Areté. Vol. 17 Núm. 2 (2005)

URI permanente para esta colecciónhttp://54.81.141.168/handle/123456789/182178

Tabla de Contenido

Artículos

La doctrina kantiana del esquematismo trascendental Arias-Albisu, Martín; 155-182

Superación del representacionalismo e inmanentismo en la génesis de la fenomenología husserliana de la percepción Rizo-Patrón de Lerner, Rosemary; 183-212

¿Religiones del amor? Reflexiones sobre religión y violencia en las grandes religiones monoteístas Uhde, Bernhard; 213-236

La idea de un cuasi pensamiento de segundo-orden: Una objección a la teoría reflexiva del pensamiento consciente Vidal, Javier; 237-249

Documentos

La transformación de la guerra y la cuestión de la paz Castillo, Monique; 253-271

Reconocimiento y justicia. Entrevista a Axel Honneth realizada por Francisco Cortés Rodas Cortés Rodas, Francisco; 273-294

El significado ya no es lo que era antes Montalbetti, Mario; 295-311

Reseñas

Miguel Giusti (ed.), El retorno del espíritu. Motivos hegelianos en la filosofía práctica contemporánea, Lima: PUCP, 2003, 294 pp. Casuso, Gianfranco; 315-325

Juan Abugattás, Indagaciones filosóficas sobre nuestro futuro, Lima: Universidad Nacional Mayor de San Marcos/UNESCO, 2005, 199 pp. Depaz, Zenón; 327-331

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Mostrando 1 - 9 de 9

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¿Religiones del amor? Reflexiones sobre religión y violencia en las grandes religiones monoteístas
(Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú. Fondo Editorial, 2005) Uhde, Bernhard
The great monotheistic religions –Judaism, Christianity, and Islam– agree in announcing God’s love for men, while demanding men’s love for God and for their neighbors. However, a brief look at these religions’ praxis leads to doubt whether this love is not a mere statement, while in history and at present were and are still imposed exclusive truth claims exercising violence against the adepts of the own religion (internally”) and, in especial, against the followers of other religions (externally”) in order to attain political power. Now, a distinction between the just sovereign power of God and detrimental violence should be made, asides from the fact that God’s sovereign power and God’s concept is not the same in the three great monotheistic religions. In Judaism God governs with love and as king, in Christianity with love and as servant, in Islam with love and majesty. Nevertheless, sovereign power is exclusive of God and detrimental violence is never desired among men. Only thus is power constitutive of religion’s inner nature, but not of the relation between religions or of religions with the world: There is no coercion in religion”.
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Superación del representacionalismo e inmanentismo en la génesis de la fenomenología husserliana de la percepción
(Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú. Fondo Editorial, 2005) Rizo-Patrón de Lerner, Rosemary
Husserl’s overcoming of the Modern representationalist and immanentist notions of consciousness and knowledge is tied to the early development of his sui generis concept of intentionality. This development is the result of logical and psychological studies, the latter laying open different modalities of intuition: the founded modes –eidetic and categorial– and the sensible founding modes, all of which presuppose the most basic and founding mode –that of perception. Although the Husserlian concept of intentionality is determined by Husserl’s discovery of ideality” in his logicsemantic investigations, no less relevant are Husserl psychological studies and the early development of a non-representationalist notion of perception. This paper will attempt to highlight some salient features of Husserl’s early phenomenology of perception and its overcoming of representationalism.
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Reconocimiento y justicia. Entrevista a Axel Honneth realizada por Francisco Cortés Rodas
(Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú. Fondo Editorial, 2005) Cortés Rodas, Francisco
No contiene resumen
Texto completo enlazado
Miguel Giusti (ed.), El retorno del espíritu. Motivos hegelianos en la filosofía práctica contemporánea, Lima: PUCP, 2003, 294 pp.
(Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú. Fondo Editorial, 2005) Casuso, Gianfranco
No contiene resumen
Texto completo enlazado
Juan Abugattás, Indagaciones filosóficas sobre nuestro futuro, Lima: Universidad Nacional Mayor de San Marcos/UNESCO, 2005, 199 pp.
(Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú. Fondo Editorial, 2005) Depaz, Zenón
No contiene resumen
Texto completo enlazado
La doctrina kantiana del esquematismo trascendental
(Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú. Fondo Editorial, 2005) Arias-Albisu, Martín
The paper’s purpose is to offer an interpretation of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason’s chapter On the schematism of the pure concepts of the understanding”. Our hypothesis is that in the doctrine of the schematism the possibility of the ontological constitution of the object as object is decided. Thus we will show that only with the transcendental schemes we find the basic ontological predicates of objectivity. This is demonstrated by establishing that only thanks to the doctrine of schematism the inner dynamism of the cooperation between sensibility and understanding gives place to objective knowledge.
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La transformación de la guerra y la cuestión de la paz
(Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú. Fondo Editorial, 2005) Castillo, Monique
No contiene resumen
Texto completo enlazado
El significado ya no es lo que era antes
(Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú. Fondo Editorial, 2005) Montalbetti, Mario
No contiene resumen
Texto completo enlazado
La idea de un cuasi pensamiento de segundo-orden: Una objección a la teoría reflexiva del pensamiento consciente
(Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú. Fondo Editorial, 2005) Vidal, Javier
The thesis defended in this paper is that theHigher-Order Thought Theory is actually inconsistent. According to the theoryit would be possible to introduce the notion of a second-order quasi-thoughtfrom S. Shoemaker’s notion of a quasi-memory. On the one hand, a secondorderquasi-thought, but not necessarily a quasi-memory, entails an use of ‘I’as subject. On the other hand, Shoemaker conceives the use of ‘I’ as subjectin terms of the notion of an immunity to error through misidentification. Now,as the notion of a quasi-memory as the notion of a second-order quasi-thoughtare liable to allow for the cases of personal and psychological fission where thecausal series between events belonging to one and the same subject is broken,and thus there is not an immunity to error through misidentification. Then, thenotion of a second-order quasi-thought would allow for cases where an use of ‘I’as subject is not immune to error through misidentification!