Viceroyalty of La Plata and Chile's elevation to a separate captaincy-general in 1778 further reduced Peruvian defensive responsibilities. Thus, the Caroline reformers failed to implement the provisions of the Cuban Militia Regulation. Unlike the situation in New Spain, Peru did not receive a veteran inspector-general or a command and staff group to train the militia until after 1776 and the majority of these militia units failed to attain a provincial, or disciplined footing as established in the Spanish regulations of 1734¹⁶.

Secondly, the reform measures took place in a deteriorating climate of

14 AGI: AL 1490 Compendio de las Prevenciones que el Excelentísimo Senor Don Manuel de Amat hizo para la defensa de la Guerra contra Portugal, e Inglaterra. Lima, November 10, 1763, 23 ff.

15 Rodríguez Casado, *Memoria de Amat*, pp. 713-714; Saenz-Rico Urbina, *El virrey Amat*, 221-234; Guillermo Céspedes del Castillo, *Lima y Buenos Aires* (Sevilla, 1947), pp. 85-86.

16 AGI: AL 654 Reglamento sobre las milicias del Virreynato del Perú. Lima, August 31, 1766.

opinion towards limeños, beginning with the arrival of the visitation in 1777¹⁷. Areche's concern with economy resulted in certain enlisted men from the fixed battalion being given acting officerships and attached as trainers to the militia when war again broke out with England in 1779. This may have served to reduce creole enthusiasm for militia service from its former level.

Third, the effect on Peru of the transfer of the Audiencia of Charcas to the Plata was to cause a drop in government revenues as a result of the loss of the rich silver-mining districts of Upper Peru¹⁸. This, along with a generally deteriorating economic situation, had the effect of forcing a reduction in military budgets, from 89.5 per cent of total government expenditures in 1763 to 36.52 per cent in 1777, an absolute decrease of fifty-three per cent. For this reason, there were inadequate resources to further train the militia. Moreover, much of the budget went to other areas in the form of *situados*, or military subsidies, to provide for their defense and to help bolster their developing economies¹⁹.

Finally, Areche's presence in Peru after 1777 acted to affect the trajectory of military reform. A believer in fiscal conservatism and an opponent of the creole elite of Lima, the visitor viewed the militia created by Amat as part of the creole establishment which had captured Viceroy Guirior and through him sought to defeat the visitation. Thus, when Peruvian military officers reported the deteriorating military situation to authorities in Lima and Madrid, Areche recommended to José de Gálvez that these measures be forestalled²⁰. His special target was the militia. Complaining that Peru had more militia officers than Spain itself, he told the Crown that the officer corps was the preserve of "Men of Affairs—rich landowners and merchants who wear the braid and epaulets of soldiers—without possessing military virtues²¹". Because these men lived in Lima

17 Leon G. Campbell, "A Creole Establishment: Creole Domination of the Audiencia of Lima During the Late Eighteenth Century", *Hispanic American Historical Review*, 52: 1 (February, 1972), 1-25, and "The Changing Racial and Administrative Structure of the Army of Peru Under the Later Bourbons", *The Americas*, (July, 1975).

18 Céspedes del Castillo, *Lima y Buenos Aires*, 81, 97-130, 145-146.

19 Céspedes del Castillo, *Lima y Buenos Aires*, 86-88, 103-104.

20 AGI: AL 658 Relación del proyecto formado por el Inspector General de las tropas veteranas y de milicias del distrito de este Virreynato del Perú. Lima, July 31, 1778, ff. 1-16; AGI: AL 1493 Guirior to Gálvez, Lima, July 20, 1778, ff. 1-2.

21 AGI: AL 1084 Areche to Gálvez, Lima, April 12, 1780, ff. 1-28.

and officered imaginary companies in the provinces he viewed them as a potential danger to his reform program.

Opposition to the visitation was not long in surfacing. In 1777 Areche's efforts to increase tax levels had produced a revolt of mulatto militiamen in Lambayeque, while customshouses were burned and tax collectors attacked in Cuzco and Arequipa in 1780. In certain cases militiamen were instrumental in leading the revolts or were considered sufficiently sympathetic to them to prevent local officials from calling out their units²². In the case of Arequipa, Areche believed that large landowners, affected by the increase in sales taxes from four to six per cent, had influenced others to revolt against the director of the local customs. He was also convinced that the situation had deteriorated as a result of Viceroy Guirior's passive response to the insurrection²³. Guirior held that the necessity of their guarding Lima prevented him from sending units from the fixed Battalion of Callao to provincial areas to suppress these rebellions and urged local corregidores to peacefully settle the issue. As a result, Areche spent much of his energies trying to convince Gálvez to replace the viceroy and to remove his creole confederates from positions of power.

By 1780 viceregal officials in Peru were concerned about the possibility of future tax revolts among the middle groups but do not seem to have concerned themselves about the prospect of Indian rebellion. Guirior rejected military recommendations that a permanent force of militiamen be activated in the interior parts of the kingdom to assure public safety on the grounds of expense²⁴. Similarly, nothing was done in response to the many rumors of Indian revolts which had allegedly been planned for 1777. It appears that the Crown largely accepted the docile nature of the Indians and felt that certain amounts of violence were characteristic of Indian societies. Authorities hardly noticed that the declining economic situation since mid-century had required corregidores to increase the number of *repartimientos*, or forced sales made to the

22 Boleslao Lewin, *La rebelión de Túpac Amaru y los orígenes de la independencia de Hispano-América*. 3ed. ed., revised. (Buenos Aires, 1967), 131-189.

23 Vicente Palacio Atard, *Areche y Guirior; observaciones sobre el fracaso de una visita al Perú*. (Seville, 1946).

24 Biblioteca del Palacio Real, Madrid: Manuscritos de America (BPR: MA) vol. 2855. Proyecto del Coronel D. Demetrio Egaña, Caballero de la Orden de Santiago, para la seguridad interior de las provincias del Reyno del Perú y resguardo de sus puertos principales. Lima, October 11, 1779, pp. 212-254.

Indians under their control, and thereby had reduced these people to a desperate situation. The paramount nature of the visitation and the effort to increase revenues can be seen in the Caroline decision to replace Guirior with Lieutenant General Augustín de Jáuregui y Aldecoa in mid-1780 because of the former's opposition to Areche.

The events taking place near Cuzco in November, 1780 are wellknown and need only be summarily recounted here. José Gabriel Condorcanqui, a *cacique*, or local Indian chief of Tinta, a small town located in the Vilcamayu Valley about eighty miles south of Cuzco in the central highlands, captured the corregidor of the district, Colonel Antonio de Arriaga. Taking the name Tupac Amaru II, stemming from his lineal descentance from the last Inca ruler of Peru, the rebel leader spoke out strongly against the repartimiento and the *mita*, or forced labor service which the corregidores required the Indians to perform in the silver mines of Upper Peru. These practices, he asserted, reduced the Indians to a condition of indentured servitude, disrupted family life by forcing migrancy and reducing women to prostitution during their husbands' absences. For these crimes he symbolically tried Arriaga and sentenced him to death. In justifying his actions he called on the King to reform the corregidor system and abolish these abuses²⁵.

The *Grito de Tinta* of November 4 soon developed into the most severe threat to Spanish authority in Peru prior to the coming of independence. At least three aspects of the revolt set it apart from prior insurrections. First, Tupac Amaru was a leader of stature and blessed with considerable charisma, whom even Spanish military officers recognized as a formidable opponent²⁶. Secondly, he cleverly directed his movement against the unpopular Arriaga who had earlier been excommunicated by the Bishop of Cuzco. Third, and most importantly, Tupac Amaru continually asserted the legitimacy of his movement and spoke almost exclusively to non-Indians in order to secure the support of many

25 Lewin, *La rebelión de Túpac Amaru y los orígenes de la independencia de Hispano-América*; Carlos Daniel Valcárcel, *Túpac Amaru, el revolucionario*, (Lima, 1970); Lillian Estelle Fisher, *The Last Inca Revolt, 1780-1783* (Norman, 1966); John H. Rowe, "El movimiento nacional inca del siglo XVIII", *Revista Universitaria*, año XLIII, 107, 2nd. trimestre, (Cuzco, 1954), 17-47.

26 Oscar Cornblit, "Society and Mass Rebellion in Eighteenth Century Peru and Bolivia", in Raymond Carr, ed., *Latin American Affairs*. St. Antony's Papers, no. 22 (Oxford, England, 1970), 24-27.

different sectors of Peruvian society. According to the furious Areche, the mestizo militiamen of Tinta followed him "as if entranced" to the point of garrisoning the Main Square during Arriaga's execution²⁷. Other witnesses attested to a strong creole support for the revolt, perhaps including the influential Bishop José de Moscoso y Peralta²⁸. Amidst this speculation, authorities pondered the proper way to put down the revolt. Events taking place elsewhere supported Areche's fear that the militia might be a liability in cases of internal rebellion sponsored by mixed-bloods²⁹.

Perhaps the gravest obstacle to ending the revolt was the lack of a proper defense in Cuzco. Without waiting for the approval of the corregidor, Fernando Inclán Valdez, two provincial corregidores whose regions had been overrun by the rebels, gathered a group of militiamen and set out for Tinta. On the evening of November 17 this group, consisting of 604 volunteers and 700 loyal Indians, camped in the Main Square of Sangarara, a small village near Tinta, planning to launch an attack the following day. Their approach, however, was noticed by the rebels and at dawn Tupac Amaru attacked at the head of an army estimated at 6,000 men. Although the Spaniards managed to take refuge in a nearby church they refused a rebel offer of safe passage for all Americans. In the fighting which ensued, the church was fired. The fight became a massacre with the Spaniards sustaining heavy casualties. 390 militiamen were killed, a majority of the 576 casualties suffered. The victory gave a renewed impulse to the rebellion as Tupac Amaru's army swelled to 20,000 men³⁰.

Reports emanating from Cuzco indicate the panic which gripped an

27 AGI: AL 1044 del Valle to Gálvez, Cuzco, March 1, 1781, ff. 1-4. An anonymous account of the revolt by a resident of Cuzco began the rumor that he had secured English support also. *Colección documental de la independencia del Perú*. 30 vols. (Lima, 1974), II, part 2, pp. 384-385. A look at the *Parliamentary and Constitutional History of England from the Earliest Period to the Year 1803* (London, 1806-1820), XX, p. 932, indicates that the revolt was discussed in Parliament but no overt plan of assistance was formulated.

28 Valcárcel, *Tupac Amaru*, 204-215; L.E. Fischer, *The Last Incas Revolt*, 49-51; Francisco Loayza, ed. *La verdad Desnuda. Las dos faces de un obispo. Escrita en 1780 por un imparcial religioso* (Lima, 1943), implicates him heavily, and Francisco Loayza, ed., *Estado del Perú* (Lima, 1944), defends his reputation.

29 L.E. Fisher, *The Last Inca Revolt*, 140-171.

30 *Colección documental*, II, part 1, 97-418; part 2, 266-268, 287-289.

unprepared Cuzco. Following receipt of the news of the revolt, a War Council was assembled and at 3:45 a.m. on the morning of November 13 a courier was dispatched to Lima to request troops since the city was unable to defend itself. Apparently the War Council was deeply divided, one group favoring a strong defense of the city and another favoring negotiations with the rebels to forestall an attack. Bishop Moscoso reported that the city lacked arms, ammunition, trained soldiers and suitable officers, since certain of the militia officers on the War Council had fled the city to save their own lives. Because of this, recruitment of officers for the militia was impossible even when these persons were offered full military privileges. Since many of the militiamen were allegedly sympathetic to the aims of the rebellion, Moscoso doubted whether 2,000 trained soldiers would be enough to hold the city in the event of an attack³¹. Moscoso's account of the situation was corroborated by Francisco Laesquilla, the creole corregidor of Chumbivilcas, who felt that a majority of the *Cuzqueños* openly favored the rebels³².

There can be no question but that Cuzco constituted the key to the rebellion's success. Simón Jiménez Villalba, the archdean of the cathedral, in a letter to the regent of the Audiencia of Lima, held that if Cuzco could be preserved the revolt could be defeated, but if it fell "all the Country is the enemy"³³. The initial mobilization of forces in the city indicates the delicacy of orchestrating a defense. The corregidor called up the several caciques of the town in order to hold the loyalties of the local Indian population, but utilized only the Spanish militia Company of Merchants as guards, implying a lack of confidence in the other units or at least a lack of organization. Much of the military leadership in fact seems to have been provided by the Cuzqueño clergy which donated 100,881 pesos to support the war effort, constructed fortifications, and even raised their own militia under the command of Manuel de Mendieta, the dean of the cathedral chapter. My mid-December these efforts were bolstered by the arrival of several provincial corregidores and their retainers, bringing to 3,000 the number of men available to defend the city.

31 *Colección documental*, II, part 2, 275-284, 296-301.

32 Bancroft Library: Documentos sobre Túpac Amaru (BL:TA) Relación de los pasajes acaecidos en esta Ciudad del Cuzco con motivo de la revelión causada por el indio José Gabriel Túpac Amaru. Cuzco, December 3, 1780, ff. 10-20.

33 *Colección documental*, II, part 2, 151-153.

The above conditions dictated an overhaul of the military command in Cuzco. A creole militia officer captured and released by the rebels held that mass support for the rebels was increasing rapidly. Tupac Amaru's army he estimated at nearly 70,000 men, at least 1,000 of whom were creoles and mestizos³⁴. Moreover, the Inca seems to have been unusually aware of events taking place in the city. In an edict delivered to the people of Chichas, Tupac Amaru criticized the *chapetones*, or Peninsular Spaniards who had fled to Cuzco and had attempted to take control of the war effort from the creoles in the city.³⁵ He was apparently aware that temporary military command had been given over to Manuel Villalta, the corregidor of Abancay, who, although a creole, had lived much of his life in Spain and held a colonelcy in the Royal Navy.

When news of the revolt reached Lima on November 24, Jáuregui and his war council acted quickly to prop up Royal authority in Cuzco. Veteran Colonel Gabriel de Avilés was immediately dispatched to the city with 200 soldiers from the militia Regiment of Mulattoes, the most loyal and well-trained of the limeño units. Their training and discipline allowed Avilés to undertake a forced march and reach Cuzco on January 1, 1781. There he reported the city to be in a shambles, defended by no one but a large group of untrained Indian irregulars and their corregidores. Avilés characterized the militia as insolent and unwilling to take orders from any one but the corregidores which required the colonel and his staff to spend an inordinate amount of time on disciplinary matters and ultimately required the jailing of 200 men³⁶.

Although obviously knowledgeable of conditions in Cuzco, Tupac Amaru's desire to secure the voluntary surrender of the city caused him to defer his attack. Only after repeated urgings from his wife Micaela Bastidas did the rebel chief march on Cuzco in late December. Once there, however, Tupac Amaru had his army situated on the heights surrounding the capital. Instead of attacking, he continued to correspond with the bishop and Town Council, defending his actions and seeking an accommodation. Since no attack seemed likely, Villalta was able to dispatch militia from the Spanish Company of Merchants to dislodge the Indians. Wisely using loyal Indians as front-line troops, the Spaniards were

34 Report of militia Colonel Pedro de la Valina in the *Colección documental*, II, part 2, 292, 298.

35 Manuel de Odriozola, ed., *Documentos históricos del Perú*. 10 vols. in 6 (Lima, 1863-1867), I, 42-43.

36 AGI: AL 1483 Avilés to Gálvez, Cuzco, January 28, 1783, ff. 1-3.

able to force the rebels to retreat and allow Avilés' soldiers to enter the city. In early January Tupac Amaru lifted the siege of Cuzco and returned to Tinta to regroup his forces. This indicated the lack of adequate force and organization within the rebel military and proved to be a turning point in the struggle. Shortly afterwards, the Royalist forces mounted an offensive which resulted in the capture of the Inca leader.

Because of his apprehensions regarding the corregidores' control over the militia, Areche sought to take personal command of the war effort in Cuzco. Following receipt of the news of the Sangarara massacre he complained to Gálvez that the Town Council of Cuzco had obstructed the prosecution of the war and that he was leaving immediately for Cuzco as the viceroy's personal representative, the latter being forced to remain in Lima while war was declared against Great Britain³⁷. Areche was piqued that Jáuregui had placed Inspector-General del Valle in command of the second expedition sent to Cuzco instead of himself. He was similarly upset about the lack of support given by the militia officer corps in Lima which uniformly refused to volunteer their companies for service, confirming del Valle's decision to conscript 200 soldiers from the fixed Battalion of Callao and another contingent of mulatto militiamen. Thereafter, Areche was an outspoken foe of the militia, which he called "unarmed gangs lacking any knowledge of tactics and discipline"³⁸. He warned Gálvez that Peruvian creoles were cowards who fled to the cities and the coast following the revolt and would refuse to fight to preserve the kingdom. He called Jáuregui, Moscoso, and del Valle weaklings who desired a negotiated peace rather than a military victory and asked for their immediate replacement³⁹.

It is true that Viceroy Jáuregui sought a peaceful end to the revolt. On December 12 he had issued, without Royal authorization, an edict abolishing the repartimiento in hope that this would defuse the rebellion. Instead, this action seems to have hindered the war effort. It had no visible effect on the rebels, whose demands were broadening rapidly. The edict did, however, threaten the corregidores who in turn controlled the district militia. En route to Cuzco by way

37 AGI: AL 1084 Areche to Gálvez, no. 249, Lima, December 22, 1780, ff. 1-7.

38 AGI: AL 1087 Areche to Gálvez, no. 462, Lima, August 18, 1782, ff. 1-2.

39 AGI: AL 1044 Areche to the Crown, no. 111, Lima, June 25, 1781, f. 1; AGI: AL 1044 no. 150, Areche to Crown, Lima, April 24, 1782, f. 1.

of Inca, Areche and del Valle reported that the corregidores registered their displeasure by refusing to release supplies or soldiers to the expedition, claiming that they were needed for local defense. José del Lagos, the Commissar of War, complained that Cuzqueños also refused to aid the King, hiding mules which were needed for transportation of supplies and refusing to sell them provisions. Del Valle complained that the corregidores would rather see the King's soldiers defeated than lose to the army a single Indian who might owe them a bolt of cloth⁴⁰.

Incensed at this turn of events, Areche moved to reduce the corregidores' authority by quashing Jáuregui's order allowing these officials to call up two militia companies in their district. In a letter to Gálvez he explained that the militia were all employees, retainers, and dependents of the corregidores who used them for their own corrupt purposes; he estimated that a savings of 2.26 million pesos annually might be made by refusing to call up this group. Areche also recommended that in the future the militiamen be paid by the Commissariat of War in Cuzco rather than the corregidores themselves to further reduce these officials' power. Even prior to receiving Gálvez' approval, the visitor notified the corregidores he would not release funds to cover the payment of a callup of provincial militia. This financial leverage gave Areche effective control over the war effort⁴¹.

Upon his arrival in Cuzco, Areche sought to finance the war effort through voluntary means to reduce government expenses to minimum levels. Because the Cuzqueños were less generous in donating to the hated visitor than they were to an external war, an action which could bring them personal rewards, Areche was disdainful of their sacrifices. His refusal to pay the defenders of the Apurímac Bridge outside Cuzco, an action which had permitted the limeño troops to enter the city, aroused considerable bitterness. Moreover, Areche's unwillingness to excuse faithful Indians from tribute payments while they were engaged in the fighting was a serious deterrent to military recruitment and was hotly criticized by army officials. Manuel de Villalta later told del Valle that this caused the

40 AGI: AL 1044 del Valle to Jáuregui, no. 2, Cuzco, September 16, 1781, ff. 1-2; AGI: AL 1044 Lagos to del Valle, no. 16, Cuzco, September 17, 1781, ff. 1-2.

41 *Relaciones de los virreyes*, III, 150-152; AGS: GH 7128 Areche to Gálvez, Cuzco, March 20, 1781, ff. 1-17.

provincianos to avoid military service and suffer punishment rather than enlist. Del Valle told Jáuregui that conditions were so bad that even his edict freeing the Indians from tribute had not aided recruitment and that forced levies provoked terrible violence. He painted a sordid picture of profiteering among the soldiery in Cuzco whom he accused of buying up scarce foodstuffs and selling them at inflated prices.⁴²

Because no threat of a British attack existed, Jáuregui's ability to free fixed troops from Callao to send to Cuzco allowed the mounting of a Royalist offensive. The expedition raised in Cuzco in April, 1781 to march on Tinta indicates the success of the visitor's efforts to personally dominate the war effort. Of the 15,000 soldiers raised in Cuzco, over 14,000 were loyal Indian conscripts, officered by faithful corregidores. With only a few exceptions, the officer corps of the expedition were all veteran Spanish officers, with only the urban militia Company of Merchants chosen to participate. This provided sufficient proof that the militia component of the Army of Peru had been de-emphasized as a tactical branch of the service.

On April 6 this army closed with Tupac Amaru's forces and the rebel leader was captured when an informer disclosed his whereabouts. The Inca leader, his family, and lieutenants were then brought to Cuzco where they were tried and found guilty of sedition. On May 15 the group was horribly executed at Areche's command⁴³.

Far from ending the revolt, however, Royalist military incapacities and Tupac Amaru's death seemed to further fan the flames of rebellion. Under the control of Tupac Amaru's lieutenants and family the revolt spread into Upper Peru and other parts of Spanish America. This extension of the war put an enormous strain on the already overextended logistical capabilities of the Spanish forces. Following Tupac Amaru's capture massive desertion took place in the expeditionary force, which required an eleven-day delay before it could continue to Puno. That city, lying on the northeast bank of Lake Titicaca in Upper Peru, controlled the overland route between Cuzco and the capital of La

42 AGI: AL 1044, Manuel de Villalta to del Valle, no. 5 General Barracks (Cuzco), September 14, 1781; AGI: AL 1044 del Valle to Jáuregui, Cuzco, September 18, 1781, f. 1; AGI: AL 1044 del Valle to Jáuregui, Cuzco, no. 10, September 17, 1781, f. 1.

43 Melchor de Paz, *Guerra separatista. Rebeliones de Indios en Sur América*. Crónica de Melchor de Paz. Ed. by Luis Antonio Eguiguren. 2 vols. (Lima, 1952), I, 349-359.

Paz, and for this reason was considered essential for controlling the spread of revolt in the highlands. When del Valle's force arrived in the city, which Areche referred to as "the Sagunto of America", further desertion forced him to abandon it to the rebels and return to Cuzco with only 1,100 of the 15,000 men who had left with him in April. As a result, the rebellion now spread to La Paz which came under determined attack⁴⁴.

Fortunately, veteran troops requested by Jáuregui were dispatched from Buenos Aires and succeeded in lifting the siege of La Paz and occupying the starving city. This broke the back of the rebel offensive and allowed negotiations between the opponents to begin. Following Jáuregui's offer of a general pardon to the rebels, the clergy were able to persuade the rebel leadership to surrender. On August 23, 1782, Jáuregui felt confident enough to notify Gálvez that the revolts had been crushed and that Peru was once again at peace⁴⁵. This was a fortunate ending for Spanish authorities whose military might was tested and found lacking. As late as July, 1781, Areche had despaired of a military victory and had urged that it might be better to try and starve the rebels into submission⁴⁶.

The fall of Puno, by renewing Areche's efforts to secure replacements for del Valle and Jáuregui, allow certain insights into the Royalist high command during the war. Del Valle responded to visitor's criticisms with a long report which exposed the friction existing between the military and the visitation which held financial control over the war. As examples of Areche's parsimoniousness, he noted that only two week's supply of food had been provided for an expedition which lasted four months, that only seven head of cattle and fifteen tents were supplied to a column of 2,760 men, that doctors and medicines were lacking, and that pay for the troops was always in arrears. By forcing the soldiers to live off the land, del Valle maintained that peasantry was unnecessarily alienated and thereby the war was prolonged. Since Areche's recruiters had promised the men full pay and a 20-day campaign desertion rates were phenomenal. The inspector bitterly concluded that his soldiers were

44 *Colección documental*, II, part 2, 793-800, Saguntum was an Iberian fortress which held out for eight months against the Carthaginians under Hannibal in 219 b.c.

45 AGI: AL 662 Jáuregui to Gálvez, Lima, August 23, 1782, f. 1.

46 AGI: AL 1044 Areche to Jáuregui, Cuzco, July 17, 1781, f.1.

better-prepared for the rebels than they were against the officers of the visitation in Cuzco⁴⁷.

It is well-established that the termination of the revolts forced the introduction of several administrative and personnel changes in Peru. As areche had wished, Jáuregui was replaced in 1783 by Teodoro de Croix, an experienced military commander, whose government of the Interior Provinces of New Spain gave him a considerable knowledge of Indian affairs. Del Valle's death that year fortuitously saved him from a courts-martial, he being replaced by Brigadier General Manuel de Pineda who arrived in 1784 as inspector-general of troops. Areche too was removed in favor of Jorge de Escobedo y Alarcón, who became visitor-general and intendant of Lima when that system replaced the *corregimientos* in 1784.

The rationale behind this re-orientation seems to have stemmed from a widespread belief that the creoles had been the guiding force behind the revolts of 1780. Since the militia was primarily a creole institution, financed and officered by limeños, any suspicion of creole involvement naturally besmirched the militia's reputation. Colonel Demetrio Egan, a senior veteran officer, reported to Gálvez that the creole militia was useless, that creoles had controlled the rebellion headed by Tupac Amaru with the hope of securing independence as the British colonies had done, and requested that 5,000 veteran troops be sent to establish Royal authority in Peru.⁴⁸ Other social groups were similarly implicated. José del Lagos felt the mestizo group had supported the revolt and asked the Crown to assure public safety by detaching them from their creole patrons.⁴⁹

Other reasons dictated a change in military policy also. Viceroy Jáuregui believed, as did many others, that it was improper to retain unsupervised militia units in the highland regions where nearly all the inhabitants were mixed-bloods or Indians of dubious loyalty and insubordinate ways.⁵⁰ Others, such as militia Captain Simón Gutiérrez, the commander of the urban militia Company of Merchants, felt the militia ought to be de-activated since the Cuzqueño economy

47 AGI: AC 63 del Valle to Gálvez, Cuzco, September 28, 1781, ff. 1-10

48 AGI: AL 1493 Relación del Coronel D. Demetrio Egan de los alborotos del Perú al Sr. José de Gálvez, Lima, February 20, 1781, ff. 1-11.

49 AGI: AL 1029 Reflexiones a favor de los Reinos del Perú. July 10, 1787 26ff.

50 *Relaciones de los virreyes*, II, p. 171

was in a shambles and people could no longer afford to support the war. He urged the presence of a large veteran force in order to allow militiamen to return to their farms which had for too long been out of production in an effort to there by stimulate the economy.⁵¹ Perhaps the most persuasive argument of all was forwarded by Areche, who estimated that militia cutbacks would produce an estimated annual savings of one-half million pesos.⁵²

It is clear that the Crown accepted the several criticisms of limeño loyalties at face value and acted upon them immediately. Gálvez' instructions to Viceroy Croix assumed that the creoles had masterminded the revolt although he admitted that firm proof of this was lacking. He characterized the militia in Peru as useless and gave notice that two veteran infantry regiments were being dispatched to dispel any illusion that Spanish arms there were weak.⁵³ A year earlier, he had notified Escobedo of his fears and had secretly ordered the viceroy to immediately train "the greatest possible number of Europeans" in the handling and firing of weapons as a means of defending Lima from a possible attack.⁵⁴

The impact of this suspicion was to deny a majority of creoles any rewards for their services. Promotion lists drawn up by Avilés, who was more sympathetic than most to creole aspirations, contained an almost equivalent number of creoles and Spaniards who were recommended for rewards or promotion. Since these rewards were crucial to future military advancement, Gálvez' denial can be interpreted as an effort to reduce creole participation in the militia, continuing a pattern of discrimination which had become evident with the coming of the visitation.

In recommending rewards for nine corregidores, eleven soldiers of fortune, seventeen regular officers, and thirty-three militia, Gálvez pointedly denied the requests of numerous other Americans who had ably served the King during the revolt, disparaging many of them as cowards or enemies of Spaniards.⁵⁵ This

51 *Colección documental*, II, part 3, 25-30.

52 AGI: AL 1086, no. 331 Areche to the Crown, Lima, November 14, 1782, ff. 1-15.

53 AGI: AL 640 Informe del Rey a dn. Teodoro de Croix, El Pardo, March 28, 1783.

54 AGI: AL 1044 Crown to Escobedo, no. 121, April 5, 1782, f. 1.

55 AGI: AL 1494 Relación cierta de los sugetos que han servido en este obispado del Cuzco. Lima, March 16, 1783, ff. 1-15.

policy, combined with the subsequent demobilization of militia units, may have served to deter creoles from entering militia service. At least some members of the creole nobility stated that their estates had been so weakened that they were forced to leave service because they could no longer afford to maintain their companies.⁵⁶

The demobilization of the Peruvian militia after 1784 also reflected a continuing desire of the visitation to reduce fixed costs. With the close of the war in 1783, Escobedo painted a bleak picture of postwar Peru to Gálvez. As a result of the 100,000 persons estimated lost during the fighting, Escobedo asserted that the Peruvian economy and the Royal Treasury were in a shambles, since the revolts had cost 2.5 million pesos to crush. Even with the close of hostilities, the visitor decried that military expenditures still remained at 1.5 million pesos annually, 730,000 pesos of which were being used to provide trainers to a discredited militia. Arguing that militia rolls in Peru were actually larger than census rolls, Escobedo asked Gálvez to implement the reforms urged earlier by Areche.⁵⁷

In April, 1784, 2,561 soldiers from the veteran infantry Regiments of Soria and Extremadura arrived in Peru. Shortly thereafter, the new inspector-general, Pineda, surveyed the Peruvian militia and placed much of the blame for its miserable situation on Areche, whose efforts to reduce expenses to a minimum had kept training cadres to a size which had made their contributions meaningless. Pineda also recognized that Peru was both geographically and sociologically different than other areas which gave little applicability to militia regulations devised in Havana or Madrid. Most militiamen, he noted, were either transients or residents of large haciendas who could not be easily assembled for regular training. Since an untrained militia produced disasters such as that which had occurred in Sangarara, he recommended that they either be adequately trained or abolished.⁵⁸ Following some heated deliberations, the Lima War Council voted to adopt the reductions proposed earlier by Areche, deactivating many units in order to produce an estimated annual savings of 579,550 pesos. Shortly thereafter, veteran infantry units were dispatched to Cuzco, Arequipa, La

56 *Colección documental*, II, part 3, p. 469, 484-488, 529-531.

57 AGI: AL 1100 Escobedo to Gálvez, Lima, January 16, 1784, ff. 1-2; AGI: AL 667 Escobedo to Jáuregui, Lima, June 2, 1784, ff. 1-2.

58 AGI: AL 667 Pineda to Croix, Lima, August 12, 1784, ff. 1-11.

Paz, Oruro, Potosí, Salta, and Chuquisaca.⁵⁹

This brief examination of the Army of Peru suggests that the Caroline reformers failed in their efforts to create a large and capable militia which could shoulder a major share of defensive burdens after 1761. Unlike the other major areas of Spanish America, the Peruvian militia reform was tested by a massive internal revolt, led by a charismatic chieftain, Tupac Amaru. Yet the evidence suggests that Tupac Amaru's movement lacked both force and organization when compared to Spanish military resources. That a highly unequal struggle persisted far longer than was necessary was due to a complex set of circumstances, including the ineffective viceregal leadership of Guirior and Jáuregui, the conflicts produced by the visitation, the overwhelming desire to economize, and the discrimination practiced against Peruvian creoles, which may have increased their reluctance to support the Royalist effort, and even have turned some in opposition to the Crown.

Whatever the precise reasons for Peruvian military ineptitude, it had the net effect of convincing the Crown that a local militia was untrustworthy. Although reform of the militia was ostensibly done for economic reasons, it also reflects a desire to prevent arms and training being given to potentially disloyal groups. In a 1786 guideline to Charles III, the Conde de Floridablanca, Charles' Minister of State, held that the traditional Austrian system of defense which was based on permanent veteran garrisons was still proper for kingdoms such as Peru. Although he conceded that local militiamen might successfully be used to combat a foreign invasion, domestic insurrection posed quite different problems. Militiamen, Floridablanca believed, "as natives born and educated with (a) dislike and jealousy of Spaniards, were likely to develop alliances with *castas*, or mixed-bloods, peoples of color, and others seeking to disrupt the peace." Because creoles and mestizos were represented in the officer corps, he felt it necessary to maintain a sufficient number of veteran garrisons, officered by Spaniards, to defend the principal areas of Peru against foreigners and Royal subjects alike. Floridablanca held that only the fortuitous signing of the Peace of Paris in 1763, by allowing Spanish troops to be sent to Peru, had saved the kingdom from being overwhelmed.⁶⁰

59 *Memorias de los virreyes*, V. 235-238.

60 William Coxe, *Memoirs of the Kings of Spain of the House of Bourbon from the Accession of Phillip the Fifth to the Death of Charles the Third: 1700-1788* 3 vols. (London, 1813), I. 484-486; *Gobierno del Señor Rey Don Carlos III, o instrucción reservada para dirección de la junta del estado que creó esta monarca; dada a luz por don Andrés Muriel* (Madrid, 1839), 261-262.

Efforts made to reverse the process of Americanization in the army after 1784 constituted an essential return to the Austrian system of defense which had governed Peru for two centuries prior to the revolts of 1780. The militia component of the Army of Peru remained restricted to the coast and was classified as urban except for a few disciplined units located in the Lima region. In 1787 the fixed Battalion of Callao was raised to regimental strength. Preference in the officer corps of the two new battalions being formed was granted to former members of the Soria and Extremadura Regiments who were of Spanish birth. Viceroy Croix's statement that Americans were weak, unaccustomed to the rigors of war, and competent as officers only when supervised by Spaniards seems to have been reflected in the social composition of the unit. Of the 157 officers and non-commissioned officers in the reformed regiment, Spaniards outnumbered creoles 92 to 65, and, with one exception, held every major rank in the command structure.⁶¹

Creoles in the military complained about the turn of events taking place in the army after 1784, warning that as a group they might fail to respond to future Royal calls to arms.⁶² With the passage of time the Army of Peru thus came to symbolize a hostile and alien force to many Peruvians, quite in contrast to the more popular citizen-soldiery which had been created by Amat. In 1816, in the wake of another Indian revolt, the Spanish President of the Audiencia of Cuzco told the Crown that a majority of creoles now sought an opportunity to overthrow Spanish rule.⁶³ Simply defeating Indian revolts no longer assured the Army of creole support nor that of the mass of Peruvians. Although it constituted a bulwark of Royalism, the army had progressively become an obstacle to American aspirations for self-determination.

61 AGI: AL 673 Croix to Gálvez, Lima, March 16, 1787, ff. 1-3. The service records of the officer corps of the Royal Regiment of Lima relocated in AGS: GH 7283 and consist of 157 folios, dated Lima, December, 1788. The exception was the aged creole judge Manuel de Mansilla, who continued to serve as adjutant-general.

62 AGI: AL 667 Representation of the Officers of the Royal Regiment of Lima, Lima, Lima, August 31, 1784, ff. 1-4.

63 The revolt referred to was that headed by Mateo Pumacahua, a cacique who had remained loyal during the Tupac Amaru revolt, for which he was awarded with a Brigadier's commission and an appointment as temporary president of the Audiencia of Cuzco. The revolt and the statement cited are discussed in J.R. Fisher, *Government and Society in Colonial Peru*, 227-232.