Capítulo 21
The Thomistic Component

Just as certain sects, social groups, or types of personality from Europe found a happier life in the New World than in the Old, so we might suppose that certain European Philosophies found warmer reception overseas. Northrop suggests this to be the case for the ideas of John Locke, whose atomistic conception of the sovereign individual squared neatly with Anglo American conditions of life. Locke’s want of attention to what Burke was later to call the “mysterious incorporation” of English society made his thought less congenial to his homeland than to the transatlantic England that was colonized during the century of his birth.¹

Because the political experience of the twenty Latin American countries is longer, more diversified, and less amenable to synthesis than that of Anglo America, one feels special need for reference points in political thought that might assist one to construe it. Here again one turns to the European intellectual arsenal, given the derivative or fragmentary character of sociopolitical thinking in the Americas.

Spanish American preceded British colonization by more than a century, and thus belongs to an era that antedates not only the Lockean rights of man but also the Bossuet—and Hobbes—type apology for the absolutist national. For clues to the Spanish American political heritage one looks to the polity of the Catholic Monarchs, Fernando and Isabel.

Isabel in a sense prefigures the divine-right monarch. Her thwarting of the nobles and of the Cortes wherein they formed an estate; her royal agents and centralizing administrative reforms; her replacement of feudal levies with a modern army; her use of the faith to further political unity—all have been cite

¹ This paper is based on passages from three previous papers, published between 1954 and 1964 and presented here in a revised and unified version.

to identify her as precursor of the Hobbesian autocrat. Yet one must remember that for three centuries after Isabel’s death the Spanish empire retained, in comparison at least with the burgeoning capitalist countries, many hallmarks of the medieval, hierarchical state.

The “common law” of Isabel’s Castile was the *Siete Partidas*, drawn up ca. 1260 and promulgated in 1348. Though tinctured with Roman law, the *Partidas* were less Roman rules for conduct than medieval principles of conduct that approached being moral treatises. As late as the nineteenth century Dunham found that elimination of all coedus but the *Partidas* would still have left Spain with a respectable body of jurisprudence, and he cites an eminent Spanish jurist who in twenty-nine years had found scarcely a case that could not have been “virtually or expressly decided by the code in question”.

The *Partidas* assumed the nuclear element of society to be not Lockean atomistic man but religious societal man: man with a salvable soul (*i.e.*, in relationship with God) and in a station of life (*i.e.*, having mutual obligations with his fellows, determinable by Christian principles). The ruler, though not procedurally responsible to the people or the estates, was bound, through his conscience, to be the instrument of God’s immutable, publicly ascertainable law. The *Partidas* in fact specifically excoriated the tyrant who strove to keep his people poor, ignorant, and timorous and to forbid their fellowship and assemblies.

As mistress of the hierarchical Castilian state, Isabel found frequent occasion to make inter- as well as intranational assertion of her spiritual authority. Unlike Aragon, freed of the Moorish menace in the thirteenth century, Castile directly confronted Moorish Grenada until 1492. The queen’s confessor Cisneros strenuously urged the African campaigns against infidel Turks as well as Moslems. And it was with the Castilian sovereign that the expeditions which claimed dominion over millions of pagan Amerindians were initially associated. In her principal foreign ventures, therefore, Isabel’s policy reflected not only politico-military vicissitudes of statecraft but also spiritual responsibilities in the face of non-Christian multitudes. After Columbus had assigned there hundred Indians to forced labor, it was as agent of the universal church that Isabel demandad: “By what authority does the Admiral give my vassals away?”.

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If Isabel, in her enterprises to the south and overseas to the west, symbolizes the religious, medieval component of the rising Spanish empire, then Fernando, whose Aragon was engaged to the east and north, represents a secular, Renaissance counterpart. His holdings (the Balearics, Sardinia, Sicily, Naples) and his Italian and Navarrese campaigns confined his problems of rule, alliance, and warfare to the Christian community. Isabel presented the unity of spiritually intransigent Christendom to infidel and pagan. Fernando was committed to the shifting, amoral statecraft of competing Christian princes in maintenance and expansion of a domain which, within its Christian context, was diversely composed.

Fernando ruled under transitional conditions which precluded resorting for authority to Isabel’s spiritual sanctions or to modern statist apologetics. Relying heavily on personal verve and cunning, he was a true Machiavellian. Indeed the Florentine, who regarded religions as instruments for political centralization and who denied that Italian well being depended on the Church of Rome (Discourses I: xii), called Fernando “a new prince” who had become “the first king in Christendom” by extraordinary actions “which have kept his subjects’ minds uncertain and astonished, and occupied in watching their result” (Prince XII). In contrasting Machiavelli’s portrait of Fernando with Castiglione’s one of Isabel in The Courtier, Menéndez Pidal confirms this interpretation of the Catholic Monarchs:

“each of them personified to an eminent degree two opposing tendencies of the period: one which based itself on the past, renewing it; the other, which initiated the Modern Age; and the king and queen harmonized their actions in such a way that they purified the excesses or deficiencies which were deeply rooted in both these tendencies.3

Luis Villoro similarly identifies this dual heritage and draws the implications it held for millions of Indians when the conquistadors and catechizers arrived on American shores.4

Long after Isabel’s death in 1504 Spanish New World administration hovered between medieval and Renaissance orientations. Were men of other

4 Luis Villoro, Los grandes momentos del indigenismo en México (Mexico City, 1950), pp. 15-88.
races and cultures to be regarded as salvable souls and accorded safeguard against exploitation. Or was expediency, reinforced perhaps by the Aristotelian notion of "natural slaves", to determine their lot? In the case of Negroes, Isabel had revoked permission to ship Christianized slaves from Spain to the Indies; but Fernando condoned the traffic in 1510, and, soon after, direct levies from Africa commenced. In the case of Indians, wide-ranging polemics, dating from Isabel's reprimand to Columbus, sought to fix the extent, if any, to which forced labor could be exacted. For decades royal decrees on the subject were a history of statement and reversal.

Another question was: Would medieval exclusivism be maintained for trade with and emigration to the Indies? Isabel's monopolistic contract with Columbus and her denial of emigration, except by special license, to all but Castilians and Leonese was the first answer. Fernando, however, extended privileges to his own subjects, and Carlos I (1516-56) went much further. Of the latter's vast polyglot empire Spanish Europe was but a segment. Carlos spoke Spanish with an accent, brought a Flemish court to Spain, and played the Machiavellian cosmopolite to bring a modicum of unity to the congeries that was his realm. An assiduous reader of The Prince, Carlos went so far as to have his delegates to the Council of Trent oppose the papal party in an effort to conciliate the Protestants. In administering overseas Spain he allowed emigration of Germans, Flemings, Italians, and others of his subjects. For its economic development he enlisted aid from the new commercial capitalists of northern Europe — the Welsers, the Fuggers, the Ehingers.

On the accession of Felipe II (1556-98) the realm became less heterogeneous with the dismemberment of Bohemia, Hungary, and Austria, while Felipe's campaigns in the Netherlands evidenced his uncompromising Catholicism and Hispanicism. As insurgent Lutheranism restored Spain to its role as the church's knight-in-arms against the forces of darkness, the writings of Machiavelli, placed on the Index in 1559, were increasingly attacked by Spanish commentators for their amorality and glorification of raison d'etat. Under Felipe the empire received the political orientation that for our purposes may be said to have lasted till the first independence movements of 1809-10. That

orientation I describe as dominantly Thomistic, with recessive Machiavellian characteristics. (The term "Thomistic" is used to emphasize contrast with northern Europe's emergent capitalist societies of 1500-1800, not to designate a residual facsimile of the thirteenth century).

In the 1570s, by extending the Inquisition to America and declaring church patronage inalienable from the crown, Felipe set his governance within a framework of divine law, imbuing his own and his agents' directives with spiritual purpose. No entry was left for the atomistic tolerance that England, despite its state religion, had begun to evince. At the same time society was conceived as a house of many mansions and levels. As Indian peoples were absorbed, for example, they were not indiscriminately reduced to a common stratum. Certain of their leaders retained prestige in post-conquest society, and may low-born Spaniards raised their own status by marrying caciques' daughters. Unlike prim New England meeting-houses, moreover, the Spanish baroque church showed the Indian's craftsmanship and, eventually, his artistry; to his people it made a lavish visual, auricular, ritual appeal, while its saints tacitly reimbodied his native gods.

To be sure, the social hierarchy had its anomalies. Creoles were often denied the prestige and opportunities officially reserved to them. Mestizos, mulattoes, Indians, and blacks, on the contrary, occasionally enjoyed social mobility they could not officially have expected. Broadly speaking, however, status was defined by occupation and by place and condition of birth. Transferral from one status to another (e.g., an Indian who passed from mission to encomienda, a black from slave to free condition, or a mestizo to the creole patriciate) generally entailed official sanction and registration.

The multiplicity of judicial systems underscored the static, functionally compartmented nature of society. The fact that they, like the hierarchies of lay and clerical administrators, disputed each other's spheres of influence served to reaffirm the king's authority as ultimate reconciler. Not only senior functionaries but also modest municipalities or even individual Indians could appeal directly to the king or his proxy, the civeroy, for redress of specified grievances. The king, even an inarticulate near-imbecile like Carlos II, was symbolic throughout his realm as the guarantor of status. In Thomistic idiom, all parts of society were ordered to the whole as the imperfect to the perfect. This ordering, inherently the responsibility of the multitude, devolved on the king as a public person acting in their behalf, for the task of ordering to a given end fell to the
agent best placed and fitted for the specific function.

In the economic realm, Spanish mercantilism checked the enterprise and free play of England's state-guided commercial capitalism. Every facet of the economy showed a medieval impress: primary dedication to extractive pursuits; confusion between bullion and real wealth; dogged, if ineffectual, prohibition of foreign and even intercolonial trade; a multiform, burdensome tax structure; monopolistic consulados and gremios; lack of credit and banking facilities; use of the simplest forms of partnership (commenda, societas); scarcity of currency; commercial exchange through annual fairs; municipal price control.

The Spanish empire, to be sure, could scarcely live in quarantine from the post-medieval world in which it existed and for which it was in part responsible. The bullion of the Indies was a lodestar for foreign merchants. Introduced as contraband or else covertly within the Spanish system itself, the wares of Dutch, French, and English were temptingly cheap, well made, and abundant. They, like the fiscal demands of the mother country, challenged the creoles to organize local economies from which bullion and exportable surplus might be factored out. The calculating acquisitiveness of capitalism, if not its institutions for unlimited accrual, were frequently in evidence.

Moreover, Indian and Negro workers were, unlike the European serf, never fully identified with the historical traditions of their overlords. This fact, and the predatory nature of the New World economy, left them more vulnerable to exploitation than Europe's peasants who remained bound to the land. The African received no comprehensive protective code until 1789. And the very laws that assured the Indian status in return for fixed service could in practice be perverted, rendering him servile to an encomendero or a corregidor. Indeed, if one speaks of Thomistic guarantees for the common man, one properly refers to the implicit logic of the society, not to a regime of exceptional humanitarianism. The point is that however strongly "recessive" Machiavellian, proto-capitalist, or secularist traits might erupt, the underpinning of the empire—social, economic, political, intellectual—bore the rubric of an earlier era.

Bourbon innovations of the eighteenth century were of limited effect in altering the status quo. Some reforms—like the intendant system—were superimposed on the old structure, caused added confusion, and were revoked. Others—like the Caracas Company, a modern and enterprising trade monopoly—met opposition because their services entailed strict enforcement of regulations which a more flexible regime of local control had winked at. Enlightenment
writings, to be sure, circulated freely among professional and clerical groups, within the universities, in the new economic societies, and, with restrictions, in the public press. Yet their effect was to stimulate reformist criticism, not to engender programmatic opposition to the regime or revolutionary Jacobinism. The traditions of the Spanish system itself in fact allowed possibilities for greater autonomy for the colonies and parity for the creoles. It has been argued that the main shortcoming of the "enlightened" reforms of the most notable Bourbon king, Carlos III (1759-88)—sometimes called the Diocletian of the Spanish empire—was that they were alien to tradition in being too rationalistic and technocratic, that they failed to develop initiative, self-rule, and human resources in loco. His expulsion of the Jesuits in 1767, to the dismay of many creoles and Indians, deprived the Indies of important intellectual, pedagogical, and economic leadership.

The Spanish America of 1800 was ill prepared for the ways of enlightened despotism, still less for those of Lockean constitutionalism.

_The Machiavellian Component_

Until the moment that Napoleon's troops took Fernando VII of Spanish into custody in 1808, there had existed throughout the Spanish empire a relative lack of concern with the remoter framework of society and general acquiescence in the ultimate authority. A study of those dispersed and sporadic uprisings against authority which did occur before independence classifies them as; revolts by the original conquistadors, uprisings of subject races, and creole protest movements. If we except seditious revolts caused by a single leader's personal ambitions, we find all the three kinds of uprising to have common traits, precisely the traits one could define as "legitimate" for revolt within the framework of the Thomistic state⁶.

Those movements were spontaneous, in the double sense of indigenous (that is, not determined by any foreign influence, although subsequently certain foreign elements might be employed for their development and legitimation) and accidental (that is, they did not respond to an organic plan or to a doctrine elaborated _ex professo_).

They were in embryo energetically local, produced by a crisis

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⁶ See for example Víctor Frankl, "La filosofía social tomista del Arzobispo-virrey Caballero y Góngora y la de los comuneros colombianos", _Bolívar_ 14 (1952): 595-626.
affecting the region or zone and directed to regional needs. When various movements broke out simultaneously at various points, this was a sociological and chronological coincidence, not a planned prior agreement.

Lastly, in cases when abstract principles are invoked to encourage revolutionary activity, the latter never occurs as a mere ideological outburst; it tends always toward the immediate resolution of a severe and urgent crisis.

Not until 1809, during the Napoleonic interregnum, did local juntas appear overseas. Yet even then their autonomy, in expectation of a legitimist restoration, was provisional. Only when the *ad hoc* “liberal” Cortes, established in unoccupied Spain, tried to reduce Spanish America from viceregal to colonial status did the independence campaigns, championed by a few firebrands, gather momentum.

Fernando VII was restored in 1814. But in the face of the independence movement, his character and policy discredited both himself and the church, whose support he retained. For Spanish America the Thomistic keystone had been withdrawn. Efforts to supplant it, on a continental basis or even within regional blocks, were vain. No creole caudillo and no prince of European or Inca lineage could command universal fealty or age-old spiritual sanction. A Thomistic sovereign could not be created *ex nihilo*, and Spanish America’s centrifugal separatism was for the first time unleashed. In effect, the collapse of Spanish authority heralded a new age of conquistadors. Although the eventual boundaries of the new republics were loosely patterned after those of Spanish colonial administration, political structures disintegrated during the independence period to the level of urban juntas and rural power systems. As during the conquest, a moment of social democratization occurred; lowborn mestizos who displayed prowess and leadership won prominence first in war, then in the new political arenas. Just as the conquistadors had been lured by booty, encomiendas, and land, so now leaders and their retinues competed strenuously for access to national treasuries, to ecclesiastical properties, to the fortunes of peninsulars, or to the favor of foreign merchants. The arming of the citizenry, begun under the Bourbons, was accelerated during the independence struggle. Both militarization and the routinization of violence became familiar features of the

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post-colonial scene. Only much later in the century would foreign investments and political centralization allay the turbulence of independent Latin America, much as the erection of the colonial viceroyalties had stabilized centrifugal forces in the age of conquest.

Another idiom than the Thomistic, then, is needed to help illuminate the republican experience. This essay proposes that at the moment the Thomistic component became "recessive" the Machiavellian component, latent since the sixteenth century, became "dominant". The philosopher-voyageur Keyserling sensed this when he wrote that "in the undisciplinable revolutionary and the unscrupulous caudillo of all South American States survives the son of Machiavelli's age". A Venezuelan cosmopolite in Sangre patria, a novel by Manuel Díaz Rodríguez (1902), also noted a similarity between his country and Renaissance Italy:

Are not our continual wars and our corruption of customs, . . . the same continual wars and depraved customs of the Italy of those times, with its multiple small republics and principalities? There were then in Italy, as among us, brutal condottieri and rough captains, exalted overnight, like the first Sforzas, from the soil to the royal purple.

Machiavelli was born to an "Age of Despots". Italian city states had lost their moral base; they no longer recognized a common Christian ethos. The pope had become one of many competing temporal rulers. Machiavelli found that the mercenary companies of adventure of his time, unlike national militias, were undependable because they had no larger loyalty. They served the intrigues of statecraft, but not the needs of open warfare. Italians were effective only in dueling and individual combat.

Like Machiavelli, the Spanish American national builder had to contend with nucleated "city states", the rural masses being passive and inarticulate. The absence of communities intermediate between such nuclei and the erstwhile imperium had been revealed by the autonomous urban juntas of 1809-10. Only the somewhat arbitrary boundaries of colonial administration defined the new nations territorially. Only virulent sectionalism could define them operatively. The church, which had once lent sanction to the state, was now an external threat to national sovereignty. The appearance of opportunist caudillos —as of

Italy’s city tyrants—deranged the predictable interplay of hierarchical class interests.

The Spanish American who held loyal to constitutionalism and to the nation-community was swept before winds of personalism and localism. Mexico’s Gómez Farías was a statesman who would not transgress “the principles of public and private morality”, before which, wrote his contemporary, Mora, “his indomitable force of character” vanished. Why did he not cast out the treacherous Santa Anna? Because the step was unconstitutional, “a famous reason which has kept the reputation of Señor Farías in a very secondary place at best and caused the nation to retrogress half a century”.

A similar case was Rivadavia, Argentina’s first president and proponent of bourgeois democracy and economic liberalism. His plans and principales were no match for provincial caudillismo. Sadly he wrote from Parisian exile in 1830:

In my opinion what retards regular and stable advance in those republics stems from the vacillations and doubts that deprive all institutions of the indispensable moral force that comes only from conviction and decisión. It is evident to me, and would be easy to demonstrate, that our country’s upheavals spring much more immediately from lack of public spirit and cooperation among responsible men in sustaining order and laws than from attacks of ungovernable, ambitious persons without merit or fitness and of indolent coveters.

Machiavelli’s writings are the handbook par excellence for the leader who would cope with “lack of public spirit and cooperation among responsible men”. Just as Lockean precepts seem more congenial to Anglo America than to England, so the Florentine appears to address the New World; his detailed instructions for personalistic rule were of secondary interest to European monarchs who were soon to find sanction in Divine Right.

At the time of Latin American independence Hegel called attention to the embryonic nature of political systems in the New World and to the lack of traditions and mystique for the state:

In South America... the republics depend only on military force; their whole history is a continued revolution; federated states become disunited; others previously separated become united; and all these changes originate in military revolutions.

9 José María Luis Mora, Ensayos, ideas y retratos (Mexico City, 1941), pp. xx, 184.
10 Bernadino Rivadavia, Páginas de un estadista (Buenos Aires, 1945), p. 137.
As to the political conditions of North America, the general object of the existence of this State is not yet fixed and determined, and the necessity for a firm combination does not yet exist; for a real State and a real Government arise only after a distinction of classes has arisen. North America will be comparable with Europe only after the immeasurable space which that country presents to its inhabitants shall have been occupied, and the members of the political body shall have begun to be pressed back on each other. ¹¹

In his essay on Paraguay's Francia (1843) another European, Carlyle, described with certain envy the free-acting caudillo, unfettered by national traditions. "Such an institution of society, adapted to our European ways, seems pressingly desirable. A Gauchos, South-American and European, what a business it is, casting out your Seven Devils!"

Locke and Machiavelli were both concerned with the antecedent conditions for a nation-state. The former, however, addressed an articulate, relatively homogeneous bourgeoisie that was free to ascertain and pursue private interests; the latter addressed the leader who with craft and foresight was to unite an inchoate, inarticulate populace whose only claim was that it be not too heavily oppressed.

On nearly every page of Machiavelli appears practical advice which seems distilled from careers of Spanish American caudillos. Of critical importance is the leader’s commanding physical presence. In time of sedition he should:

... present himself before the multitude with all possible grace and dignity, and attired with all the insignia of his rank, so as to inspire more respect. [For] there is no better or safer way of appeasing an excited mob than the presence of some man of imposing appearance and highly respected. [Discourses I: liv]

Among countless incidents one recalls the moment when Bolivia's Melgarejo, with six men, entered the palace where his rival, Belzu, was celebrating a coup d'état. The intruder, icily calm, shot the president, then with imperious presence faced and overawed the mob in whose throats the shouts of victory for Belzu had scarcely died away.

The personalist leader must be physically disciplined, skilled in warfare, and familiar with mountains and plains, rivers and swamps. (Prince XIV; also Discourses III: xxxix) This is almost a page from the autobiography of Páez, who knew Venezuela's llanos like the palm of his hand, a knowledge that

¹¹ G.W.F. Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of History (Lond, 1894), pp. 87-90.
confounded the royalists in 1817 and later earned respect for him as leader of the new republic.

Although one might indefinitely extend the list of Machiavelli's dicta that were validated by the caudillos, it remains to emphasize that he was concerned with state-building, not merely with leadership. His ideal was a republic with "laws so regulated that, without the necessity of correcting them, they afford security to those who live under them" (Discourses I: ii) The most difficult time to preserve republican liberties is when a people, accustomed to living under a prince who binds himself "by a number of laws that provide for the security of all his people", recovers "by some accident" its freedom. Such a people, "ignorant of all public affairs, of all means of defense or offense, neither knowing the princes nor being known by them", soon relapses under a yoke often heavier than the one just shaken off. (Discourses I: xvi) Government, to be created in these cases ex nihilo, is most expeditiously organized by a single leader of strength and sagacity. Yet "it will not endure long if the administration of it remains on the shoulders of a single individual; it is well, then, to confide this to the charge of the many, for thus it will be sustained by the many". (Discourses I: ix)

If at length a republic is established, that very fact certifies a fundamental "goodness" and certain "original principles" conducing to its "first growth and reputation". To maintain republican vigor and repress men's "insolence and ambition" those principles must find periodic reassertion through "extrinsic accident" or, preferably, "intrinsic prudence". (Discourses III: i) The Machiavellian leader, therefore, is to be bound by original principles, environmental and social, generic to the nascent nation-community.

Writing in about 1840 the Argentine socialist Echeverría prescribed for his country's political chaos in identical terms. He found it impossible to organize a people without a constitution rooted in "customs, sentiments, understandings, traditions". If the sole credentials of a nation-building legislator are those bestowed by electoral victory, his official acts will be no more in the public interest than the activities of a private businessman. Because the premises for community will not be readily apparent, he must eschew foreign solutions and sound out the "instincts, necessities, interests" of the citizens and, through laws, reveal to them their own will and common identity. Only on this preliminary basis of wise and public-minded paternalism may one hope for an eventual "faculty of perpetual communication between man and man, generation and
generation—the continuous embodiment of the spirit of one generation in the next."  

The amorphous cast of Spanish America’s “original principles” is suggested by Keyersling’s notion of a ubiquitous gana. By this he meant a raw, telluric spirit, unchanneled and self-nourishing, lacking past traditions or future hope. Sarmiento had expressed himself similarly in describing the nomadic yet earthbound life of the pampas, having a morality unto itself and evoking Asiatic comparisons. And in 1821 Bolívar, criticizing Colombia’s lawmakers, wrote:

These gentlemen believe that Colombia is filled with dullards who sit around the firesides of Bogotá, Tunja, and Pamplona. They have not troubled to notice the Caribs of the Orinoco, the herdsmen of the Apure, the seamen of Maracaibo, the boatmen of the Magdalena, the bandits of Patía, the indomitable citizens of Pasto, the Guajibos of Casanare, and all the savage hordes from Africa and American who, like deer, run untamed in the solitudes of Colombia.  

The meaning of gana, recognizable enough for pampas and forest cultures, applies as well to the highland zones of the high Amerindian civilizations. In Peru, once the conquerors removed the ruling Inca, the tribes and nations of his empire:

...dispersed like the beads of a necklace whose thread has been broken. Each community returned, politically and economically, to the pre-Incaic stage. Thousands of communities, isolated, strangers each to the other, could thus be conquered one at a time.  

The Indian was turned earthward by the Spaniard, made an instrument of production for a vast imperial community to which, despite its proselytizers and tutelary legislation, the Indian could never feel joined. Much later, Mariátegui would find it necessary to reformulate his Marxist dialectic to make allowance for this “earth-consciousness” of the Indian.

The Legitimacy Question

In the face of this New World brand of social and moral centrifugalism, how is it that governments in certain countries and eras have achieved stability? Or in Weberian terms, what circumstances made for routinization of charisma?  

The history of republican Spanish America is rife with examples of the
personalist Machiavellian leader who shrewdly identifies himself with local "original principles", though without being willing or able to relinquish government, as Machiavelli would have wished, "to the charge of many". The systems remains subordinate to the man and unless a suitable "heir" is available, it falls with him. Here we have Weber's charismatic leader with the personal gift of grace, who flouts the authority of the "eternal yesterday" as well as norms for bureaucratic rationality, whose justice is Solomonic rather than statutory, who maintains authority by proving his strength in life.

Occasionally a leader may assume the mission to mould foundations for a national community or even, as in the case of Bolívar and Morazán, an international federation. More usually, a caudillo who asserted national dominance regarded his country as a fief. In the "age of caudillos" the leader would win the army's allegiance or create his own plebeian militia, then assert control over or come to terms with regional and social groups by blandishment, force, or personal magnetism. Features important to caudillismo were: prevalence of patron-client groups motivated to secure wealth by force of arms; use of violence in political competition; lack of institutionalized means for succession to offices; repeated failure of incumbent leaders to achieve lasting tenure. Such conditions were not necessarily pathological. Landowners generally dominated the elites, and since their properties tended to be organized for subsistence rather than for maximum production and export, hacienda management led logically to expansion of territory and of peon labor forces rather than to rationalization and technification. This helps explain the endemic rivalries among clustered kin groups and their resistance to the creation of a strong central government. Thus the caudillo, not the would-be constitution maker, was the effective political architect. Endowed with keen "access vision", he strove from a local power base to cement his small retinues into a "maximal" one designed to seize central power and, with it, the national treasury.15

Caudillismo therefore constituted a national political systems, even though it appears unstable in almost any given historical manifestation. It rested on a regionalized structure of personal and family alliances having some degree of popular endorsement. The caudillo himself was not a wholly free agent but depended on the supplies and manpower of landowners, the good will of

foreigners and of urban commercial and financial groups, and the legal, constitutional, and ideological skills of lawyers and letrados. Toward the end of the century new sources of mineral and agricultural wealth and the influx of foreign investment gave caudillos more dependable leverage. Though force and personalism did not go in the discard, financial resources and the protective favor of foreigners allowed the leader to govern by "remote control." He adopted bourgeois bon ton and even paid lip service to constitutionalism.

On occasion the Machiavellian blueprint is realized. A personalist leader arises and goes on successfully to create a system, larger than himself, that is faithful to "original principles". In Spanish America such a system is larger than the leader, to frame a paradox, only when it recognizes the leader to be larger than itself. This statement has Thomistic implications, and the more successful Spanish American constitutions have translated into modern idiom certain principles under which the vicereoyalties enjoyed three centuries of relative stability. It has in fact been said that the relation between a seemingly subservient national congress and a presidential caudillo was less a travesty of Western constitutional form than a re-creation of the colonial apparatus that prescribed consultation between a viceroy and a subordinate audiencia.

Chile was a perhaps unparalleled case of a country that managed, after a twelve-year transitional period, to avoid the extremes of tyranny and anarchy with a political system unencumbered by the mechanisms and rhetoric of exotic liberalism. Despite its outlandish contour the country had a certain ecological cohesion around its central agricultural zone. Because the landholding class had been infiltrated by mercantile groups partly composed of recent immigrants from northern Spain, the elite represented a spectrum of moderately diverse economic interest. A Valparaiso businessman, Diego Portales, was shrewd enough to identify and coordinate those interests within a constitutional system having an aura of native legitimacy. The centralizing 1833 Constitution created a strong executive without stripping the congress and courts of countervailing powers. The first president had the aristocratic bearing that Portales himself lacked; a staunch Catholic and brave general who stood above party factionalism, he helped to legitimize the office itself. The first several presidents each served double five-year terms. The official candidate was generally victorious and hand-picked by his predecessor. Thus the structure of the Spanish state was re-created, with only those minimum concessions to Anglo-French constitutionalism that were necessary for a nineteenth-century republic which had just
rejected monarchical rule.

Mexico offers the classic twentieth-century example of routinization of caudillismo, in this case the multiple leadership thrown up on the collapse of the decadent regime of Porfirio Díaz. However disconnected the many facets and phases of the Mexican Revolution, they became bonded in a rhetorical and emotive mystique. This mystique, notably objectified by the mural painters, suggests a new start, a fresh vista of the Mexican “reality”. Yet in many ways the Revolution represented a return to earlier premises. The fact that it was, for example, fiercely anticlerical does not mean that it was not deeply consonant with Hispanic tradition. Traditions which are matrices of social action retain vitality precisely because they accommodate to many guises and purposes. This same anticlerical Revolution had as its martyr-hero the spiritualistic (and literally a practitioner of spiritualism) Madero. Teachers sent among the Indians went as “missionaries”, sometimes too as martyrs. The painters revived the tradition of monumental public art, spreading government buildings with murals depicting the Indian’s exploitation through the centuries like stations of Calvary leading toward chiliastic redemption.

Once again the subsoil was declared the patrimony of the state as it had been of the Spanish crown. The *ejido* system, by which the soil itself was redistributed to rural workers, took its name from the commons of the old Spanish municipality. Reawakened interest in the Indian restored him to special tutelage. Groups hitherto neglected, the rural and urban workers, were brought to national prominence through paternalistic institutions subject to state management. Laborers, capitalists, managerial and commercial groups, syndicates of professionals and teachers, tend to relate themselves to the politico-administrative core of the central government, only secondarily to each other. State and regional conflicts are often referred to the government for resolution, except where a local caudillo manages to establish a temporary satrapy.

The Magna Charta of the Revolution, its Constitution of 1917, does not primarily serve as a social compact or set of ground rules for the conduct of public life. Like the old Laws of the Indies, this lengthy codification mixes general precepts with regulative specifics and is characteristically viewed as a document to be put into effect. No one was concerned that many provisions of the Constitution were in abeyance for years. In the Hispano-Thomist tradition there is no urgency to enforce the law if enforcement is for good reasons unfeasible and if the community at large shows no great concern. Once it
enjoyed legitimacy, the Revolution was regarded as something to be perman­
ently institutionalized, not a point of departure for open-ended process.

The Brazilian Case

The political development of Brazil might appear to lie outside the Spanish
American experience, even given the considerable diversity of the latter. To
begin with, the Portuguese state apparatus was transferred parsimoniously to its
New World colony. This meant that, formally, Lisboa retained more administra­
tive and judicial authority than did Madrid. Yet by the same token the meager
transplantation of bureaucracy to Brasil gave local groups and institutions a
sizable arena for defining and testing prerogatives. For example, conflicts
between town councils and Jesuit missionaries, a recurrent theme of colonial
history, often took their course without bureaucratic intervention. The status of
the Indian in Brazil was worked out under relatively little influence from royal
decrees and scholastic controversy in the mother country. Finally, one can
mention the bandeirantes who, beyond their role as pathfinders and prospectors,
served as a locally controlled strike force that was mobilized against the Jesuits
in Paraguay, against the Dutch invaders of Pernambuco, and against Palmares,
the “republic” of runaway slaves.

Between 1920 and 1950 influential writers like Oliveira Vianna, Nestor
Duarte, and Vítor Nunes Leal constructed an image of a dispersive “clan”-based
or clientistic Brazilian society which was anarchic in the sense that the private
order dominated the public until well into the twentieth century. Their
argument is persuasive; yet if it be true that Portugal reproduced overseas so
feeble an instrument of central control, one wonders why independent Brazil
was not even more subject than Spanish America to political pulverization.

Here in fact arises a second difficulty in aligning Brazilian with Spanish
American political experience. For just as the tutelary state was weakly
represented in Portuguese America, so one finds that caudillismo, and
specifically the post-independence “age of caudillos”, has no obvious counter­
part. A conventional explanation is that the transplantation to Rio de Janeiro of
the house of Bragança at the start of the Napoleonic intervention filled the
legitimacy vacuum experienced in Spanish America, while the dislocations and
centrifugalism attendant on independence were rendered manageable by a
Brazilian talent for political accommodation and conciliation.

In short, the argument just summarized leaves little margin for applying
the Thomistic and Machiavellian paradigms to the Brazilian case. Nor, at the same time, does it cogently explain how a loose archipelago of agrarian satrapies was fused with relatively little commotion into an independent, politically cohesive “empire”.

Another line of analysis, while not wholly incompatible with the one just sketched, enlarges the historical context and helps fit Brazil to the Latin American political family. This argument stresses the premise that well before the colonization of America the Portuguese crown had centralized power, curbed the nobles, coopted the merchants, and created a solid “bureaucratic state”. Many problems of political, territorial, and cultural unity or integration which have plagued “the Spains” down to our own day had been resolved or diminished in Portugal before overseas expansion. The Portuguese failure to delegate judicial and administrative functions to Brazil perhaps left regional patriciates a margin of freedom to establish their “private order”. But the state never relinquished control over the export economy, geographically limited for a century and a half to the northeast littoral. Even the bandeiras, so often celebrated as representing autonomous frontier energies, may have played an occasional role in Portuguese geopolitics.

In contrasting the careers of the Spanish and Portuguese empires Furtado shows that the state of Brazil may be seen to have had a more unilinear development. In the Spanish Indies the early period witnessed extensive state intervention to organize large regions around a few dynamic mining centers. The later period with its demographic rise and spread of hacienda agriculture saw a slackening of regional integration and the growth of landed patriciates having local economic horizons. Brazil’s early period, on the other hand, was characterized by an export economy of isolated zones oriented overseas. Then after the 1690s mineral strikes gave the state the incentive and wherewithal to assert its presence decisively throughout and beyond the settlement zones.

17 This may explain why Machiavelli’s writings stirred less interest in Portugal than in Spain in the sixteenth century. Martim de Albuquerque, A sombra de Mauivel e a ética tradicional portuguesa (Lisbon, 1974).
The strikes also accelerated immigration, growth of domestic markets, and the interlinking of regional elites.

On this view the articulation of the state apparatus in colonial Brazil, beginning with the curbing of the town councils after the mid-seventeenth century and reaching an apogee with the neomercantilism of the Marquis of Pombal (1750-77), seems not so much the implantation of a system of domination on a dispersed, "anarchic" agrarian domain as the actualizing of a set of political controls that had always existed in potential. Thus for example central power was extended in the eighteenth century by expanding the militia system. This in effect vested with public authority the "natural" command structures headed by landowners and local notables, who became cooperative if far from docile agents of royal power. Without causing stress and conflict, this strategy checked the incipient caudilhagem of backlanders and landed poderosos, as earlier asserted in bandeirismo or guerrilla resistance to the Dutch invader, and confined their authority to the scattered nuclei of rural production. In this light, the legendary Brazilian talent for political conciliation comes to represent systemic availability for cooptation rather than psychic preference for cordiality in human dealings.20

On the eve of Brazilian independence in 1822 certain circumstances reinforced the possibilities for evolutionary transition to nationhood. First, Brazil was a slave society. In the four influential provinces of Río de Janeiro, Minas Gerais, Bahia, and Pernambuco, where more than half the population lived, there were only two free citizens for every slave. This meant that the propertied classes were prepared to subordinate divisive regional and group interests to the need for unity in the event of slave insurrections, possibly abetted by the urban popular classes. Another factor was that Portuguese policy makers of the 1790s turned toward a design for empire that would give freer rein to initiatives from the colony. Brazilian intellectuals and Portuguese ministers collaborated to produce "an imperial idea, Luso-Brazilian in inspiration, which moved beyond nationalism to a broader imperial solution, and sought to defuse metropolitan-colonial tensions."21

Against this background, and given the migration of the Portuguese court to Rio, the task of giving form to an independent Brazilian polity was less a

question of nation-building, or “forging a patria”, than one of “internalizing” the mechanisms of metropolitan control formerly exercised from Lisbon. As Faoro puts it, the opposition between metropolis and colony persisted as one between state and nation.

Like Spanish American, then, Brazil inherited venerable precedents for the tutelary state. Indeed, the fact that Portuguese national unity was earlier and more conclusive than Spain’s may have lent the state rather matter-of-fact acceptance. For Brazilians the office of the king and later emperor was never imbued with the kind of mystique—the sanction of ancient tradition, of royal prerogative, of the Christian faith itself— which many claimed was the antidote for Spanish American anarchy and separatism. Brazil, wrote Oliveira Vianna, offered no constituency for divine right:

The principle of monarchy reached us when it was already losing its aura of sacredness. The king was not, when we became a nation, the “anointed of the Lord”; he was, on the contrary, a privileged person, whose privilege was discussed, combatted, denied.

When the Brazilian empire was finally abolished in 1889, the then president of Venezuela remarked, “The only republic that existed in America has been done away with: the Empire of Brazil.”

Within the institutional context so far sketched, the hegira of the Portuguese court to Rio in 1808, a sine qua non of the Brazilian story, merits attention as a case study in legitimation. For all of the muddleheadedness and procrastination that some have attributed to João VI, he managed during his Brazilian sojourn to expand the nation’s territory by conquest; to open Brazilian ports to the trade of friendly countries; to create the nation’s first bank; to sponsor the first attempts at industrialization and at colonization by non-Iberians; to establish a royal printing press; to invite a mission of French artists to the country; to found military and medical schools and a botanical garden. João even went so far as to abolish the jalousies of Rio house fronts, symbol of patriarchal seclusion and of the agrarian foundations of the culture. At the very moment, therefore, when the fragmented Spanish American countries were divested of viceregal panoply and falling, many of them, under

24 José María dos Santos, A política geral do Brasil (São Paulo, 1930), p. 11n.
caudillo leadership of popular origin, Brazil received those urban and courtly endowments it had so far lacked. The political significance of this, Faoro holds, was that Brazil, as distinct from most of Spanish America, now offered a chance to build the state “from the top down”, that is, starting from the “bureaucratic state” rather than from the caudillos and latifundistas.

Indecisive and apprehensive to the last, King João returned to Portugal in 1821, and his son Pedro declared Brazilian independence the following year in the face of the Portuguese policy of “recolonization”. Unlike most of the American nations, Brazil produced no outstanding national hero at this dramatic moment, although the two protagonists each had important qualities for leadership. Pedro had much of Bolívar’s dash, handsomeness, and physical prowess; he was a natural leader of considerable native intelligence; his sentimental life was impetuous; he moved as easily among commoners as among those of his station. In declaring Brazil an empire rather than a kingdom, he did so to acknowledge a popular base of popular support and not merely to enhance his public image.

José Bonifacio de Andrada, Pedro’s principal counselor at the moment of independence, was a scientist, schooled in the Enlightenment. He had been director of mines in Norway, established the chair of mineralogy at Coimbra, and served against the Napoleonic troops in Portugal. He was a man of outstanding intellect, a leader and organizer, and a constitutionalist in politics with fundamentally conservative leanings, although progressive in his plans for social and economic improvement. Like the emperor he briefly served, he could be vindictive and intolerant of criticism.

One might say that these men exhibited two sets of traits which in Bolívar were combined. Pedro had physique, bravado, and personal charm. José Bonifacio had a loftier political sense and a mature vision of national institutions. Bonifacio was the architect and Pedro the agent of Brazilian independence. In 1823, shortly after this fruitful collaboration, Pedro dissolved the constitutional assembly, arrested José Bonifacio and his brothers, then exiled them. Relations between the two men had consisted “rather in the conjunction of two energies than in the sympathy of two personalities”.25 Dissolution of the assembly was Pedro’s response to the “liberalism” —that is, the desire for decentralization and local autonomy— of the regional patriciates. He then

hand-picked a commission of ten who produced the Constitution of 1824, conspicuous for the broad discretionary powers it vested in the emperor.

We are addressing here the question of leadership and how that leadership mediated among the urgencies of the moment, the articulated aspirations of the few, and the shapeless desires of the multitude. In Brazil as elsewhere in Latin America a government had to meet four specifications if society were not to fall on the rocks of despotic or oligarchic caudillismo, or the shoals of collapsed authority and factionalism. These were: legitimacy, constitutionalism, nationalism, and personalism. That is, a new government, coming on the heels of three centuries of Catholic monarchical rule whose ultimate authority had never been questioned, needed the very aura of legitimacy that Metternich was then preaching in Europe. Second, it had to be constitutional, given the North American example and a penetration of Enlightenment ideas deeper than in many corners of Europe. Third, it had to acknowledge popular aspirations toward democratic national sovereignty. And finally, given a situation of political inexperience and incipient social chaos, a new government could be institutionalized only by the astute intervention of strong personalist leadership.

Needless to say, these four elements were difficult to orchestrate. Legitimacy generally meant a European prince (except to those who envisioned a restoration of the Incas), yet this was hard to square with nationalism, or with the need for shrewd personalistic leadership. Personalism and constitutionalism were of course uneasy bedfellows, for, as Machiavelli observed in the *Discourses*, the charismatic leader who establishes a constitutional regime must, like the old soldier, be willing to fade away.

In Brazil all four requirements were met. To the legitimacy of his Bragança lineage Dom Pedro gave popular, nationalist sanction by consulting with local leaders on the eve of independence; by acting under the advice of José Bonifacio, who was rabidly anti-Portuguese; and by declaring Brazil an empire in something of Napoleon’s spirit. Then at the crisis when factionalism threatened to impede the process of constitution-making, Pedro packed the Andrada brothers off to Portugal and—in personalistic style that would have pleased Machiavelli—promulgated a constitution. Thereafter his leadership faltered. His democratic convictions could never be reconciled with his authoritarian temperament, and in 1831 he abdicated in obedience to pressure for responsible government from the soldiery and the populace. Luckily, exile was made responsible by the fact that there awaited him in Portugal the task of rescuing the crown
from his usurping brother. As his successor, Pedro left in Brazil his give-year-old son, who came under the tutelage of José Bonifacio, now returned.

The regency period that ensued threw into question the political premises of the new empire. The Additional Act of 1834 increased the power of the provincial governments at the expense of the central government on one hand and the territorial magnates on the other. Throughout the regency decade and for another decade after Pedro II assumed power in 1840, Brazil was torn from north to south by revolts of varied complexion.

Faoro constructs a hypothetical cast of political actors to differentiate the incipient political breakdown in Brazil from the caudillismo of Argentina. On one side, standing for centralization and traditional metropolitan interests, he places the "bureaucratic estate", reconstituted after independence and reinforced by Portuguese urban-commercial groups. On the other he locates the latifundista representing "liberalism" in the form of local autonomy, resistance to statism, and "privatization". Intermittently allied to the landed patriarch are the caudillo and the bandido. While the latter find their natural home in regions inaccessible to justice, the caudillo participates in the national polity and may sometimes be a landowner. To a degree the caudillo's sympathies are with localism and "liberalism". Yet he has historic ties to central authority by his service in the old militia or in the new National Guard. This, according to Faoro, is what distinguishes the Argentine and Brazilian caudillos. The former assemble and lead their montoneras in defiance of the law of the new nation; the latter have links to the public order, boast military patents, and may be recruited to smother insurrections.

In reexamining the dichotomous characterization of Brazilian political development as state vs. society, or bureaucracy vs. "feudalism," Fabio Wanderley Reis warns against embracing either pole as representing an original principle. We look for shifting configurations, not an isolated motive force. Take for example the proposition that the conspicuous political actor in nineteenth-century Brazil was not the separatistic caudillo but the coronel, or

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26 Faoro, Donos do poder, pp. 179-81.
local notable who held military credentials from the central government. This is by no means a polar distinction, for both colonel and caudillo are defined by the extent and nature of their compromise with central power. Moreover, just as the Spanish American caudillo did have a Brazilian counterpart, so Spanish America offered a large cast of latifundistas, caciques, and militia commanders who were functional equivalents of the colonel.

The two contexts therefore produced analogous dramatis personae, deployed as historical circumstances dictated. The Spanish American age of caudillos lasted half a century or more after 1810 while Brazil’s years of caudilhagem are associated with the regency decade. In the colonial period, the tables were turned. The age of the Spanish caudillo-conquistador yielded to bureaucratic domination in the third quarter of the sixteenth century, while in Brazil, outside the northeast sugar strip, the caudillo-bandeirante reigned until 1700. While differences of political tradition and of institutional momentum lie behind these contrasts, one turns to economic circumstances in explaining historical specifics. The tardy transplantation of the state apparatus to Brazil obviously has to do with the lateness of the mineral strikes, while the brevity of the caudillo period is related to the prospects for export earnings and to the commercial interests of the British and of resident Portuguese merchants.

The usefulness of the state-society binomial is not that it encapsulates a “thesis” about Latin American political development but that it offers more suitable coordinates for discussing the topic than have customarily been available. The assumptions made here are, first, that “the state” is a self-standing entity to be conjured with, not a multilateral covenant. Second, “the society” is a somewhat passive organism, parts of it marginalized or inchoate, not an aggregation of persons and primary associations with protean capacities for organization. As Fabio Wanderley reminds us, Brazilian coronelismo may, for purposes of “state-building”, seem a force for dispersion and corrosion; but for purposes of “society-building,” it may be seen as a force that creates and shapes power. A similar analysis has been constructed for Spanish American caudillismo.

Brazil’s interlude of potential disaggregation was terminated by the

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decisive action of centralist political leaders who "interpreted" the Additional Act to reverse its decentralizing provisions; advanced the "majority" of Pedro II to allow him to assume power in 1840; systematically put down provincial insurrections by military force; and finally, in the 1850s, fashioned a program of "Conciliation" to rehabilitate the tutelary state. Pedro II, famed for benevolent and constitutional rule, acceded to the throne as the steward of the state, not its author.

Ideal Types as Pointers

Earlier we proposed that the Thomistic and Machiavellian types of polity loosely correspond to the two Weberian ideal types of the political system legitimized on traditional grounds and the system legitimized on charismatic grounds. This cross-linking gives historical and cultural anchorage for Weber's categories while suggesting universal or comparative features of the Latin American experience.

In the three instances given to illustrate routinization of charisma—Chile and Brazil in the nineteenth century, Mexico in the twentieth—our interpretation was that in each case charisma was transferred from a leader or leaders to an office, a process assisted by the recovery of certain features of the traditional polity. Such recovery involved reworking, not mere reproduction, of these features. In Brazil, for example, they were adapted to the forms of constitutional, parliamentary monarchy, while in Mexico they were reasserted in the guise of revolutionary populism.

So far I have left out of discussion Weber's third type of authority, whose legitimacy rests on rational or legal grounds. Here the historico-cultural correlate would, in the context of this essay, be the Lockean polity. Our account of routinization of charisma in Latin America has been presented as though the only outcome for charismatic authority was legitimation on traditional grounds. To be sure, the post-independence decades were a time when patterns of bureaucratic rationality that had been reinforced during the "enlightened" Bourbon and Pombaline period seem to have become enfeebled. On the other hand, with the foreign investments and bureaucratic growth of the "order and progress" decades starting in about 1870, it seemed that rationalization of the grounds of authority was an inevitable prerequisite for, or concomitant to, the insertion of Latin America into the international economy. Until well into our century, conventional wisdom assumed that Latin America's destined path was
from charismatic to legal-rational authority, following the Argentine model of 1870-1930 as it was then interpreted.

Weber warns against using ideal types as historical descriptions. What history gives us are “highly complex variants, transitions, and combinations of these pure types”. To illustrate this historical flux we use typologies to help detect configurations and tendencies. Typologies do not impart logic to a historical situation. They help us discern a logic that is inherent in it. Thus a “common-sense” view of the political requirements for economic development, deduced from the ideal constructs themselves, would suggest natural evolution from traditional to rational forms of authority. As we apply these constructs to Latin America we find every situation to be an intricate mix of the three types. We further find that the characteristic development is from charismatic to traditional legitimation, with rationalization an inevitable but secondary motif.31

To understand why Latin American political development presents this central feature requires fuller elaboration of the argument. First, of Weber’s several subtypes of traditional authority (patriarchalism, feudalism, patrimonialism, sultanism, and so forth) we must identify the one most pertinent to the case. Second, we reckon with the fact that a system of authority is not simply an institutional arrangement but rests on a substrate of belief, perhaps of a “religious” nature, that sanctions authority and predisposes to obedience. Finally, we must recognize that shifts in an authority system are not simply a matter of political “will power” but are linked to changes in the economic order. These topics, however, must be explored elsewhere.32

31 I therefore take issue with those who distinguish caciques from caudillos on the grounds that the former tend to convert charisma into traditional domination while the latter convert it to legal domination. Fernando Díaz Díaz, Caudillos y caciques, Antonio López de Santa Anna y Juan A. Alvarez (México City, 1972), p. 4.
32 For the first two points see my essay “La herencia de América Latina”, Plural 4, 10 (1975): 33-42.