DT
DECON

DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO

Nº 551

# PERCEPTIONS OF OWN SOCIAL CLASS AND LOCAL AFFLUENCE: EFFECTS ON PREFERENCES FOR REDISTRIBUTION

Javier Olivera and Paola Villa-Paro

Departamento
Académico de Economía

PUCP

DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N° 551

# Perceptions of own social class and local affluence: Effects on preferences for redistribution

Javier Olivera and Paola Villa-Paro

Noviembre, 2025


DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO 551
http://doi.org/10.18800/2079-8474.0551

**Perceptions of own social class and local affluence: Effects on preferences for redistribution**
Documento de Trabajo 551



Editado:

© Departamento de Economía – Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú
Av. Universitaria 1801, Lima 32 – Perú.
Teléfono: (51-1) 626-2000 anexos 4950 - 4951
econo@pucp.edu.pe
https://departamento-economia.pucp.edu.pe/publicaciones/documentos

Encargado de la Serie: Gabriel Rodríguez
Departamento de Economía – Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú
gabriel.rodriguez@pucp.edu.pe
Primera edición – Noviembre, 2025

ISSN 2079-8474 (En línea)

# Perceptions of own social class and local affluence: Effects on preferences for redistribution*

Javier Olivera† Paola Villa-Paro‡

November 3, 2025

**Abstract**

We conducted an online survey experiment in Lima to study how perceptions of social class shape support for economic redistribution. Participants were randomly informed about either their actual socio-economic status (SES) or the true share of affluent households in their district. Respondents substantially overestimated their own SES and, to a lesser extent, the prevalence of affluent households. Correcting these misperceptions generally increased support for redistribution, with no effect on a wealth-tax proposal. Effects were especially strong when respondents had misjudged their SES by two or more levels: even those predisposed against redistribution (e.g., right-leaning, individualistic, or sceptical of government) increased their support. Similar patterns also emerged when correcting beliefs about the local distribution of SES.

**Key words:** Preferences for redistribution, inequality perceptions, beliefs, wealth taxes, Peru

**JEL-classification:** H24, D31, D63, E62, H53

*We thank comments by Ingvild Almas, Johanna Mollerstrom, and seminar participants at Princeton, ECINEQ in Aix-en-Marseille, Universidad del Pacifico in Lima, Colegio de Mexico, and LSE in London. We thank Claudia Vivas for excellent research assistance. This research was supported by the Pontificia Universidad Catolica del Peru (Research Grant FAI-0014-2021) and by the Luxembourg Fonds National de la Recherche (PREFERME grant C17/SC/11715898).

†National Bank of Belgium, Luxembourg Institute of Socio-Economic Research (LISER), and Department of Economics, Pontificia Universidad Catolica del Peru (PUCP); e-mail: javier.olivera@liser.lu; javier.olivera@nbb.be.

‡University of Michigan; e-mail: villap@umich.edu.

# Percepciones de la propia clase social y la riqueza local: Efectos sobre las preferencias por redistribución


**Resumen**

Explotamos una encuesta en línea en Lima para estudiar cómo las percepciones sobre la clase social influyen en la demanda por redistribución económica. Se informó aleatoriamente a los participantes sobre su nivel socioeconómico (NSE) real o sobre la proporción real de hogares acomodados en su distrito. Los encuestados sobreestimaron considerablemente su propio NSE y, en menor medida, la prevalencia de hogares acomodados. La corrección de estas percepciones erróneas aumentó en general la demanda por redistribución, sin que ello tuviera ningún efecto sobre el apoyo a impuesto sobre la riqueza. Los efectos fueron especialmente importantes cuando los encuestados habían juzgado erróneamente su NSE en dos o más niveles: incluso aquellos predispuestos en contra de la redistribución (por ejemplo, de tendencia conservadora, individualistas o escépticos con respecto al gobierno) aumentaron su apoyo. También se observaron patrones similares al corregir las creencias sobre la distribución local del BSE.



**Palabras claves:** Preferencias for redistribución, percepciones de desigualdad, creencias, impuesto a la riqueza, Peru

**Clasificacion JEL:** H24, D31, E62, H53.

# 1 Introduction

An essential prediction of the Meltzer and Richard (1981) model is that higher income inequality should lead to greater demand for redistribution. A common approach to testing this prediction has been the examination of individual preferences for redistribution, with several studies investigating the influence of income inequality on these preferences (e.g., Alesina and Giuliano, 2011; Pittau et al., 2013; Olivera, 2015; Dimick et al., 2016; Andreoli and Olivera, 2020). However, the findings are mixed, with some studies failing to confirm that greater inequality consistently leads to stronger support for redistribution. In response, the literature has explored alternative avenues to better assess this relationship, with a growing body of research focusing on the role of perceptions and informational biases. For instance, Cruces et al. (2013), Karadja et al. (2017), and Fernandez-Albertos and Kuo (2015) demonstrate that redistributive preferences are often shaped by misperceptions of relative income, yet these preferences can change when individuals are exposed to accurate information. Similarly, Kuziemko et al. (2015) and Sides (2016) document significant shifts in support for estate taxes when respondents learn that only a small fraction of estates are subject to this tax. Furthermore, Gimpelson and Treisman (2018) and Hauser and Norton (2017) emphasize that perceptions of inequality have a more substantial influence on redistributive preferences than actual levels of inequality.

In addition to perceptions, individual beliefs about the origins of inequality are key determinants of preferences for redistribution (Scheuer and Slemrod, 2021; Alesina and Angeletos, 2005; Cappelen et al., 2013; Durante et al., 2014). Notably, beliefs about fairness, luck, and effort are central to understanding redistributive attitudes, as highlighted by studies using both laboratory and field experiments. Other factors influencing preferences include self-interest and altruism (Fong, 2001; Dimick et al., 2016, 2018), insurance motives, social concerns (Durante et al., 2014), expectations of upward mobility (Benabou and Ok, 2001), and perceived benefits of redistribution (Stantcheva, 2021). These micro-level mechanisms provide a more nuanced understanding of how individuals form their attitudes toward redistribution.

Recent studies use survey experiments to examine how misperceptions shape preferences for tax and redistribution policies. These experiments randomly assign informational treatments to correct individuals' beliefs about inequality levels or their relative income position, and then assess changes in their support for redistribution. For instance, individuals who overestimate their position in the income distribution may demand less redistribution than they would if aware of their true standing. Prominent examples include Cruces et al. (2013), Karadja et al. (2017), Hoy et al. (2024b), Bublitz (2022), and Kuziemko et al. (2015).

This study uses an online survey experiment conducted in Lima in 2021 to examine how perceived socio-economic status (SES) and local inequality affect support for redistribution. The main outcomes include preferences for redistribution, support for reducing income inequality, endorsement of a wealth tax, and support for reducing inequality of opportunity. At baseline, respondents self-assessed their SES using a five-level classification –from low to upper class–

following the standards of Peru's National Institute of Statistics (INEI). They were also asked to estimate the share of affluent households (upper-middle and upper class) living in their district.

To test the effects of information on perceptions, participants were randomly assigned to one of three groups. The first received accurate information about their actual SES based on INEI estimates, the second was informed about the true share of affluent households in their district, and the third received no information and served as the control group. The results reveal two main patterns. First, unlike many studies where individuals underestimate their relative income, most respondents in our sample perceived themselves as belonging to a higher SES than they actually were, with about 70% showing a positive bias. Second, perceptions of local affluence were also biased: about half overestimated the district share of affluent households (50%), while 34% underestimated it.

An important distinction of our study is the use of perceived SES, which captures individuals' broader sense of social class and social standing. This measure differs substantially from income percentiles commonly used in previous research on low- and middle-income countries (e.g., Bussolo and Dixit, 2023; Hoy et al., 2024b). The distinction is particularly relevant in contexts like Lima, where class identity reflects not only income but also education, occupation, and lifestyle. By focusing on perceived SES, our experiment captures a more meaningful dimension of social comparison.

Our findings show that treatment effects are concentrated among respondents with a positive bias –those who overestimate either their own SES or the share of affluent households in their district. The SES information treatment is generally ineffective at correcting perceptions, except when the adjustment involves a change of at least two SES levels. In such cases, providing accurate information about respondents' actual SES increases support for reducing both income and opportunity inequalities and raises the composite index of redistributive preferences. Similarly, providing accurate information about the true share of affluent households in respondents' districts enhances support for redistribution, including stronger agreement with reducing income inequality, addressing inequality of opportunity, and improving the overall redistributive preference index. Notably, however, neither treatment affects support for a wealth tax.

The heterogeneity analysis focuses on respondents exhibiting a positive bias under any treatment condition. The results show that correcting misperceptions about one's own SES increases support for redistribution, especially among individuals whose prior beliefs are typically linked to weaker redistributive preferences –such as higher risk tolerance, right-leaning political orientation, individualistic values, low trust in government, and the belief that income mainly reflects effort. A similar pattern is observed when correcting misperceptions about the share of affluent households in respondents' districts.

Recent work shows that the socio-economic composition of neighbourhoods –especially local income inequality– shapes people's (mis)perceptions and their attitudes toward inequality and redistribution. Minkoff and Lyons (2019) find that exposure to greater income diversity

in one's surroundings is associated with larger perceived income gaps and stronger support for redistribution. Similarly, Hoy et al. (2024a) show that right-leaning individuals in high-inequality areas are more likely to revise beliefs and increase support for redistribution after receiving accurate information about inequality. By contrast, Domènech-Arumí (2025) report that local inequality in Barcelona correlates with perceived inequality but not with redistributive preferences. Building on this literature, our survey records the geo-location of each respondent's dwelling and links census-based local inequality measures within buffer zones of 300, 500, and 1,000 meters around each household.

We find that local inequality indices are significantly associated with bias in perceived SES, but not with bias in the estimated share of affluent households in the district. Since bias in SES is defined as the difference between perceived and objective class, individuals living in areas with higher local inequality tend to form more accurate assessments of their own social position.

Moreover, we find that higher local inequality is generally associated with weaker support for redistribution. There is some evidence that individuals living in high-inequality areas become more supportive of redistribution when informed that they overestimated the share of affluent households in their district, but this effect is not very strong, does not appear across all outcomes, and is sensitive to how bias is defined. These results should be interpreted with caution given the relatively small experimental subsamples.

The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the data and methods. Section 3 analyses the biases identified in our experiment. Section 4 presents and discusses the regression results. Section 5 provides additional analysis incorporating local inequality metrics. Finally, Section 6 concludes.

# 2 Data and methods

## 2.1 The online survey

We designed an online survey to examine how perceived social class and local inequality shape individual attitudes toward economic redistribution. The survey was implemented by Pulso-PUCP in the city of Lima during October and November 2021.[1] Specifically, the study focuses on the Lima Metropolitan Area (Lima Metropolitana), which comprises 43 districts of Lima Province and 7 districts of the adjacent Callao Province. This area is the largest metropolitan region in Peru, with 11.2 million inhabitants out of a national population of 33.4 million. These districts are commonly grouped into five subregions according to their location: Northern Lima, Southern Lima, Eastern Lima, Central Lima, and Callao.

The survey targeted Peruvian citizens residing in Metropolitan Lima aged between 18 and 64. Pulso-PUCP recruited participants using quota sampling to approximate the actual pop-

[1] Pulso-PUCP is a spin-off company of the Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú (PUCP) dedicated to conducting market and opinion studies as well as strategic data analysis.

ulation distribution of Metropolitan Lima by district, sex, and age group (18–29, 30–44, and 45–64). The sampling frame included residents aged 18 to 64 in 2021 across 35 districts. Fifteen smaller or more remote districts (e.g., seaside or near mountain areas) were excluded, representing about 5.6% of the total metropolitan population. Population projections from the National Institute of Statistics were used to construct the sampling framework. The sample consists of 1,319 individuals. As shown in Table A–1, the sample is well balanced across the five subregions of Metropolitan Lima. A balance test on socio-demographic variables confirms the comparability of treatment groups (Table A–2). The sample is also broadly representative at the district level, although some districts are slightly over- or under-represented.

The first fifteen questions of the survey gathered socio-demographic information. Reported income and household size were later used to tailor the information provided to respondents randomly assigned to the treatment groups. The questionnaire also included baseline measures of beliefs and attitudes, such as views on fairness, trust in the government's capacity to manage and redistribute public funds, perceptions of individual versus governmental responsibility for supporting others, political ideology, and risk preferences.

Two additional questions capture individuals' baseline perceptions of their socio-economic status (SES) and of the share of affluent households in their district. Specifically, respondents were asked: "The National Institute of Statistics (INEI) classifies households in Lima into five levels according to their income. Which group do you think your household belongs to?". The available options were Upper, Upper-middle, Middle, Lower-middle, and Low. In the second question, respondents used a slider to indicate the percentage of households in their district they believed belonged to the Upper or Upper-middle classes.[2]

Respondents were randomly assigned to one of three groups: a control group (C), treatment 1 (T1) a correction on their perceived SES, or treatment 2 (T2) a correction on their perception about the share of affluent households. Pre-treatment questions and outcome measures were identical across all groups. The only difference in the treatment groups was the provision of accurate information intended to "correct" respondents' perceptions (see Table 1). In T1, participants were shown both their self-reported and actual SES levels. The actual SES was determined by constructing household income per capita from self-reported income and household size, and then applying INEI's income brackets for SES classification. The treatment indicated whether the respondent's perceived SES was equal to, higher, or lower than the official classification. In T2, participants were shown the share of affluent households in their district as reported by them and the true value from INEI statistics. The treatment highlighted whether the perceived share was equal to, higher, or lower than the official estimate.

[2] INEI (2021) provides maps and estimates of the SES distribution for all districts and blocks of Metropolitan Lima, based on data from the 2017 National Census and large-scale household surveys conducted between 2017 and 2020. INEI first estimates per capita income for sampled households within each block, and then computes the SES distribution at block and district levels using income thresholds specific to Metropolitan Lima.

Table 1: Description of treatments

| Name | Description | Sample size |
|---|---|---|
| Baseline | 1. "The National Institute of Statistics (INEI) classifies the households in Lima into 5 levels according to their incomes. Choose the group you think your household belongs to: <Upper>, <Upper-middle>, <Middle>, <Lower-middle>, and <Low>".<br>2. "In the district where you live, what percentage of households do you think are Upper or Upper Middle level. Please slide the bar until you reach the percentage you think is appropriate". | 1,296 |
| T1 | "According to your income and according to studies by the National Institute of Statistics, your household would belong to level **L**, and you said it was level **M**. That is, the level of your household is <higher> <lower> <the same> than you thought". | 426 |
| T2 | "According to studies performed by the National Institute of Statistics, in your district there are **R**% of Upper and Upper-Middle households, and you said there were **S**%. That is, there is <a higher> <a lower> <about the same> percentage of rich households in your district than you thought". | 471 |
| C | The control group does not receive any bias correction | 396 |

*Notes:* The sample size refers to the initial sample before dropping any observations due to missing covariates. Only extreme interview durations (bottom and top 1%) were removed. All individuals answered the baseline questions, while respondents were randomly assigned to the control and treatment groups (C=396, T1=426, T2=471).

## 2.2 Variables of interest

The outcomes we measure after baseline and treatment questions are:

- *Preferences for redistribution*. Respondents indicate their position on a scale from 1 to 10 between two opposing statements: 1 means strong agreement with the idea that incomes should be made more equal, while 10 indicates strong agreement with the view that greater income differences are necessary to reward individual effort. Respondents may choose any value between 1 and 10 to reflect their views. This question has been included in multiple waves of the World Values Survey (WVS) and the European Values Survey (EVS) across various countries and years.

- *Reduce inequality*. Participants indicate the extent to which they agree with the statement "The state must implement strong policies to reduce income inequality between the rich and the poor". Responses are measured on a 4-point Likert scale: strongly disagree (1), disagree (2), agree (3), and strongly agree (4).

- *Wealth tax*. Participants indicate the extent to which they agree with the statement "The State should levy a tax on wealth exceeding one million Soles". This value is about USD 260,000. The Likert scale is the same as before.

- *Reduce inequality of opportunity*. Participants indicate the extent to which they agree with the statement "The state must reduce the differences in opportunities between children from rich and poor neighbourhoods". The Likert scale is the same as before.

- *Index of redistribution*. We construct an overall index of redistributive preferences for each individual by averaging the standardized values of the four outcome variables. This approach follows Cruces et al. (2013), who use a similar composite index to summarize preferences for redistribution.

For all outcome variables, we rescale the values to range between 0 and 1. Table A–3 in the Appendix presents the descriptive statistics for both the outcomes and the covariates.

## 2.3 Local inequality

The survey asked each respondent to provide their household address or, alternatively, the closest identifiable point to their dwelling, such as a street intersection, park, or bus stop. Based on automated searches using the Google API and subsequent manual verification, we obtained valid geographical coordinates for 937 individuals (72% of the analytical sample), after discarding inconsistent or low-quality entries. Appendix F describes the procedure used to obtain these coordinates and presents the corresponding maps. Overall, the distribution of districts in the initial sample and the selected sample with addresses is very similar, except for one district (San Martín de Porres; see Table F–1 in the Appendix). Moreover, the control and treatment groups are well distributed across the city (see Figure F–1 in the Appendix).

The georeferenced data allow us to link each respondent to local inequality measures, which we include in some of the regression analyses. We construct buffer zones of 300, 500, and 1,000 meters around each respondent's dwelling. The local data come from the *Stratified plans of Metropolitan Lima by income at the block level* published in INEI (2021). This source provides block-level information for 2020 in Metropolitan Lima on household income per capita, the share of households and persons in each of the five SES levels, and the coefficient of variation (CV). Because these data are available at the block level, we can aggregate them to each buffer zone and compute three inequality metrics: the Generalized Entropy index with $\alpha = 2$ (GE(2)), the CV, and the local share of affluent households (defined as the sum of the upper and upper-middle SES groups).[3]

## 2.4 Methods

We begin by measuring and analysing the biases that individuals hold regarding their own socioeconomic class and the share of affluent households in their district. Graphical and regression

[3]Given the availability of the CV, mean income, and the number of persons and households per block, we can derive GE(2) for each buffer zone using the standard within/between decomposition of the GE(2) index. The CV of the buffer zone is also computed from the block-level information.

analyses are used to document these patterns, both separately and jointly. We then estimate the effects of the informational treatments on each outcome related to redistribution preferences using linear regressions, and examine heterogeneous effects along key pre-treatment beliefs.

Finally, we compute local inequality measures, which are matched to each respondent's geographical location within buffer zones of 300, 500, and 1,000 meters around the dwelling. These measures help to better understand the observed biases and to assess how individuals' responsiveness to the treatments varies with local inequality.

Our main regression model estimates average treatment effects using the following specification:

$$y_j = \beta_0 + \beta_1 T \times negbias + \beta_2 T \times posbias + \beta_3 T \times nobias + \beta_4 negbias + \beta_5 posbias + \varepsilon_i \quad (1)$$

where $y_j$ represents one of the $j$ outcomes measuring preferences for redistribution, and $T$ takes the value 1 if the individual receives the treatment and 0 otherwise. The variables *posbias*, *negbias*, and *nobias* indicate whether the respondent exhibits a positive bias, negative bias, or no bias, respectively.

For treatment 1 (T1), there is a positive (negative) bias when the respondent believes she belongs to a higher (lower) socio-economic status (SES) group than the one to which she actually belongs. There is no bias when the perceived and actual SES levels coincide. For treatment 2 (T2), there is a positive (negative) bias when the respondent believes that the share of affluent households in her district is at least 5 percentage points (pp) higher (lower) than the actual value. No bias is defined when the difference between the perceived and actual shares is no larger than 5 pp.

Because assignment to the treatment and control groups is random, we can identify the average effects of the treatments ($\beta_1$ and $\beta_2$) for two types of individuals: those exhibiting a positive or negative bias. As expected, no treatment effects should arise among individuals without bias.

To allow for greater sensitivity to treatment intensity, we also redefine the bias thresholds. For T1, a bias is considered relevant only when the difference between the perceived and actual SES levels is at least two categories. For T2, we relax the definition of no bias by increasing the threshold from 5 pp to 10 pp between the perceived and actual shares of affluent households.

# 3 Bias analysis

In this section, we examine individuals' biased perceptions of their own socio-economic status (SES) and of the share of affluent households (upper and upper-middle class) residing in their district. We define the absolute bias as the absolute difference between the objective and per-

ceived SES. Figure 1a displays the distribution of the SES bias, which is skewed to the right.[4] Most respondents believe they belong to a higher SES group than their actual one—that is, they exhibit a positive bias (overestimation). Specifically, 69.9% of respondents overestimate their SES position, 17.5% report it accurately, and only 12.6% underestimate it. Table B–1 in Appendix B details the bias level for each SES group.[5]

These results stand in sharp contrast with findings from previous studies. Karadja et al. (2017) report that 86% of their Swedish respondents underestimate their position in the national income distribution. Similarly, the field experiment of Cruces et al. (2013) in Buenos Aires finds that only 30% of subjects display a positive bias about their income decile, while 55% underestimate and 15% report it correctly. In a large-scale survey experiment in India, Bussolo and Dixit (2023) find that 70% of respondents underestimate their income decile and only 17% overestimate it. Closer to our findings, Fernandez-Albertos and Kuo (2015) report from an online survey experiment y in Spain that 45% of respondents see themselves as richer than they are, while 40% believe they are poorer.[6] It is important to note that for our study, the perceived socio-economic class might encompass a broader self-assessment than an income decile, possibly reflecting different reference points or dimensions of status. Nevertheless, individuals also tend to have limited knowledge of the income distribution and of their own relative position within it. In our case, the key interest lies in how "correcting" these misperceptions influences preferences for redistribution.

Regarding the perceived percentage of affluent households, we do not observe a systematic bias, although the distribution is slightly skewed to the right (see Figure 1b). This suggests that individuals tend to overestimate the share of affluent households in their districts. In fact, 57.1% of respondents report a higher percentage than the actual value, while 41.2% report a lower one. Table B–2 highlights a significant disparity in bias across different district types. Respondents from low-income districts exhibit an average positive bias of 0.93, while those from high-income districts exhibit an average negative bias of 0.96. . Figure B–2 further illustrates the extent of these deviations from the unbiased benchmark.

[4] Assigning numerical values from 1 (low) to 5 (upper) to the SES groups, the absolute bias has a median of 1.0 and a mean of 0.89.

[5] Figure B–1 in the Appendix shows that the distribution of perceived social class in our survey is broadly similar to that observed in the Latinobarómetro survey, a well-known cross-country study of public opinion and values conducted biannually across Latin America. The Peruvian data were collected between February and March 2023

[6] Interestingly, in a study covering ten countries, Hoy and Mager (2021) focus on the two poorest quintiles and find that between 67% (in the United Kingdom) and 94% (in Nigeria) of individuals overestimated their relative position.

Figure 1: Distribution of bias in the sample

(a) Perceived and actual SES




(b) Perceived and actual share of affluent households in the district




*Notes*: *Note:* The top panel shows the distribution of bias, defined as the difference between perceived and actual SES group. The bottom panel displays the distribution of bias measured as the difference between the perceived and actual percentage of affluent households (upper and upper-middle classes) in the district. The analysis is based on 1,293 observations.

We next explore the determinants of bias in our sample. Table 2 reports linear regressions of the two types of bias on individual covariates.[7] Columns (1)–(2) present results for the bias

[7]We included all individuals from both the control and treatment groups, as perceptions of one's own socioeconomic status (SES) and the proportion of affluent households in the district were assessed at the baseline, prior to any informational intervention.

related to the perceived versus actual SES, while columns (3)–(4) show results for the bias between the perceived and actual shares of affluent households (upper and upper-middle classes) in the district. The dependent variable in columns (1) and (3) is the nominal bias –the signed difference between the perceived and actual values– whereas columns (2) and (4) use the absolute value of the bias. Because the nature of the information differs across experimental treatments, we include fixed effects for the actual SES in the SES-bias regressions and fixed effects for the actual share of affluent households in the affluent-share regressions. These specifications therefore exploit variation in perceived position only.

According to Table 2, individuals tend to exhibit a negative bias for both their own SES and the perceived share of affluent households. Respondents with higher income are more likely to overestimate their SES. Those with right-wing political orientations overestimate both their own SES and the share of affluent households in their district. Individuals who believe that the rich are wealthy because they have enjoyed greater advantages tend to underestimate their own SES, whereas those who trust the government to use public resources for the benefit of the poor tend to overestimate their SES and the share of affluent households in the district.

Analyses using absolute bias values allow us to examine how covariates affect the dispersion of bias. We find that income, right-wing orientation, trust in the state, and believing that the government should have more responsibility to ensure that everyone has a livelihood increase the dispersion of SES bias toward positive values (overestimation), while being better informed (following daily news), believing that the rich owe their position to advantages, and being more willing to take risks increase the dispersion toward negative values (underestimation). For the bias in the perceived share of affluent households, only tertiary education increases the dispersion toward negative values.

Table 2: Determinants of bias

| | (1) SES bias | (2) SES bias (abs value) | (3) Affluent-share bias | (4) Affluent-share bias (abs value) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Age 14-29 | 0.138** | 0.079 | 1.064 | 0.370 |
| | (0.06) | (0.06) | (1.73) | (1.53) |
| Age 30-44 | -0.021 | 0.013 | -0.437 | 1.975 |
| | (0.05) | (0.05) | (1.56) | (1.40) |
| Male | -0.004 | 0.028 | 0.572 | 0.386 |
| | (0.04) | (0.04) | (1.24) | (1.09) |
| Married | 0.087* | 0.073 | 1.069 | 1.106 |
| | (0.05) | (0.05) | (1.47) | (1.31) |
| Per capita household income | 0.164*** | 0.159*** | -0.859 | 0.369 |
| | (0.05) | (0.05) | (0.80) | (0.71) |
| Secondary education | -0.013 | -0.026 | -2.855 | -1.818 |
| | (0.09) | (0.09) | (2.35) | (2.07) |
| Tertiary education | 0.098 | -0.002 | -3.116 | -4.861** |
| | (0.10) | (0.10) | (2.54) | (2.25) |
| Employed | 0.028 | -0.028 | -2.103 | -0.407 |
| | (0.06) | (0.06) | (1.68) | (1.46) |
| Self-employed | 0.057 | 0.045 | -2.278 | 0.905 |
| | (0.06) | (0.06) | (1.69) | (1.49) |
| Informed | -0.021 | -0.080* | 0.148 | -1.426 |
| | (0.04) | (0.04) | (1.28) | (1.15) |
| Right-wing | 0.150*** | 0.121*** | 4.465*** | 1.507 |
| | (0.04) | (0.04) | (1.25) | (1.12) |
| Poor due to circumstances | -0.068 | -0.064 | -2.084 | -0.137 |
| | (0.05) | (0.05) | (1.39) | (1.26) |
| Rich due to more advantages | -0.181*** | -0.144*** | -1.990 | -1.709 |
| | (0.05) | (0.05) | (1.39) | (1.26) |
| Trust in the state | 0.136*** | 0.105** | 2.621** | 0.030 |
| | (0.05) | (0.05) | (1.32) | (1.18) |
| Responsibility of the state | 0.047 | 0.101** | 1.285 | -0.729 |
| | (0.04) | (0.04) | (1.25) | (1.12) |
| Take risks | -0.051 | -0.078* | 1.239 | -0.758 |
| | (0.05) | (0.05) | (1.29) | (1.15) |
| Constant | -0.222 | 0.267 | 7.607 | 26.957*** |
| | (0.30) | (0.30) | (5.44) | (4.88) |
| Observations | 1,222 | 1,222 | 1,222 | 1,222 |
| Mean | 0.90 | 1.27 | 1.23 | 26.34 |

*Notes*: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. $*p < 0.10$, $**p < 0.05$, and $***p < 0.01$ denote statistical significance levels. The dependent variable in columns 1 and 2 is the bias in the respondent's SES, calculated as the difference between the perceived SES and the actual SES (measured in SES group levels). In columns 3 and 4, the dependent variable is the bias in the estimated percentage of upper or upper-middle-class households in the respondent's district, defined as the difference between the perceived and actual percentages. Regressions in columns 1 and 2 include fixed effects for the actual SES group, while regressions in columns 3 and 4 include fixed effects for the actual share of affluent households in the district.

Building on recent evidence linking local inequality to perceptions and attitudes toward inequality and redistribution (e.g., Minkoff and Lyons, 2019; Hoy et al., 2024a; Domènech-Arumí, 2025), our survey –combining geo-location information with census data– allows us to examine whether perception biases are related to local inequality. Using a similar specification as in Table 2, we include measures of local inequality computed within buffer zones of 300 to 1,000 meters around each household in the regressions for SES bias and affluent-share bias. Results, reported in Table B–3 in the Appendix, show that local inequality indices are significantly associated with bias in perceived SES but not with bias in the estimated share of affluent house-

holds in the district. As SES bias is defined as the difference between perceived and objective class, individuals residing in more unequal areas tend to form more accurate assessments of their own social position.

# 4 Results

## 4.1 Main results

The main results on average treatment effects are presented in Tables 3 and 4. As noted, we focus on effects among individuals with either a positive or a negative bias. The first panel of Table 3 reports the SES treatment effects, defining bias as believing one belongs to at least one higher (positive) or lower (negative) SES level than one's actual level. We find a weakly significant effect for positively biased respondents on support for reducing income inequality ($\beta = 0.026$, $p = 0.075$). When individuals learn they belong to a lower SES group than they believed, their support for reducing income inequality increases. This is consistent with self-interest: people may back redistributive policies more when they recognise they could benefit. Similarly, Cruces et al. (2013) show that informing respondents that their actual income decile is lower than they thought raises support for redistribution.

Given that treatment effects may be stronger when the gap between perception and reality is larger, we redefine the bias measure accordingly. Here, a bias occurs when the difference between perceived and actual SES is at least two categories. The second panel of Table 3 reports the SES treatment effects under this definition. When respondents learn they belong to an SES group at least two levels lower than they believed, support for reducing income inequality and for reducing inequality of opportunity increases by 5.2 and 4.8 pp, respectively ($p = 0.012$ and $p = 0.021$). The composite redistribution index also rises by 3.9 pp ($p = 0.037$). These patterns are consistent with self-interest: individuals update toward greater support for redistribution when they realise they are worse off. Relatedly, Karadja et al. (2017) show the complementary case –individuals who had underestimated their relative position become less supportive of redistribution once they learn they are relatively better off.

We also find an unexpected positive effect on support for reducing inequality of opportunity among individuals with a negative bias ($\beta = 12.3$, $p = 0.027$). This may reflect strong pre-existing views in favour of state intervention to equalise opportunities between children from rich and poor neighbourhoods: 81% of control respondents agree or strongly agree with reducing inequality of opportunity. The treatment does not diminish this support among those with a negative bias; if anything, it reinforces it. However, this result should be interpreted with caution given the small number of respondents exhibiting a two-level negative bias (23 in the control group and 22 in the SES treatment group). It is worth noting that the treatments have no detectable effects among unbiased individuals, suggesting that the impact of information provision can be disentangled from mere confirmation effects (Cruces et al., 2013).

Table 3: Average effects of SES treatment

| | (1) Pref. for redist. | (2) Reduce inequality | (3) Wealth tax | (4) Reduce IneqOpp | (5) Index redist. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Panel A: Bias when perceived and actual SES differ by at least one class** | | | | | |
| Treated x Neg. bias | -0.011 | 0.029 | 0.035 | 0.044 | 0.033 |
| | (0.049) | (0.039) | (0.040) | (0.037) | (0.038) |
| Treated x Pos. bias | 0.012 | 0.026* | 0.003 | 0.023 | 0.020 |
| | (0.021) | (0.014) | (0.016) | (0.015) | (0.013) |
| Treated x No bias | 0.036 | -0.017 | -0.005 | -0.006 | -0.003 |
| | (0.045) | (0.030) | (0.034) | (0.030) | (0.029) |
| Neg. bias | 0.044 | -0.037 | -0.108*** | -0.048 | -0.054* |
| | (0.051) | (0.032) | (0.038) | (0.035) | (0.032) |
| Pos. bias | 0.051 | -0.021 | -0.042 | -0.038 | -0.021 |
| | (0.037) | (0.024) | (0.030) | (0.026) | (0.025) |
| Constant | 0.432*** | 0.700*** | 0.705*** | 0.773*** | 0.576*** |
| | (0.034) | (0.022) | (0.027) | (0.023) | (0.023) |
| Observations | 815 | 816 | 816 | 818 | 810 |
| **Panel B: Bias when perceived and actual SES differ by at least two classes** | | | | | |
| Treated x Neg. bias | -0.116 | 0.086 | 0.050 | 0.123** | 0.063 |
| | (0.076) | (0.060) | (0.062) | (0.055) | (0.057) |
| Treated x Pos. bias | -0.004 | 0.052** | 0.025 | 0.048** | 0.039** |
| | (0.030) | (0.021) | (0.022) | (0.021) | (0.019) |
| Treated x No bias | 0.036 | -0.005 | -0.009 | -0.007 | 0.002 |
| | (0.024) | (0.016) | (0.018) | (0.017) | (0.015) |
| Neg. bias | 0.101* | -0.037 | -0.060 | -0.067* | -0.031 |
| | (0.056) | (0.036) | (0.045) | (0.037) | (0.034) |
| Pos. bias | 0.031 | -0.018 | -0.011 | -0.049** | -0.017 |
| | (0.027) | (0.019) | (0.021) | (0.020) | (0.018) |
| Constant | 0.455*** | 0.689*** | 0.669*** | 0.762*** | 0.563*** |
| | (0.018) | (0.012) | (0.014) | (0.013) | (0.012) |
| Observations | 815 | 816 | 816 | 818 | 810 |

*Notes:* The table reports the estimated average effects of the SES treatment by bias type. In Panel A, the negative (positive) bias occurs when the perceived SES is lower (larger) than the actual SES in at least one SES group. In Panel B, the negative (positive) bias is observed when the perceived SES is lower (larger) than the actual SES in across at least two SES groups. Robust standard errors are indicated in parenthesis. $*p < 0.10$, $**p < 0.05$, and $***p < 0.01$ indicate statistically significance levels.

Table 4 presents the effects of providing information about the share of affluent households in the respondent's district. The first panel uses the baseline bias definition: a positive (negative) bias occurs when the perceived share is at least 5 pp higher (lower) than the actual value; perceptions within $\pm 5$ pp are treated as unbiased. Among positively biased respondents, the treatment increases support for redistribution: preferences for redistribution rise by 6.0 pp ($p = 0.015$), support for reducing inequality of opportunity by 3.7 pp ($p = 0.042$), and the composite redistribution index by 4.2 pp ($p = 0.009$). Under this $\pm 5$ pp definition, we find no significant effects among respondents who underestimate the local share of affluent households.

The second panel of Table 4 reports treatment effects using a wider threshold: perceptions within $\pm 10$ pp of the actual district share are classified as unbiased, and bias is defined as deviations of at least 10 pp. Results are broadly consistent with the $\pm 5$ pp definition, with somewhat

larger coefficients. Among positively biased respondents, preferences for redistribution rise by 6.9 pp ($p = 0.009$), support for reducing income inequality increases by 3.4 pp ($p = 0.076$), support for reducing inequality of opportunity rises by 4.1 pp ($p = 0.042$), and the composite redistribution index increases by 5.4 pp ($p = 0.003$).

Overall, average treatment effects concentrate among individuals with a positive bias in both informational interventions. The SES treatment rarely "corrects" perceptions unless the adjustment is at least two SES levels; in that case, informing respondents of their actual SES increases support for reducing income inequality, for reducing inequality of opportunity, and the overall redistribution index. The treatment providing accurate information about the share of affluent households in the district similarly raises support for redistribution, including reductions in income inequality and inequality of opportunity, and improves the composite index. Across specifications, positively biased individuals consistently increase support when measured by the composite index. Finally, we find no evidence that either treatment affects support for a wealth tax.[8]

[8]Tables C–1 and C–2 in Appendix C show that including covariates in the regressions does not qualitatively alter our results.

Table 4: Average effects of the affluent-share treatment

| | (1) Pref. for redist. | (2) Reduce inequality | (3) Wealth tax | (4) Reduce IneqOpp | (5) Index redist. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Panel A: Bias when perceived and actual share differ by at least 5%** | | | | | |
| Treated x Neg. bias | 0.037 | -0.019 | -0.019 | 0.002 | -0.004 |
| | (0.031) | (0.019) | (0.023) | (0.019) | (0.019) |
| Treated x Pos. bias | 0.060** | 0.025 | 0.012 | 0.037** | 0.042*** |
| | (0.024) | (0.017) | (0.020) | (0.018) | (0.016) |
| Treated x No bias | 0.010 | 0.045 | -0.020 | 0.021 | 0.013 |
| | (0.048) | (0.033) | (0.036) | (0.033) | (0.031) |
| Neg. bias | -0.027 | 0.047 | -0.011 | 0.018 | 0.006 |
| | (0.044) | (0.029) | (0.033) | (0.031) | (0.028) |
| Pos. bias | -0.013 | 0.016 | -0.009 | -0.023 | -0.016 |
| | (0.042) | (0.029) | (0.032) | (0.031) | (0.028) |
| Constant | 0.489*** | 0.656*** | 0.670*** | 0.746*** | 0.561*** |
| | (0.038) | (0.027) | (0.028) | (0.027) | (0.025) |
| Observations | 858 | 857 | 857 | 859 | 849 |
| **Panel B: Bias when perceived and actual share differ by at least 10%** | | | | | |
| Treated x Neg. bias | 0.057* | -0.013 | -0.026 | 0.002 | -0.000 |
| | (0.033) | (0.021) | (0.025) | (0.020) | (0.020) |
| Treated x Pos. bias | 0.069*** | 0.034* | 0.025 | 0.041** | 0.054*** |
| | (0.026) | (0.019) | (0.022) | (0.020) | (0.018) |
| Treated x No bias | -0.002 | 0.008 | -0.029 | 0.010 | -0.007 |
| | (0.035) | (0.022) | (0.025) | (0.023) | (0.021) |
| Neg. bias | -0.047 | 0.012 | -0.046* | -0.021 | -0.033 |
| | (0.036) | (0.022) | (0.026) | (0.024) | (0.021) |
| Pos. bias | -0.020 | -0.030 | -0.056** | -0.063*** | -0.061*** |
| | (0.033) | (0.022) | (0.025) | (0.024) | (0.021) |
| Constant | 0.495*** | 0.690*** | 0.699*** | 0.773*** | 0.591*** |
| | (0.027) | (0.017) | (0.019) | (0.018) | (0.016) |
| Observations | 858 | 857 | 857 | 859 | 849 |

*Notes:* The table reports the estimated average effects of the affluent-share treatment by bias type. In Panel A, a negative (positive) bias is defined as perceiving the share of affluent households in the district as at least 5% lower (higher) than the actual share. In Panel B, the negative (positive) bias is defined similarly but requires a difference of at least 10%. Robust standard errors are indicated in parenthesis. $*p < 0.10$, $**p < 0.05$, and $***p < 0.01$ indicate statistically significance levels.

## 4.2 Heterogeneous treatment effects

We analyse heterogeneous treatment effects based on beliefs elicited prior to any intervention. Because most respondents exhibit a positive bias, we restrict the analysis to individuals who overestimated either their SES group or the local share of affluent households. Beliefs include views on fairness, risk preferences, political ideology, trust in government, and perceptions of individual responsibility. Heterogeneous effects are estimated with separate linear regressions for each outcome. Each specification includes the treatment indicator, a belief indicator (e.g., left-wing= 0, right-wing= 1), and their interaction. The estimated equation on the positively biased subsample is:

$$y_j = \beta_0 + \beta_1 T \times belief + \beta_2 belief + \varepsilon_i \quad (2)$$

where $y_j$ denotes one of the $j$ outcomes measuring preferences for redistribution, and $T = 1$ if the respondent received the treatment and 0 otherwise.

Regardless of treatment arm and both definitions of unbiased responses, we do not find statistically significant heterogeneity across these belief dimensions. Full results for all outcomes are reported in Appendix D. The absence of significant differences across belief subgroups likely reflects limited sample size. Even so, the patterns suggest that providing accurate information –particularly to respondents predisposed against redistribution (e.g., right-leaning or sceptical of government) who overestimated their SES by two or more levels– raises support for redistribution. As shown in Figure D–2, these respondents increase support for reducing both income inequality and inequality of opportunity after learning they had overestimated their SES by at least two levels. Similar patterns appear for risk-seekers, for those favouring individual responsibility over government intervention, for respondents with low trust in government, and for those attributing wealth to hard work or poverty to lack of effort; these are mirrored in the composite redistribution index.

For the treatment providing information on the local share of affluent households, Figure D–4 shows that risk-seekers, those emphasising individual responsibility, and those who distrust government increase support across redistributive outcomes –except the wealth tax– after learning they had overestimated the local affluent share by at least 10 pp. Respondents attributing wealth to hard work also display stronger preferences for redistribution, greater support for reducing income inequality, and higher values on the overall index; those attributing poverty to lack of effort similarly increase support for redistribution and the composite index.

Overall, these results indicate that informational corrections can shift redistributive attitudes even among respondents typically resistant to redistribution. The evidence is consistent with self-interest and belief updating: when individuals realise their socio-economic position or local affluence is lower than perceived, they revise attitudes in favour of redistribution. The persistence of positive responses among groups generally opposed to redistribution also suggests a role for fairness and social-comparison mechanisms alongside material motives.

# 5 Local inequality analysis

In this section, we examine the role of local income inequality in shaping preferences for redistribution and assess whether our treatments have differential effects across areas with higher and lower inequality.

## 5.1 Inclusion of local inequality levels

Table 5 reports coefficients for alternative local inequality measures, each included as a covariate in separate regressions estimated from equation 1. In these estimations, we focus on the stricter definitions of perception bias. For the SES treatment, a bias is recorded when the perceived and actual SES differ by at least two levels. For the affluent-share treatment, a bias is recorded when the perceived and actual shares of affluent households in the district differ by at least 10 pp.

For the regressions based on the SES treatment (Panel A of Table 5), local income inequality, measured by the Generalized Entropy index GE(2) and by the coefficient of variation (CV), is negatively correlated with support for redistribution and with support for a wealth tax, although the latter correlation is only weakly significant. Our third inequality metric, the local share of affluent households in small areas, also exhibits a negative correlation with support for redistribution and a wealth tax; conversely, it is positively correlated with support for policies aimed at reducing inequality of opportunity, although this last relationship is only weakly significant.

For the regressions based on the affluent-share treatment (Panel B of Table 5), we again find that local inequality is negatively correlated with redistributive preferences. These relationships are generally stronger than in the SES regressions. In particular, the negative correlation between local inequality and both the composite redistribution index and support for a wealth tax is more pronounced.

Table 5: Coefficients of local inequality on redistributive preferences

| Buffer zone | Inequality metric | Pref. for redist. | Reduce inequality | Wealth tax | Reduce IneqOpp | Index redist. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Panel A: SES treatment equation** | | | | | | |
| 300 mts. | GE(2) | -0.057 | 0.002 | -0.014 | 0.009 | -0.030 |
| | Coef. Var. | -0.012 | 0.000 | -0.005 | 0.003 | -0.006 |
| | %Rich | -0.066** | -0.015 | -0.039* | 0.040** | -0.021 |
| 500 mts. | GE(2) | -0.093** | -0.006 | -0.055* | 0.024 | -0.042 |
| | Coef. Var. | -0.018** | -0.001 | -0.010 | 0.005 | -0.007 |
| | %Rich | -0.060 ** | -0.020 | -0.043* | 0.039 * | -0.021 |
| 1000 mts. | GE(2) | -0.090* | -0.025 | -0.057* | 0.013 | -0.052* |
| | Coef. Var. | -0.017* | -0.005 | -0.011* | 0.003 | -0.009* |
| | %Rich | -0.051* | -0.022 | -0.043* | 0.040* | -0.020 |
| **Panel B: Rich share treatment equation** | | | | | | |
| 300 mts. | GE(2) | -0.057 | -0.050* | -0.058* | -0.036 | -0.068** |
| | Coef. Var. | -0.012 | -0.009 | -0.011* | -0.007 | -0.013** |
| | %Rich | -0.072** | -0.027 | -0.071*** | 0.003 | -0.051** |
| 500 mts. | GE(2) | -0.086* | -0.067* | -0.081** | -0.051 | -0.096*** |
| | Coef. Var. | -0.017* | -0.012* | -0.015** | -0.009 | -0.018*** |
| | %Rich | -0.067 * | -0.038 | -0.085*** | -0.000 | -0.059** |
| 1000 mts. | GE(2) | -0.119** | -0.084*** | -0.111*** | -0.065* | -0.123*** |
| | Coef. Var. | -0.023** | -0.016** | -0.022*** | -0.012* | -0.024*** |
| | %Rich | -0.070* | -0.048 | -0.095*** | 0.002 | -0.067** |

*Notes:* The table reports coefficients on local inequality metrics, each included as a covariate in separate regressions estimated from equation 1. Each cell corresponds to a distinct regression. Inequality metrics are computed using households within buffer zones of 300, 500, or 1,000 meters around the respondent's location. In Panel A, a negative (positive) bias is defined as perceiving one's SES to be at least two categories lower (higher) than the actual SES. In Panel B, a negative (positive) bias is defined as perceiving the district share of affluent households to be at least 10 percentage points lower (higher) than the actual share. $^{*}p < 0.10$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, and $^{***}p < 0.01$ indicate statistically significance levels.

## 5.2 Treatment effects across inequality levels

The previous results suggest that individuals exposed to higher local inequality may be less supportive of redistribution. We now ask whether local inequality also affects how individuals update their views when presented with corrective information. To study this, we estimate heterogeneous treatment effects in redistributive attitudes, focusing on respondents who exhibited a positive bias in either their SES or the perceived share of affluent households in their district. We estimate the following specification:

$$y_j = \beta_0 + \beta_1 T + \beta_2 (T \times highineq) + \beta_3 highineq + \varepsilon_i \tag{3}$$

where $y_j$ denotes one of the $j$ outcome variables capturing redistributive preferences, and $T = 1$ if the respondent received the treatment and 0 otherwise. The variable *highineq* takes the value 1 when the level of local inequality within the respondent's buffer zone is above the sample median, and 0 otherwise. Local inequality is calculated for buffer zones of 300, 500, and 1,000 meters around each respondent's dwelling. The results are reported in Appendix E.

For the SES treatment, we do not observe differential effects across low- and high-inequality areas, either when using GE(2) as the inequality measure (Table E–1) or when using the local share of affluent households (Table E–2).

For the affluent-share treatment, however, we find heterogeneous effects by local inequality. Respondents living in higher-inequality areas are more likely to revise their views about the local share of affluent households and, in turn, increase their stated support for redistribution (the *preference for redistribution* outcome). Since we focus on individuals with positive bias, these results indicate that correcting overestimation of local affluence leads to higher support for redistribution only among those in high-inequality areas.[9]

Our results suggest that local inequality may matter for how individuals revise their beliefs about the perceived share of affluent households in their district. However, this effect is not very strong, it does not appear consistently across outcomes, and it is only present under the less strict definition of bias. These limited effects should also be interpreted with caution, given the relatively small size of the experimental subsamples.

# 6 Conclusions

This paper studies how perceptions of own social class and local affluence relate to support for redistribution. In our online survey experiment in Lima, most respondents substantially overestimated their own socio-economic status (SES), and many also overestimated the local share of affluent households (to a lesser extent). Providing accurate information generally raised support for redistribution, with no effect on support for a wealth tax. Effects were strongest when SES misperceptions were large –at least two SES levels– consistent with belief updating and self-interest: learning one is worse off than believed increases demand for redistribution policies.

Treatment effects were concentrated among respondents with a positive bias. Importantly, updates occurred even among groups typically less supportive of redistribution (right-leaning, individualistic, or with low trust in government). Corrections to beliefs about local affluence also increased support for redistribution under standard or strict bias thresholds. Using geocoded data, we further document that higher local inequality is generally associated with weaker support for redistribution. There is some evidence that people living in higher-inequality areas respond more to corrections about local affluence, but these patterns are not uniformly strong across outcomes and depend on how bias is defined.

These findings have policy relevance. Interventions that target salient, class-related beliefs –rather than only income-decile feedback– can shift attitudes, especially when misperceptions

[9] We find statistically significant differences between respondents in low- and high-inequality areas when bias is defined as overestimating the share of affluent households in the district by at least 10 percentage points, and inequality is measured by GE(2) within a 1 km buffer around the respondent's home (see Table E–3). A similar difference is observed when inequality is measured as the local share of affluent households within a 500-meter buffer (see Table E–4).

are large. At the same time, the null results for wealth-tax support suggest that some instruments are harder to shift with simple information and may require broader narratives (e.g., fairness, opportunity, or use of revenues) or different framings.

The study has limitations. SES classification relies on self-reported income and household size; heterogeneous-effects tests are underpowered in some subsamples; local inequality metrics may involve measurement error; and outcomes capture stated preferences rather than revealed choices. Future work could test the durability of updates, compare alternative framings, link to behavioural outcomes with material stakes, and examine how information interacts with other features of the local context.

# References


Alesina, A. and Angeletos, G.-M. (2005). Fairness and redistribution. *American economic review*, 95(4):960–980.

Alesina, A. and Giuliano, P. (2011). Preferences for redistribution. In Bisin, A. and Benhabib, J., editors, *Handbook of Social Economics*, pages 93–132. North Holland.

Andreoli, F. and Olivera, J. (2020). Preferences for redistribution and exposure to tax-benefit schemes in Europe. *European Journal of Political Economy*, 63:101880.

Benabou, R. and Ok, E. A. (2001). Social mobility and the demand for redistribution: the poum hypothesis. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 116(2):447–487.

Bublitz, E. (2022). Misperceptions of income distributions: cross-country evidence from a randomized survey experiment. *Socio-Economic Review*, 20(2):435–462.

Bussolo, M. and Dixit, A. G. (2023). (Perceptions of) Inequality, Demand for Redistribution, and Group-Specific Public Goods :A Survey Experiment in India. Policy Research Working Paper Series 10505, The World Bank.

Cappelen, A. W., Konow, J., Sørensen, E. Ø., and Tungodden, B. (2013). Just luck: An experimental study of risk-taking and fairness. *American Economic Review*, 103(4):1398–1413.

Cruces, G., Perez-Truglia, R., and Tetaz, M. (2013). Biased perceptions of income distribution and preferences for redistribution: Evidence from a survey experiment. *Journal of Public Economics*, 98:100–112.

Dimick, M., Rueda, D., and Stegmueller, D. (2016). The altruistic rich? inequality and other-regarding preferences for redistribution. *Quarterly Journal of Political Science*, 11(4):385–439.

Dimick, M., Rueda, D., and Stegmueller, D. (2018). Models of other-regarding preferences and redistribution. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 21:441.

Domènech-Arumí, G. (2025). Neighborhoods, perceived inequality, and preferences for redistribution: Evidence from barcelona. *Journal of Public Economics*, 242:105288.

Durante, R., Putterman, L., and Van der Weele, J. (2014). Preferences for redistribution and perception of fairness: An experimental study. *Journal of the European Economic Association*, 12(4):1059–1086.

Fernandez-Albertos, J. and Kuo, A. (2015). Income perception, information, and progressive taxation: evidence from a survey experiment. *Political Science Research and Methods*, 6(01).

Fong, C. (2001). Social preferences, self-interest, and the demand for redistribution. *Journal of Public economics*, 82(2):225–246.

Gimpelson, V. and Treisman, D. (2018). Misperceiving inequality. *Economics & Politics*, 30(1):27–54.

Hauser, O. P. and Norton, M. I. (2017). (mis) perceptions of inequality. *Current Opinion in Psychology*, 18:21–25.

Hoy, C. and Mager, F. (2021). Why are relatively poor people not more supportive of redistribution? evidence from a randomized survey experiment across ten countries. *American Economic Journal: Economic Policy*, 13(4):299–328.

Hoy, C., Tóth, R., and Merdikawati, N. (2024a). A false divide? providing information about inequality aligns preferences for redistribution between right- and left-wing voters. *Journal of Economic Inequality*, 22:669–707.

Hoy, C., Toth, R., and Merdikawati, N. (2024b). How does information about inequality shape voting intentions and preferences for redistribution? evidence from a randomized survey experiment in indonesia. *Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics*, 112:102274.

INEI (2021). *Planos estratificados de Lima Metropolitana por ingreso a nivel de manzanas 2020*. Instituto Nacional de Estadisticas e Informatica.

Karadja, M., Mollerstrom, J., and Seim, D. (2017). Richer (and holier) than thou? the effect of relative income improvements on demand for redistribution. *Review of Economics and Statistics*, 99(2):201–212.

Kuziemko, I., Norton, M. I., Saez, E., and Stantcheva, S. (2015). How elastic are preferences for redistribution? evidence from randomized survey experiments. *American Economic Review*, 105(4):1478–1508.

Meltzer, A. H. and Richard, S. F. (1981). A rational theory of the size of government. *Journal of political Economy*, 89(5):914–927.

Minkoff, S. L. and Lyons, J. (2019). Living with inequality: Neighborhood income diversity and perceptions of the income gap. *American Politics Research*, 47(2):329–361.

Olivera, J. (2015). Preferences for redistribution in Europe. *IZA Journal of European Labor Studies*, 4(14):437–511.

Pittau, M. G., Massari, R., and Zelli, R. (2013). Hierarchical modelling of disparities in preferences for redistribution. *Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics*, 75(4):556–584.

Scheuer, F. and Slemrod, J. (2021). Taxing our wealth. *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 35(1):207–30.

Sides, J. (2016). Stories or science? facts, frames, and policy attitudes. *American Politics Research*, 44(3):387–414.

Stantcheva, S. (2021). Understanding tax policy: how do people reason? *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 136(4):2309–2369.

# Appendix

# A Sample selection and descriptive statistics

Table A–1: Population and sample distribution by districts of Metropolitan Lima

| Sub-area | District | Population | | Sample | | (%n)/(%N) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | N | % | n | % | |
| Lima Centro | Brena | 66,737 | 1.01 | 13 | 0.99 | 0.98 |
| Lima Centro | Lima | 208,133 | 3.14 | 40 | 3.03 | 0.97 |
| Lima Centro | Jesus Maria | 61,901 | 0.93 | 8 | 0.61 | 0.65 |
| Lima Centro | La Victoria | 132,117 | 1.99 | 26 | 2.01 | 1.01 |
| Lima Centro | Lince | 44,876 | 0.68 | 9 | 0.68 | 1.01 |
| Lima Centro | Magdalena del Mar | 48,541 | 0.73 | 7 | 0.53 | 0.72 |
| Lima Centro | Miraflores | 83,418 | 1.26 | 18 | 1.36 | 1.08 |
| Lima Centro | Pueblo Libre | 67,929 | 1.02 | 13 | 1.01 | 0.98 |
| Lima Centro | Rimac | 131,167 | 1.98 | 30 | 2.32 | 1.17 |
| Lima Centro | San Borja | 92,849 | 1.40 | 15 | 1.14 | 0.81 |
| Lima Centro | San Isidro | 50,512 | 0.76 | 8 | 0.61 | 0.80 |
| Lima Centro | San Luis | 40,804 | 0.62 | 6 | 0.46 | 0.75 |
| Lima Centro | San Miguel | 122,417 | 1.85 | 27 | 2.05 | 1.11 |
| Lima Centro | Santiago de Surco | 260,245 | 3.93 | 45 | 3.41 | 0.87 |
| Lima Centro | Surquillo | 72,870 | 1.10 | 16 | 1.21 | 1.10 |
| *Total Lima Centro* | | 1,484,516 | 22.39 | 281 | 21.73 | 0.97 |
| Lima Este | Ate | 422,579 | 6.37 | 82 | 6.34 | 0.99 |
| Lima Este | El Agustino | 144,046 | 2.17 | 31 | 2.35 | 1.08 |
| Lima Este | La Molina | 110,896 | 1.67 | 21 | 1.62 | 0.97 |
| Lima Este | Lurigancho | 165,874 | 2.50 | 31 | 2.40 | 0.96 |
| Lima Este | San Juan de Lurigancho | 742,577 | 11.20 | 152 | 11.76 | 1.05 |
| Lima Este | Santa Anita | 144,253 | 2.18 | 27 | 2.05 | 0.94 |
| *Total Lima Este* | | 1,730,225 | 26.10 | 344 | 26.60 | 1.02 |
| Lima Norte | Carabayllo | 226,536 | 3.42 | 43 | 3.26 | 0.95 |
| Lima Norte | Comas | 378,048 | 5.70 | 80 | 6.19 | 1.08 |
| Lima Norte | Independencia | 154,467 | 2.33 | 26 | 1.97 | 0.85 |
| Lima Norte | Los Olivos | 245,638 | 3.71 | 48 | 3.71 | 1.00 |
| Lima Norte | Puente Piedra | 225,150 | 3.40 | 39 | 2.96 | 0.87 |
| Lima Norte | San Martin de Porres | 484,503 | 7.31 | 87 | 6.73 | 0.92 |
| *Total Lima Norte* | | 1,714,342 | 25.86 | 323 | 24.98 | 0.97 |
| Lima Sur | Chorrillos | 232,700 | 3.51 | 50 | 3.79 | 1.08 |
| Lima Sur | San Juan de Miraflores | 263,905 | 3.98 | 51 | 3.94 | 0.99 |
| Lima Sur | Villa El Salvador | 279,389 | 4.21 | 62 | 4.80 | 1.14 |
| Lima Sur | Villa Maria del Triunfo | 282,596 | 4.26 | 48 | 3.64 | 0.85 |
| *Total Lima Sur* | | 1,058,590 | 15.97 | 211 | 16.32 | 1.02 |
| Callao | Callao | 329,648 | 4.97 | 61 | 4.72 | 0.95 |
| Callao | Bellavista | 57,924 | 0.87 | 13 | 1.01 | 1.11 |
| Callao | La Perla | 47,570 | 0.72 | 11 | 0.85 | 1.19 |
| Callao | Ventanilla | 206,538 | 3.12 | 49 | 3.79 | 1.22 |
| *Total Callao* | | 641,680 | 9.68 | 134 | 10.36 | 1.07 |
| TOTAL | Total | 6,629,353 | 100.00 | 1,293 | 100.00 | 1.00 |

*Notes:* The table reports the actual distribution of population by district and the distribution of the individuals in our selected sample in Metropolitan Lima. The population used in the sampling framework consists of people aged between 18 and 64 in 2020 living in 35 districts. 15 other districts were left out of the framework because they have small populations or are located in remote areas (seaside locations or near mountain areas). The population of these dropped districts represents 5.6% of the total population of Metropolitan Lima.

Table A–2: Balance of covariates

| Variables | Control vs SES treatment | | Control vs Affluent-share treatment | | SES treatment vs Affluent-share treatment | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Male | 0.053 | (0.035) | 0.039 | (0.034) | 0.015 | (0.033) |
| Age 18-29 | 0.016 | (0.032) | -0.030 | (0.031) | -0.014 | (0.033) |
| Age 30-44 | -0.005 | (0.032) | 0.053 | (0.032) | 0.048 | (0.034) |
| Age 45-64 | -0.012 | (0.032) | -0.023 | (0.031) | -0.035 | (0.032) |
| Married | -0.011 | (0.034) | 0.069** | (0.033) | 0.058* | (0.035) |
| Per capita household income | -0.037 | (0.062) | 0.074 | (0.061) | 0.037 | (0.063) |
| Primary education | 0.013 | (0.020) | -0.012 | (0.019) | 0.001 | (0.020) |
| Secondary education | -0.045 | (0.034) | -0.018 | (0.034) | -0.063* | (0.035) |
| Tertiary education | 0.032 | (0.033) | 0.030 | (0.033) | 0.063* | (0.034) |
| Employed | 0.014 | (0.033) | -0.020 | (0.033) | -0.005 | (0.034) |
| Self-employed | -0.029 | (0.033) | 0.015 | (0.033) | -0.013 | (0.034) |
| Student | -0.022 | (0.021) | 0.017 | (0.020) | -0.006 | (0.022) |
| Unemployed | 0.013 | (0.012) | -0.024** | (0.011) | -0.012 | (0.011) |
| Other labour status | 0.024 | (0.022) | 0.011 | (0.023) | 0.036 | (0.023) |
| Informed | 0.032 | (0.035) | 0.005 | (0.034) | 0.027 | (0.033) |
| *N* | 817 | | 862 | | 891 | |

*Notes:* The table shows differences in means of covariates between experimental groups. Robust standard errors are shown in parenthesis. *$p < 0.10$, **$p < 0.05$, and ***$p < 0.01$ indicate statistically significance levels.

Table A–3: Descriptive statistics

| Variables | Control | | SES treatment | | Affluent-share treatment | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Preference for redistribution | 0.473 | (0.013) | 0.486 | (0.012) | 0.517 | (0.012) |
| Reduce income inequality | 0.680 | (0.009) | 0.699 | (0.009) | 0.694 | (0.008) |
| Introduce wealth tax | 0.661 | (0.010) | 0.667 | (0.009) | 0.658 | (0.009) |
| Reduce inequality of opportunity | 0.740 | (0.010) | 0.761 | (0.008) | 0.763 | (0.008) |
| Redistribution index | 0.554 | (0.008) | 0.572 | (0.008) | 0.577 | (0.008) |
| Poor due to circumstances | 0.523 | (0.025) | 0.577 | (0.024) | 0.518 | (0.023) |
| Rich due to advantages | 0.462 | (0.025) | 0.506 | (0.024) | 0.474 | (0.023) |
| Trust in Government | 0.330 | (0.024) | 0.364 | (0.023) | 0.343 | (0.022) |
| Govt take more responsibility | 0.544 | (0.025) | 0.542 | (0.024) | 0.533 | (0.023) |
| Right-leaning | 0.483 | (0.025) | 0.520 | (0.024) | 0.451 | (0.023) |
| Risk lover | 0.622 | (0.024) | 0.673 | (0.023) | 0.595 | (0.023) |
| Male | 0.477 | (0.025) | 0.531 | (0.024) | 0.516 | (0.023) |
| Age 18-29 | 0.326 | (0.024) | 0.312 | (0.022) | 0.342 | (0.022) |
| Age 30-44 | 0.348 | (0.024) | 0.397 | (0.024) | 0.344 | (0.022) |
| Age 45-64 | 0.326 | (0.024) | 0.291 | (0.022) | 0.314 | (0.021) |
| Married | 0.475 | (0.025) | 0.533 | (0.024) | 0.464 | (0.023) |
| Per capita household income | 6.216 | (0.045) | 6.253 | (0.044) | 6.180 | (0.042) |
| Primary education | 0.084 | (0.014) | 0.085 | (0.014) | 0.097 | (0.014) |
| Secondary education | 0.586 | (0.025) | 0.522 | (0.024) | 0.541 | (0.023) |
| Tertiary education | 0.330 | (0.024) | 0.392 | (0.024) | 0.362 | (0.022) |
| Employed | 0.374 | (0.025) | 0.368 | (0.024) | 0.388 | (0.023) |
| Self-employed | 0.387 | (0.025) | 0.373 | (0.024) | 0.358 | (0.022) |
| Student | 0.111 | (0.016) | 0.105 | (0.015) | 0.088 | (0.013) |
| Unemployed | 0.028 | (0.008) | 0.017 | (0.006) | 0.041 | (0.009) |
| Other labour status | 0.101 | (0.015) | 0.136 | (0.017) | 0.125 | (0.015) |
| Informed | 0.426 | (0.025) | 0.459 | (0.024) | 0.432 | (0.023) |

*Notes:* The table shows means of outcomes, beliefs, and covariates across experimental groups. Standard errors are shown in parenthesis.

Figure A–1: Balance of covariates




*Notes:* The figure shows differences in means of covariates between the control group and both treatment groups. The intervals are based on a 95% level of confidence.

# B Tables and figures of bias analysis

Table B–1: Objective and perceived own-SES, and bias by SES

| Actual SES | Perceived SES | Actual SES (level) | Bias | Proportion with positive bias | Proportion with negative bias |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Low | 2.428 | 1 | 1.428 | 0.898 | 0.000 |
| Lower-middle | 2.619 | 2 | 0.619 | 0.588 | 0.041 |
| Middle | 2.870 | 3 | -0.130 | 0.160 | 0.275 |
| Upper-middle | 3.050 | 4 | -0.950 | 0.013 | 0.738 |
| Upper | 3.227 | 5 | -1.773 | 0.000 | 0.955 |

*Notes*: The bias is defined as the difference between the perceived and actual SES.

Table B–2: Objective and perceived percentage of affluent households, and bias by district

| District affluence level | Perceived % affluent hhs | Objective % affluent hhs | Bias | Proportion with positive bias | Proportion with negative bias |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Low (<10%) | 26.178 | 2.692 | 23.486 | 0.934 | 0.041 |
| Middle(10-50%) | 29.707 | 23.085 | 6.622 | 0.556 | 0.426 |
| High (>50%) | 43.723 | 89.453 | -45.730 | 0.036 | 0.957 |

*Notes*: *Note:* The bias is defined as the difference between the perceived and actual percentages of affluent households (upper and upper-middle classes) in each district. Districts are classified by their actual share of affluent households: *low* (below 10%), *middle* (10–50%), and *high* (above 50%).

Table B–3: Local inequality metrics and bias

| | SES bias | SES bias (abs value) | Affluent-share bias | Affluent-share bias (abs value) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Buffer 300 mts.** | | | | |
| GE2 | 0.270 *** | 0.074 | 3.323 | -1.317 |
| Coef. Var. | 0.050 *** | 0.013 | 0.556 | -0.250 |
| %Affluent households | 0.366 *** | 0.100 | 4.256 | -5.770 ** |
| **Buffer 500 mts.** | | | | |
| GE2 | 0.271 ** | 0.114 | 3.025 | 1.289 |
| Coef. Var. | 0.050 ** | 0.021 | 0.624 | 0.190 |
| %Affluent households | 0.396 *** | 0.128 * | 4.200 | -6.167 ** |
| **Buffer 1 Km.** | | | | |
| GE2 | 0.203 * | 0.125 | 3.614 | 3.890 |
| Coef. Var. | 0.039 * | 0.025 | 0.867 | 0.695 |
| %Rich households | 0.434 *** | 0.146 * | 2.267 | -4.119 |

*Notes:* The table reports the coefficients of alternative inequality metrics included as a covariate in the bias regressions reported in Table 2. Each cell displays the results of a regression that incorporates a single type of inequality metric alongside the other covariates included in the bias regressions. These inequality metrics are calculated for households within buffer zones of 300, 500, or 1,000 meters around the respondent's location. The dependent variable in columns 1 and 2 is the bias in the respondent's SES, calculated as the difference between the perceived SES and the actual SES (measured in SES group levels). In columns 3 and 4, the dependent variable is the bias in the estimated percentage of upper or upper-middle-class households in the respondent's district, defined as the difference between the perceived and actual percentages. Regressions in columns 1 and 2 include fixed effects for the actual SES group, while regressions in columns 3 and 4 include fixed effects for the actual share of rich households in the district. The regressions use robust standard errors, and $^{*}p < 0.10$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, and $^{***}p < 0.01$ indicate statistically significance levels.

Figure B–1: Self-reported social class in Lima




*Notes: Note:* The figure shows the distribution of self-reported social classes in our online survey and in the 2023 wave of the Latinobarómetro (see www.latinobarometro.org). The Latinobarómetro values refer to respondents aged 18–64 residing in Lima and are weighted using survey weights. Data were collected between February and March 2023.

Figure B–2: Actual and perceived percentage of affluent households by district




*Notes*: The figure compares district-level averages of actual and perceived proportions of affluent households (upper and upper-middle classes).

Figure B–3: Actual and perceived relative economic position

(a) Objective and Perceived SES




*Notes*: The figure displays the distributions for perceived and objective own SES in their district. The number of observations is 1,256. A significant portion of low SES individuals place themselves in higher positions than they actually occupy, while only Upper SES individuals underestimate their rank (similar results to Cruces et al. (2013)) and reverse results to Karadja et al. (2017)

(b) Objective and perceived % of rich households




*Notes*: The figure displays the relation between perceived and objective percentages of upper and upper-middle households in the district.

Figure B–4: Correlation of two types of biases



# C Average effects - extended regressions

Table C–1: Average effects on biased perceptions of SES with controls

| | (1) Pref. for redist. | (2) Reduce inequality | (3) Wealth tax | (4) Reduce IneqOpp | (5) Index redist. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Panel A: Bias when perceived and actual SES differ by at least one class** | | | | | |
| Treated x Neg. bias | -0.013 | 0.035 | 0.043 | 0.040 | 0.036 |
| | (0.050) | (0.040) | (0.040) | (0.037) | (0.038) |
| Treated x Pos. bias | 0.018 | 0.019 | -0.004 | 0.020 | 0.018 |
| | (0.021) | (0.015) | (0.016) | (0.015) | (0.014) |
| Treated x No bias | 0.025 | -0.008 | -0.005 | -0.003 | -0.002 |
| | (0.045) | (0.029) | (0.035) | (0.030) | (0.029) |
| Neg. bias | 0.094* | -0.039 | -0.112*** | -0.067* | -0.051 |
| | (0.052) | (0.034) | (0.041) | (0.037) | (0.033) |
| Pos. bias | 0.022 | -0.029 | -0.048 | -0.035 | -0.033 |
| | (0.039) | (0.024) | (0.031) | (0.027) | (0.025) |
| Constant | 0.757*** | 0.701*** | 0.689*** | 0.683*** | 0.618*** |
| | (0.111) | (0.068) | (0.075) | (0.075) | (0.069) |
| Observations | 798 | 797 | 797 | 799 | 793 |
| **Panel B: Bias when perceived and actual SES differ by at least two classes** | | | | | |
| Treated x Neg. bias | -0.122 | 0.096 | 0.059 | 0.117** | 0.065 |
| | (0.078) | (0.060) | (0.062) | (0.054) | (0.057) |
| Treated x Pos. bias | -0.002 | 0.044** | 0.024 | 0.044** | 0.037** |
| | (0.030) | (0.021) | (0.022) | (0.021) | (0.019) |
| Treated x No bias | 0.038 | -0.004 | -0.013 | -0.006 | 0.001 |
| | (0.023) | (0.016) | (0.019) | (0.017) | (0.016) |
| Neg. bias | 0.181*** | -0.030 | -0.048 | -0.079** | -0.009 |
| | (0.058) | (0.038) | (0.048) | (0.038) | (0.036) |
| Pos. bias | 0.012 | -0.014 | -0.010 | -0.041** | -0.020 |
| | (0.027) | (0.019) | (0.021) | (0.020) | (0.018) |
| Constant | 0.774*** | 0.684*** | 0.674*** | 0.696*** | 0.618*** |
| | (0.090) | (0.058) | (0.065) | (0.062) | (0.059) |
| Observations | 798 | 797 | 797 | 799 | 793 |

*Notes:* The table presents the estimated average effects of the SES treatment by bias type, controlling for a set of covariates, including age, sex, marriage status, logarithm of household income per capita, college attendance, and employment status. In Panel A, the negative (positive) bias occurs when the perceived SES is lower (larger) than the actual SES in at least one SES group. In Panel B, the negative (positive) bias is observed when the perceived SES is lower (larger) than the actual SES across at least two SES groups. Robust standard errors are indicated in parenthesis. $*p < 0.10$, $**p < 0.05$, and $***p < 0.01$ indicate statistically significance levels.

Table C–2: Average effects on biased perceptions of the share of affluent people in the district with controls

| | (1) Pref. for redist. | (2) Reduce inequality | (3) Wealth tax | (4) Reduce IneqOpp | (5) Index redist. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Panel A: Bias when perceived and actual share differ by at least 5%** | | | | | |
| Treated x Neg. bias | 0.042 | -0.024 | -0.018 | 0.005 | -0.004 |
| | (0.031) | (0.019) | (0.023) | (0.019) | (0.018) |
| Treated x Pos. bias | 0.061** | 0.028 | 0.013 | 0.034* | 0.043*** |
| | (0.024) | (0.017) | (0.020) | (0.018) | (0.016) |
| Treated x No bias | 0.002 | 0.042 | -0.032 | 0.016 | 0.012 |
| | (0.047) | (0.032) | (0.037) | (0.033) | (0.032) |
| Neg. bias | -0.014 | 0.045 | -0.014 | 0.011 | 0.012 |
| | (0.042) | (0.029) | (0.033) | (0.030) | (0.028) |
| Pos. bias | -0.029 | 0.012 | -0.015 | -0.019 | -0.015 |
| | (0.040) | (0.029) | (0.033) | (0.030) | (0.029) |
| Constant | 0.824*** | 0.650*** | 0.701*** | 0.591*** | 0.586*** |
| | (0.084) | (0.057) | (0.067) | (0.058) | (0.055) |
| Observations | 842 | 839 | 840 | 841 | 833 |
| **Panel B: Bias when perceived and actual share differ by at least 10%** | | | | | |
| Treated x Neg. bias | 0.063* | -0.020 | -0.028 | 0.006 | 0.000 |
| | (0.033) | (0.021) | (0.026) | (0.020) | (0.020) |
| Treated x Pos. bias | 0.069*** | 0.037* | 0.027 | 0.037* | 0.054*** |
| | (0.026) | (0.019) | (0.022) | (0.020) | (0.018) |
| Treated x No bias | -0.004 | 0.008 | -0.033 | 0.007 | -0.006 |
| | (0.034) | (0.022) | (0.025) | (0.023) | (0.021) |
| Neg. bias | -0.029 | 0.012 | -0.044* | -0.028 | -0.027 |
| | (0.035) | (0.021) | (0.026) | (0.024) | (0.021) |
| Pos. bias | -0.034 | -0.032 | -0.060** | -0.057** | -0.061*** |
| | (0.032) | (0.022) | (0.025) | (0.024) | (0.022) |
| Constant | 0.826*** | 0.685*** | 0.727*** | 0.613*** | 0.615*** |
| | (0.080) | (0.054) | (0.063) | (0.054) | (0.051) |
| Observations | 842 | 839 | 840 | 841 | 833 |

*Notes:* The table reports the estimated average effects of the rich share treatment by bias type, controlling for covariates such as age, sex, marital status, logarithm of household income per capita, college attendance, and employment status. In Panel A, a negative (positive) bias is defined as perceiving the share of affluent households in the district as at least 5% lower (higher) than the actual share. In Panel B, the negative (positive) bias is defined similarly but requires a difference of at least 10%. Robust standard errors are indicated in parenthesis. $*p < 0.10$, $**p < 0.05$, and $***p < 0.01$ indicate statistically significance levels.

# D Heterogeneous effects by basic beliefs (sample of respondents with positive bias)

This section reports the heterogeneous treatment effects on redistributive attitudes, focusing on individuals who overestimated either their socio-economic status (SES) or the proportion of affluent households in their district (positive bias). The analysis explores how these effects vary across key pre-treatment beliefs, including fairness views, risk preferences, political ideology, trust in government, and perceptions of individual responsibility. Heterogeneous effects are estimated using separate linear regression models for each outcome variable. Each specification includes the treatment indicator, an indicator capturing the specific belief, and an interaction term between these two variables. The estimated equation is as follows:

$$y_j = \beta_0 + \beta_1 T \times belief + \beta_2 belief + \varepsilon_i \tag{D.1}$$

where $y_j$ denotes one of the $j$ outcome variables measuring preferences for redistribution, and $T$ equals 1 if the respondent received the treatment and 0 otherwise. The regressions are estimated on the subsample of individuals exhibiting a positive bias.

Figure D–1: Effects of the SES treatment by prior beliefs (sample of subjects with positive bias of at least one SES group)




*Notes:* The figure plots the heterogeneous effects of the SES treatment on outcomes capturing preferences for redistribution. The sample consists of individuals who overestimated (positive bias) their SES by at least one SES group. The heterogeneous effects are estimated from separate linear regressions for each type of prior belief. The equations regress the outcome on the treatment, the belief and the interaction of these two variables. The bars indicate 90% confidence intervals.

Figure D–2: Effects of the SES treatment by prior beliefs (sample of subjects with positive bias of at least two SES groups)




*Notes:* The figure plots the heterogeneous effects of the SES treatment on outcomes capturing preferences for redistribution. The sample consists of individuals who overestimated (positive bias) their SES by at least two SES groups. The heterogeneous effects are estimated from separate linear regressions for each type of prior belief. The equations regress the outcome on the treatment, the belief and the interaction of these two variables. The bars indicate 90% confidence intervals.

Figure D–3: Effects of the affluent-share treatment by prior beliefs (sample of subjects with positive bias of at least 5%)




*Notes:* The figure plots the heterogeneous treatment effects of the district share of high class people on outcomes capturing preferences for redistribution. The sample consists of individuals who overestimated (positive bias) the share of upper and upper-middle class in their district of residence by at least 5%. The heterogeneous effects are estimated from separate linear regressions for each type of prior belief. The equations regress the outcome on the treatment, the belief and the interaction of these two variables. The bars indicate 90% confidence intervals.

Figure D–4: Effects of the affluent-share treatment by prior beliefs (sample of subjects with positive bias of at least 10%)




*Notes:* The figure plots the heterogeneous treatment effects of the district share of high class people on outcomes capturing preferences for redistribution. The sample consists of individuals who overestimated (positive bias) the share of upper and upper-middle class in their district of residence by at least 10%. The heterogeneous effects are estimated from separate linear regressions for each type of prior belief. The equations regress the outcome on the treatment, the belief and the interaction of these two variables. The bars indicate 90% confidence intervals.

# E Heterogeneous treatment effects by level of local inequality (sample of respondents with positive bias)

This section reports the results on heterogeneous treatment effects in redistributive attitudes, focusing on individuals who exhibited a positive bias –that is, those who overestimated either their socio-economic status (SES) or the proportion of affluent households in their district. The analysis investigates how these effects vary with the degree of local inequality, classified as *high* when the inequality metric within a given buffer zone exceeds the sample median across comparable zones, and *low* otherwise. Heterogeneous effects are estimated using separate linear regression models for each outcome variable, including the treatment indicator, an indicator for high local inequality, and their interaction term. The estimated equation is as follows:

$$y_j = \beta_0 + \beta_1 T + \beta_2 T \times highineq + \beta_3 highineq + \varepsilon_i \tag{F.1}$$

where $y_j$ denotes one of the $j$ outcome variables capturing preferences for redistribution, and $T$ equals 1 if the respondent received the treatment and 0 otherwise. The variable *highineq* takes the value 1 when the level of inequality within the participant's buffer zone is above the sample median and 0 otherwise. Local inequality metrics are computed for three alternative buffer zones: 300, 500, and 1,000 meters around each respondent's household.

This appendix reports results using GE(2) and the local share of affluent households (upper and upper-middle class). Results using the coefficient of variation (CV) are not shown, as they are effectively the same as those for GE(2) due to the high correlation between the two measures.

Figure E–1: Effects of the SES treatment by levels of inequality (using the GE(2) of the buffer)




*Notes:* The figure shows the heterogeneous effects of the SES treatment on outcomes related to preferences for redistribution, focusing on individuals who overestimated their SES (positive bias). The heterogeneous effects are estimated from separate linear regressions for each outcome. Each regression includes the treatment indicator, an indicator for the level of local inequality (high or low), and their interaction term. The level of inequality is classified as *high* when the inequality metric within a given buffer zone exceeds the sample median for zones of equivalent size, and *low* otherwise. The bottom panels correspond to cases where positive bias is defined as overestimating one's own SES by at least one level; the top panels correspond to cases where positive bias is defined as overestimating by at least two levels. Bars represent 90% confidence intervals. Bars indicate 90% confidence intervals.

Figure E–2: Effects of the SES treatment by levels of inequality (using the share of rich households in the buffer)




*Notes:* The figure shows the heterogeneous effects of the SES treatment on outcomes related to preferences for redistribution, focusing on individuals who overestimated their SES (positive bias). The heterogeneous effects are estimated from separate linear regressions for each outcome. Each regression includes the treatment indicator, an indicator for the level of local inequality (high or low), and their interaction term. The level of inequality is classified as *high* when the inequality metric within a given buffer zone exceeds the sample median for zones of equivalent size, and *low* otherwise. The bottom panels correspond to cases where positive bias is defined as overestimating one's own SES by at least one level; the top panels correspond to cases where positive bias is defined as overestimating by at least two levels. Bars represent 90% confidence intervals. Bars indicate 90% confidence intervals.

Figure E–3: Effects of the affluent-share treatment by levels of inequality (using the GE(2) of the buffer)




*Notes:* The figure shows the heterogeneous effects of the affluent-share treatment on outcomes related to preferences for redistribution, focusing on individuals who overestimated the share of affluent households in their district (positive bias). The heterogeneous effects are estimated using separate linear regressions for each outcome. Each regression includes the treatment indicator, an indicator for the level of local inequality (high or low), and their interaction term. The level of inequality is classified as *high* when the inequality metric within a given buffer zone exceeds the sample median for zones of equivalent size, and *low* otherwise. The bottom panels correspond to cases where positive bias is defined as overestimating the share of rich households in the district by at least 5 pp; the top panels correspond to cases where positive bias is defined as overestimating by at least 10 pp. Bars represent 90% confidence intervals.

Figure E–4: Effects of the affluent-share treatment by levels of inequality (using the share of rich households in the buffer)




*Notes:* The figure shows the heterogeneous effects of the affluent-share treatment on outcomes related to preferences for redistribution, focusing on individuals who overestimated the share of affluent households in their district (positive bias). The heterogeneous effects are estimated using separate linear regressions for each outcome. Each regression includes the treatment indicator, an indicator for the level of local inequality (high or low), and their interaction term. The level of inequality is classified as *high* when the inequality metric within a given buffer zone exceeds the sample median for zones of equivalent size, and *low* otherwise. The bottom panels correspond to cases where positive bias is defined as overestimating the share of rich households in the district by at least 5 pp; the top panels correspond to cases where positive bias is defined as overestimating by at least 10 pp. Bars represent 90% confidence intervals.

# F Geo-referenced households and maps

### Georeferencing

The survey asked each respondent to provide their household address or, alternatively, the closest identifiable point—such as a street intersection, park, or bus stop. This question was not mandatory, and some individuals chose not to provide any location information.

Starting from the initial sample of 1,319 individuals, 212 respondents did not report an address or local reference point. Geo-coordinates for the remaining 1,107 observations were obtained using the Google API. Because this tool is not entirely reliable, a manual verification and correction process was carried out. A total of 236 addresses were corrected because their initial coordinates fell outside the respondent's district (i.e., errors due to the Google API, while misspecified addresses in the survey were discarded). The cases of low precision addresses were also manually verified and corrected.

Subsequently, 39 addresses were discarded due to insufficient information (e.g., incomplete or vague entries), and 117 were excluded because they were located outside the respondent's declared district. After these adjustments, the sample included 951 observations. After further excluding cases with extreme interview durations, the final sample used for the local inequality analysis consisted of 937 individuals.

Table F–1: Sample addresses distribution

| District | All | | With addresses | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | n | % | n | % |
| Ate | 82 | 6.34 | 54 | 5.76 |
| Bellavista | 13 | 1.01 | 6 | 0.64 |
| Breña | 13 | 1.01 | 5 | 0.53 |
| Callao | 61 | 4.72 | 40 | 4.27 |
| Carabayllo | 43 | 3.33 | 32 | 3.42 |
| Chorrillos | 50 | 3.87 | 36 | 3.84 |
| Comas | 80 | 6.19 | 42 | 4.48 |
| El Agustino | 31 | 2.4 | 19 | 2.03 |
| Independencia | 26 | 2.01 | 25 | 2.67 |
| Jesús María | 8 | 0.62 | 5 | 0.53 |
| La Molina | 21 | 1.62 | 16 | 1.71 |
| La Perla | 11 | 0.85 | 6 | 0.64 |
| La Victoria | 26 | 2.01 | 25 | 2.67 |
| Lima | 40 | 3.09 | 35 | 3.74 |
| Lince | 9 | 0.7 | 7 | 0.75 |
| Los Olivos | 48 | 3.71 | 30 | 3.2 |
| Lurigancho | 31 | 2.4 | 27 | 2.88 |
| Magdalena del Mar | 7 | 0.54 | 6 | 0.64 |
| Miraflores | 18 | 1.39 | 17 | 1.81 |
| Pueblo Libre | 13 | 1.01 | 6 | 0.64 |
| Puente Piedra | 39 | 3.02 | 36 | 3.84 |
| Rímac | 30 | 2.32 | 17 | 1.81 |
| San Borja | 15 | 1.16 | 9 | 0.96 |
| San Isidro | 8 | 0.62 | 4 | 0.43 |
| San Juan de Lurigancho | 152 | 11.76 | 127 | 13.55 |
| San Juan de Miraflores | 51 | 3.94 | 45 | 4.8 |
| San Luis | 6 | 0.46 | 5 | 0.53 |
| San Martín de Porres | 87 | 6.73 | 25 | 2.67 |
| San Miguel | 27 | 2.09 | 25 | 2.67 |
| Santa Anita | 27 | 2.09 | 20 | 2.13 |
| Santiago de Surco | 45 | 3.48 | 39 | 4.16 |
| Surquillo | 16 | 1.24 | 10 | 1.07 |
| Ventanilla | 49 | 3.79 | 40 | 4.27 |
| Villa El Salvador | 62 | 4.8 | 54 | 5.76 |
| Villa María del Triunfo | 48 | 3.71 | 42 | 4.48 |
| Total | 1293 | 100 | 937 | 100 |

*Notes:* The table reports the distribution of the sample by districts before and after the cleaning data process.

Figure F–1: Distribution of control and treatment groups



# G Questionnaire (Eglish version)

**A. Socio-demographic Questions**

*NOTE: Questions 1-7 are mandatory.*

1. **Does your usual place of residence in Lima or Callao?**: _____
   ☐ Yes ☐ No [-> End of the survey]
2. **In which district do you currently live? [scroll through the list of 49 districts of Lima Metropolitana]**
3. **How old are you in completed years?** : _____
4. **Are you**: _____
   ☐ Male ☐ Female
5. **How many people permanently live in your household? [check min=1; max=10]**: _____
6. **Which type of housing does your house resemble the most?**: _____
   ☐ Apartment ☐ House
7. **In which range does the TOTAL monthly household income fall, including all wages, salaries, pensions, remittances, and government transfers? [Please scroll through the list]**: _____
   ☐ Less than 1,000 soles
   ☐ 1,000 to 1,500 soles
   ☐ 1,500 to 2,000 soles
   ☐ 2,000 to 2,500 soles
   ☐ 2,500 to 3,000 soles
   ☐ 3,000 to 3,500 soles
   ☐ 3,500 to 4,000 soles
   ☐ 4,000 to 4,500 soles
   ☐ 4,500 to 5,000 soles
   ☐ 5,000 to 6,000 soles
   ☐ 6,000 to 7,000 soles
   ☐ 7,000 to 8,000 soles
   ☐ 8,000 to 9,000 soles
   ☐ 9,000 to 10,000 soles
   ☐ 10,000 to 12,500 soles
   ☐ 12,500 to 15,000 soles
   ☐ More than 15,000 soles
8. **What is your marital status?**: _____
   ☐ Cohabiting
   ☐ Married
   ☐ Widowed
   ☐ Divorced

- [ ] Separated
- [ ] Single

9. **What is your relationship to the head of household?**: _____
   - [ ] I am the head of household
   - [ ] Spouse or partner
   - [ ] Son or daughter or stepson
   - [ ] Son-in-law or daughter-in-law
   - [ ] Grandchild
   - [ ] Father/mother or parent-in-law
   - [ ] Other relative
   - [ ] Domestic worker
   - [ ] Pensioner
   - [ ] Other

10. **What is the highest level of education you have completed?**: _____
    - [ ] No education
    - [ ] Incomplete primary education
    - [ ] Completed primary education
    - [ ] Incomplete secondary education
    - [ ] Completed secondary education
    - [ ] Special basic education
    - [ ] Incomplete non-university higher education
    - [ ] Completed non-university higher education
    - [ ] Incomplete university education
    - [ ] Complete university education
    - [ ] Master's or doctorate degree

11. **Select the employment status that best matches your current situation (choose one option)**: _____
    - [ ] Employer or boss
    - [ ] Self-employed
    - [ ] Employee
    - [ ] Laborer
    - [ ] Unpaid family worker
    - [ ] Domestic worker
    - [ ] Unemployed
    - [ ] Retired
    - [ ] Student
    - [ ] Other

12. **How often do you follow the news through television, radio, newspapers, social media, or the internet?**: _____
    - [ ] Daily
    - [ ] Several times a week
    - [ ] Several times a month

☐ Several times a year
☐ Never

13. **Did you or someone in your household receive any government assistance/benefits to cope with the COVID-19 pandemic (such as the "Bono Yo Me Quedo en Casa" or "Bono Familiar Universal", etc.)?**: _____
☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Don't know

14. **Have you or someone in your household received or used any of the government social programs (such as Quali Warma, Juntos, Pensión 65, Beca 18, Cuna Más, etc.)?**: _____
☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Don't know

15. **Do you consider your economic situation to be better, the same, or worse than it was twelve months ago?**: _____
☐ Better
☐ Same
☐ Worse

**B. Opinion and beliefs questions**

16. **In your opinion, why is a person poor? Choose the most important reason**: _____
☐ Due to their lack of effort
☐ Due to circumstances beyond their control

17. **In your opinion, why is a person rich? Choose the most important reason**: _____
☐ Because they worked harder than others
☐ Because they had more advantages than others

18. **Speaking about the people in your neighbourhood, would you say they are very trustworthy, somewhat trustworthy, not very trustworthy, or not trustworthy?**: _____
☐ Very trustworthy
☐ Somewhat trustworthy
☐ Not very trustworthy
☐ Not trustworthy

19. **In the past 12 months, have you participated in a public demonstration or protest?**: _____
☐ Yes, I have participated
☐ No, I have not participated

20. **Are you very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied with the quality of public schools?**: _____
☐ Very satisfied
☐ Satisfied
☐ Dissatisfied
☐ Very dissatisfied

21. **And with the quality of public medical and healthcare services?**: _____
☐ Very satisfied

☐ Satisfied
☐ Dissatisfied
☐ Very dissatisfied

22. **In political matters, people often talk about the left and the right. On the following scale, where 1 represents the left and 10 represents the right, where would you place yourself in general terms?**

| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Left | | | | | | | | | Right |

23. **Indicate how willing you are, in general, to take risks. Use the following scale, where 1 indicates that you are not willing to take risks, and 10 indicates that you are very willing:**

| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Not willing to take risks at all | | | | | | | | | Very willing to take risks |

24. **Indicate how much trust you have in the government to use public resources for the benefit of the poorest. Use the following scale, where 1 indicates that you have no trust at all, and 10 indicates that you have a lot of trust:**

| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| No trust at all | | | | | | | | | Complete trust |

25. **Some people believe that the government should have more responsibility to ensure that everyone has a livelihood, while others believe that individuals should have more responsibility to support themselves. Mark the option that best reflects your opinion**: _____
☐ The government should have more responsibility to ensure that everyone has a livelihood
☐ Individuals should have more responsibility to support themselves

26. **The National Institute of Statistics and Informatics (INEI) classifies households in Lima into 5 income levels. Mark the group you believe your household belongs to**: _____
☐ High
☐ Upper Middle
☐ Middle
☐ Lower Middle
☐ Low

27. **In the district where you live, what percentage of households do you believe belong to the High or Upper Middle-income level? Please slide the bar until you reach the appropriate figure. [The bar moves from 1 to 100 in increments of 1, and the text changes accordingly].**
In my district, X% of households belong to the High or Upper Middle-income level.


**C. Treatments**

**District-based NSE Treatments**

**T1a. According to your income and according to studies by the National Institute of Statistics, your household would belong to level L, and you said it was level M... [1/2/3].**

(1) "That is, the level of your household is higher than you thought."
(2) "That is, the level of your household is lower than you thought."
(3) "That is, the level of your household is the same than you thought."
Now that you know this, we will ask you a few final questions.

**T1b. According to studies by the National Institute of Statistics, in your district, there are R% of Upper and Upper-Middle households, and you said there were S%...[1/2/3].**

(1) "That is, there is a higher percentage of rich households in your district than you thought."
(2) "That is, there is a lower percentage of rich households in your district than you thought."
(3) "That is, there is about the same percentage of rich households in your district as you thought."
Now that you know this, we will ask you a few final questions.

**D. Outcome Measurement Questions**

28. **How much do you agree with the following contrasting ideas? 1 means "Strongly disagree" with the first statement, and 10 means "Strongly agree" with the second statement. If your opinion falls somewhere else on the scale, please choose the corresponding number.**

| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Incomes should be made more equal | | | | Greater income differences are needed as an incentive for individual effort | | | | | |

29. **How fair do you believe the income distribution in Peru is?**: _____
- ☐ Very fair
- ☐ Fair
- ☐ Unfair
- ☐ Very unfair

30. **How much do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements?**: _____

31. **If you have any comments about the questions, please write them down below.**: _____

| | Strongly agree | Agree | Disagree | Strongly disagree |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| A. The government should implement strong policies to reduce income inequality between the rich and the poor. | | | | |
| B. The government should impose a wealth tax above a certain amount. | | | | |
| C. The government should reduce the disparities in opportunities between children from rich and poor families. | | | | |

32. **Your participation in the survey has helped us a lot in our study, we really appreciate it, may we contact you at a later date to continue with a second phase of our study?**: _____

☐ Yes [-> 33. Could you please provide us your cell phone number and/or email address?]

☐ No

**ÚLTIMAS PUBLICACIONES DE LOS PROFESORES**
**DEL DEPARTAMENTO DE ECONOMÍA**

- *Libros*

Waldo Mendoza
2025 *Microeconomía y macroeconomía: una introducción.* Lima, Fondo Editorial PUCP.

Jorge Rojas
2024 *Lecciones de economía internacional: teoría pura*. Lima, Fondo Editorial PUCP.

Gonzalo Ruiz Díaz y Sergio Sifuentes Castañeda
2024 *Análisis de impacto regulatorio, ensayos reunidos.* Lima, Fondo Editorial PUCP.

Félix Jiménez, José Oscátegui y Marco Arroyo
2024 *Perú 1990-2021: La causa del "milagro" económico.* Lima, Fondo Editorial PUCP.

Alan Fairlie Reinoso y Ariana Figueroa
2024 *Programas de posgrado en crecimiento verde y desarrollo sostenible en América Latina: una aproximación comparativa*. Lima, INTE PUCP.

Félix Jiménez
2024 *La economía peruana del periodo 1950-2020.* Lima, Fondo Editorial PUCP.

Roxana Barrantes y José I. Távara (editores)
2023 *Perspectivas sobre desarrollo y territorio en el nuevo contexto. Homenaje a Efraín Gonzales de Olarte.* Lima, Fondo Editorial PUCP.

Efraín Gonzales de Olarte
2023 *La descentralización pasmada. Desconcentración y desarrollo regional en el Perú 2003-2020*. Lima, Fondo Editorial PUCP.

Adolfo Figueroa
2023 *The Quality of Society, Volume III. Essays on the Unified Theory of Capitalism.* New York, Palgrave Macmillan

Efraín Gonzales de Olarte
2023 *El modelo de Washington, el neoliberalismo y el desarrollo económico. El caso peruano 1990-2020. L*ima, Fondo Editorial PUCP.

Máximo Vega Centeno.
2023 *Perú: desarrollo, naturaleza y urgencias Una mirada desde la economía y el desarrollo humano.* Lima, Fondo Editorial PUCP.

Waldo Mendoza
2023 *Constitución y crecimiento económico: Perú 1993-2021*. Lima, Fondo Editorial PUCP.

Oscar Dancourt y Waldo Mendoza (Eds.)
2023 *Ensayos macroeconómicos en honor a Félix Jiménez*. Lima, Fondo Editorial PUCP.

Carlos Contreras Carranza (ed.)
2022 *Historia económica del Perú central. Ventajas y desafíos de estar cerca de la capital*. Lima, Banco Central de Reserva del Perú e Instituto de Estudios Peruanos.

Alejandro Lugon

2022 *Equilibrio, eficiencia e imperfecciones del mercado.* Lima, Fondo Editorial PUCP.

Waldo Mendoza Bellido

2022 *Cómo investigan los economistas. Guía para elaborar y desarrollar un proyecto de investigación. Segunda edición aumentada*. Lima, Fondo Editorial PUCP.

Elena Álvarez (Editor)

2022 *Agricultura y desarrollo rural en el Perú: homenaje a José María Caballero.* Lima, Departamento de Economía PUCP.

Aleida Azamar Alonso, José Carlos Silva Macher y Federico Zuberman (Editores)

2022 *Economía ecológica latinoamericana.* Buenos Aires, México. CLACSO, Siglo XXI Editores.

Efraín Gonzales de Olarte

2021 *Economía regional y urbana. El espacio importa.* Lima, Fondo Editorial PUCP.

Alfredo Dammert Lira

2021 *Economía minera*. Lima, Fondo Editorial PUCP.

Adolfo Figueroa

2021 *The Quality of Society, Volume II – Essays on the Unified Theory of Capitalism*. New York, Palgrave Macmillan.

Carlos Contreras Carranza (Editor)

2021 *La Economía como Ciencia Social en el Perú. Cincuenta años de estudios económicos en la Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú.* Lima, Departamento de Economía PUCP.

José Carlos Orihuela y César Contreras

2021 *Amazonía en cifras: Recursos naturales, cambio climático y desigualdades.* Lima, OXFAM.

Alan Fairlie

2021 *Hacia una estrategia de desarrollo sostenible para el Perú del Bicentenario.* Arequipa, Editorial UNSA.

Waldo Mendoza e Yuliño Anastacio

2021 *La historia fiscal del Perú: 1980-2020. Colapso, estabilización, consolidación y el golpe de la COVID-19.* Lima, Fondo Editorial PUCP.

Cecilia Garavito

2020 *Microeconomía: Consumidores, productores y estructuras de mercado. Segunda edición.* Lima, Fondo Editorial de la Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú.

Adolfo Figueroa

2019 *The Quality of Society Essays on the Unified Theory of Capitalism.* New York. Palgrave MacMillan.

Carlos Contreras y Stephan Gruber (Eds.)

2019 *Historia del Pensamiento Económico en el Perú. Antología y selección de textos*. Lima, Facultad de Ciencias Sociales PUCP.

Barreix, Alberto Daniel; Corrales, Luis Fernando; Benitez, Juan Carlos; Garcimartín, Carlos; Ardanaz, Martín; Díaz, Santiago; Cerda, Rodrigo; Larraín B., Felipe; Revilla, Ernesto; Acevedo, Carlos; Peña, Santiago; Agüero, Emmanuel; Mendoza Bellido, Waldo; Escobar Arango y Andrés.
2019 *Reglas fiscales resilientes en América Latina*. Washington, BID.

José D. Gallardo Ku
2019 *Notas de teoría para para la incertidumbre*. Lima, Fondo Editorial de la Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú.

Úrsula Aldana, Jhonatan Clausen, Angelo Cozzubo, Carolina Trivelli, Carlos Urrutia y Johanna Yancari
2018 *Desigualdad y pobreza en un contexto de crecimiento económico*. Lima, Instituto de Estudios Peruanos.

Séverine Deneulin, Jhonatan Clausen y Arelí Valencia (Eds.)
2018 *Introducción al enfoque de las capacidades: Aportes para el Desarrollo Humano en América Latina*. Flacso Argentina y Editorial Manantial. Fondo Editorial de la Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú.

Mario Dammil, Oscar Dancourt y Roberto Frenkel (Eds.)
2018 *Dilemas de las políticas cambiarias y monetarias en América Latina*. Lima, Fondo Editorial de la Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú.

- *Documentos de trabajo*

No. 550 Producto potencial y demanda agregada: a propósito de la experiencia peruana. Oscar Dancourt. Octubre 2025

No. 549 Gato por liebre o gato encerrado: ¿Cuánto vale la nueva refinería de petróleo de Talara?. Jorge Vega Castro. Setiembre 2025

No. 548 "Motherly Care: The impacts of exiting a childcare program on child and maternal health. Chris M. Boyd, Norma Correa, Ángelo Cozzubo and José María Rentería. Setiembre 2025

No. 547 "No Early Advantage? The Effects of Preschool Entry-Age Policies on Child Development in Peru". Chris M. Boyd and José María Rentería. Setiembre 2025.

No. 546 "Informalidad, productividades e ingresos en el Perú: Análisis sectorial". Efraín Gonzales de Olarte. Junio 2025.

No. 545 "Productividad y costos operativos en las instituciones microfinancieras peruanas reguladas". Giovanna Aguilar y Jhonatan Portilla. Mayo 2025.

No. 544 "The Inflation Uncertainty-Inflation Relationship: Time Variation Across Latin America and the G7". Mauricio Alvarado and Gabriel Rodriguez. Marzo 2025.

No. 543 "The Role of Technology Extension and Transfer in Firms' Innovation and Productivity in Peru". Miguel Ortiz and Juan Palomino. Marzo 2025.

No. 542 "How to develop the capital market?: make countries fitness". Julio Villavicencio. Febrero 2025.

No. 541 "Public Debt Dynamics and Sustainability: A Framework for Analysis". Waldo Mendoza, Marco Razzo and Rafael Vilca. Diciembre 2024.

No. 540 "Efecto de los bonos sobre el consumo de bienes durante la crisis económica de la pandemia de Covid 19". Luis García. Diciembre 2024.

No. 539 "Regime-Switching, Stochastic Volatility, Fiscal Policy Shocks and Macroeconomic Fluctuations in Peru". Gabriel Rodríguez and Joseph Santisteban. Octubre 2024.

No. 538 "Flotación cambiaria, precio materias primas y fluctuaciones macroeconómicas: un modelo para el Perú". Waldo Mendoza y Rafael Vilca Romero. Setiembre 2024.

No. 537 "Regime-Switching, Stochastic Volatility and Impacts of Monetary Policy Shocks on Macroeconomic Fluctuations in Peru". Paola Alvarado Silva, Moisés Cáceres Quispe and Gabriel Rodríguez. Agosto 2024

No. 536 "La dinámica de la inversión en una economía primario exportadora: un modelo". Waldo Mendoza. Julio 2024.

No. 535 "Perú 1895-2019: Continuidad de la Dependencia Externa y Desindustrialización Prematura". Félix Jiménez. Junio 2024.

No. 534 "'Bonos': Lecciones de las transferencias monetarias no condicionadas durante la pandemia de COVID-19 en Perú". Pedro Francke y Josue Benites. Abril 2024.

No. 533 “Modeling the Trend, Persistence, and Volatility of Inflation in Pacific Alliance Countries: An Empirical Application Using a Model with Inflation Bands”. Gabriel Rodríguez and Luis Surco. Febrero 2024.

No. 532 “Regional Financial Development and Micro and Small Enterprises in Peru”. Jennifer de la Cruz. Enero 2024.

No. 531 “Time-Varying Effects of Financial Uncertainty Shocks on Macroeconomic Fluctuations in Peru”. Mauricio Alvarado and Gabriel Rodríguez. Enero 2024.

No. 530 “Experiments on the Different Numbers of Bidders in Sequential Auctions”. Gunay, Hikmet and Ricardo Huamán-Aguilar. Enero 2024.

No. 529 “External Shocks and Economic Fluctuations in Peru: Empirical Evidence using Mixture Innovation TVP-VAR-SV Models”.
Brenda Guevara, Gabriel Rodríguez and Lorena Yamuca Salvatierra. Enero, 2024.

No. 528 “COVID-19 y el mercado laboral de Lima Metropolitana y Callao: Un análisis de género”. Tania Paredes. Noviembre, 2023.

No. 527 “COVID-19 y el alza de la inseguridad alimentaria de los hogares rurales en Perú durante 2020-2021”. Josue Benites y Pedro Francke. Noviembre, 2023.

No. 526 “Globalización Neoliberal y Reordenamiento Geopolítico”. Jorge Rojas. Octubre, 2023.

No. 525 T”he effects of social pensions on mortality among the extreme poor elderly”. Jose A. Valderrama and Javier Olivera. Setiembre, 2023.

No. 524 “Jane Haldimand Marcet: Escribir sobre economía política en el siglo XVIII”. Cecilia Garavito. Setiembre, 2023.

No. 523 “Impact of Monetary Policy Shocks in the Peruvian Economy Over Time”. Flavio Pérez Rojo and Gabriel Rodríguez. Agosto, 2023.

No. 522 “Perú 1990-2021: la causa del “milagro” económico ¿Constitución de 1993 o Superciclo de las materias primas?” Félix Jiménez, José Oscátegui y Marco Arroyo. Agosto, 2023.

No. 521 “Envejeciendo desigualmente en América Latina”. Javier Olivera. Julio, 2023.

No. 520 “Choques externos en la economía peruana: un enfoque de ceros y signos en un modelo BVAR”. Gustavo Ganiko y Álvaro Jiménez. Mayo, 2023

No. 519 “Ley de Okun en Lima Metropolitana 1970 – 2021”. Cecilia Garavito. Mayo, 2023

No. 518 “Efectos ‘Spillovers’ (de derrame) del COVID-19 Sobre la Pobreza en el Perú: Un Diseño No Experimental de Control Sintético”. Mario Tello. Febrero, 2023

No. 517 “Indicadores comerciales de la Comunidad Andina 2002-2021: ¿Posible complementariedad o convergencia regional?” Alan Fairlie y Paula Paredes. Febrero, 2023.

No. 516 “Evolution over Time of the Effects of Fiscal Shocks in the Peruvian Economy: Empirical Application Using TVP-VAR-SV Models”. Alexander Meléndez Holguín and Gabriel Rodríguez. Enero, 2023.

No. 515 "COVID-19 and Gender Differences in the Labor Market: Evidence from the Peruvian Economy". Giannina Vaccaro and Tania Paredes. Julio, 2022.

No. 514 "Do institutions mitigate the uncertainty effect on sovereign credit ratings?" Nelson Ramírez-Rondán, Renato Rojas-Rojas and Julio A. Villavicencio. Julio 2022.

No. 513 "Gender gap in pension savings: Evidence from Peru's individual capitalization system. Javier Olivera and Yadiraah Iparraguirre". Junio 2022.

No. 512 "Poder de mercado, bienestar social y eficiencia en la industria microfinanciera regulada en el Perú. Giovanna Aguilar y Jhonatan Portilla". Junio 2022.

No. 511 "Perú 1990-2020: Heterogeneidad estructural y regímenes económicos regionales ¿Persiste la desconexión entre la economía, la demografía y la geografía?" Félix Jiménez y Marco Arroyo. Junio 2022.

No. 510 "Evolution of the Exchange Rate Pass-Throught into Prices in Peru: An Empirical Application Using TVP-VAR-SV Models". Roberto Calero, Gabriel Rodríguez and Rodrigo Salcedo Cisneros. Mayo 2022.

No. 509 " Time Changing Effects of External Shocks on Macroeconomic Fluctuations in Peru: Empirical Application Using Regime-Switching VAR Models with Stochastic Volatility". Paulo Chávez and Gabriel Rodríguez. Marzo 2022.

No. 508 " Time Evolution of External Shocks on Macroeconomic Fluctuations in Pacific Alliance Countries: Empirical Application using TVP-VAR-SV Models". Gabriel Rodríguez and Renato Vassallo. Marzo 2022.

No. 507 Time-Varying Effects of External Shocks on Macroeconomic Fluctuations in Peru: An Empirical Application using TVP-VARSV Models. Junior A. Ojeda Cunya and Gabriel Rodríguez. Marzo 2022.

No. 506 " La Macroeconomía de la cuarentena: Un modelo de dos sectores". Waldo Mendoza, Luis Mancilla y Rafael Velarde. Febrero 2022.

No. 505 " ¿Coexistencia o canibalismo? Un análisis del desplazamiento de medios de comunicación tradicionales y modernos en los adultos mayores para el caso latinoamericano: Argentina, Colombia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Paraguay y Perú". Roxana Barrantes Cáceres y Silvana Manrique Romero. Enero 2022.

No. 504 "Does the Central Bank of Peru Respond to Exchange Rate Movements? A Bayesian Estimation of a New Keynesian DSGE Model with FX Interventions". Gabriel Rodríguez, Paul Castillo B. and Harumi Hasegawa. Diciembre, 2021

No. 503 "La no linealidad en la relación entre la competencia y la sostenibilidad financiera y alcance social de las instituciones microfinancieras reguladas en el Perú". Giovanna Aguilar y Jhonatan Portilla. Noviembre, 2021.

No. 502 "Approximate Bayesian Estimation of Stochastic Volatility in Mean Models using Hidden Markov Models: Empirical Evidence from Stock Latin American Markets". Carlos A. Abanto-Valle, Gabriel Rodríguez, Luis M. Castro Cepero and Hernán B. Garrafa-Aragón. Noviembre, 2021.

No. 501 "El impacto de políticas diferenciadas de cuarentena sobre la mortalidad por COVID-19: el caso de Brasil y Perú". Angelo Cozzubo, Javier Herrera, Mireille Razafindrakoto y François Roubaud. Octubre, 2021.

No. 500 “Determinantes del gasto de bolsillo en salud en el Perú”. Luis García y Crissy Rojas. Julio, 2021.

No. 499 “Cadenas Globales de Valor de Exportación de los Países de la Comunidad Andina 2000-2015”. Mario Tello. Junio, 2021.

No. 498 “¿Cómo afecta el desempleo regional a los salarios en el área urbana? Una curva de salarios para Perú (2012-2019)”. Sergio Quispe. Mayo, 2021.

No. 497 “¿Qué tan rígidos son los precios en línea? Evidencia para Perú usando Big Data”. Hilary Coronado, Erick Lahura y Marco Vega. Mayo, 2021.

No. 496 “Reformando el sistema de pensiones en Perú: costo fiscal, nivel de pensiones, brecha de género y desigualdad”. Javier Olivera. Diciembre, 2020.

No. 495 “Crónica de la economía peruana en tiempos de pandemia”. Jorge Vega Castro. Diciembre, 2020.

No. 494 “Epidemia y nivel de actividad económica: un modelo”. Waldo Mendoza e Isaías Chalco. Setiembre, 2020.

No. 493 “Competencia, alcance social y sostenibilidad financiera en las microfinanzas reguladas peruanas”. Giovanna Aguilar Andía y Jhonatan Portilla Goicochea. Setiembre, 2020.

No. 492 “Empoderamiento de la mujer y demanda por servicios de salud preventivos y de salud reproductiva en el Perú 2015-2018”. Pedro Francke y Diego Quispe O. Julio, 2020.

No. 491 “Inversión en infraestructura y demanda turística: una aplicación del enfoque de control sintético para el caso Kuéalp, Perú”. Erick Lahura y Rosario Sabrera. Julio, 2020.

No. 490 “La dinámica de inversión privada. El modelo del acelerador flexible en una economía abierta”. Waldo Mendoza Bellido. Mayo, 2020.

No. 489 “Time-Varying Impact of Fiscal Shocks over GDP Growth in Peru: An Empirical Application using Hybrid TVP-VAR-SV Models”. Álvaro Jiménez and Gabriel Rodríguez. Abril, 2020.

No. 488 “Experimentos clásicos de economía. Evidencia de laboratorio de Perú”. Kristian López Vargas y Alejandro Lugon. Marzo, 2020.

No. 487 “Investigación y desarrollo, tecnologías de información y comunicación e impactos sobre el proceso de innovación y la productividad”. Mario D. Tello. Marzo, 2020.

No. 486 “The Political Economy Approach of Trade Barriers: The Case of Peruvian’s Trade Liberalization”. Mario D. Tello. Marzo, 2020.

No. 485 “Evolution of Monetary Policy in Peru. An Empirical Application Using a Mixture Innovation TVP-VAR-SV Model”. Jhonatan Portilla Goicochea and Gabriel Rodríguez. Febrero, 2020.

No. 484 "Modeling the Volatility of Returns on Commodities: An Application and Empirical Comparison of GARCH and SV Models". Jean Pierre Fernández Prada Saucedo and Gabriel Rodríguez. Febrero, 2020.

No. 483 "Macroeconomic Effects of Loan Supply Shocks: Empirical Evidence". Jefferson Martínez amd Gabriel Rodríguez. Febrero, 2020.

No. 482 "Acerca de la relación entre el gasto público por alumno y los retornos a la educación en el Perú: un análisis por cohortes". Luis García y Sara Sánchez. Febrero, 2020.

No. 481 "Stochastic Volatility in Mean. Empirical Evidence from Stock Latin American Markets". Carlos A. Abanto-Valle, Gabriel Rodríguez and Hernán B. Garrafa-Aragón. Febrero, 2020.

No. 480 "Presidential Approval in Peru: An Empirical Analysis Using a Fractionally Cointegrated VAR2". Alexander Boca Saravia and Gabriel Rodríguez. Diciembre, 2019.

No. 479 "La Ley de Okun en el Perú: Lima Metropolitana 1971 – 2016." Cecilia Garavito. Agosto, 2019.

No. 478 "Peru´s Regional Growth and Convergence in 1979-2017: An Empirical Spatial Panel Data Analysis". Juan Palomino and Gabriel Rodríguez. Marzo, 2019.

- *Materiales de Enseñanza*

No. 14 "Programación de Experimentos en Ciencias Sociales con oTree". Ricardo Huamán-Aguilar y Joan Miranda. Marzo, 2025.

No. 13 "Fundamentos de Econometría". Juan León Jara Almonte y Marcelo Manuel Gallardo Burga. Febrero, 2025.

No. 12 "La teoría clásica de las ventajas comparativas en el comercio internacional". Jorge Vega Castro. Junio, 2024.

No. 11 "La teoría de protección efectiva: conceptos básicos". Jorge Vega Castro. Mayo, 2023.

No. 10 "Boleta o factura: el impuesto general a las ventas (IGV) en el Perú". Jorge Vega Castro. Abril, 2023.

No. 9 "Economía Pública. Segunda edición". Roxana Barrantes Cáceres, Silvana Manrique Romero y Carla Glave Barrantes. Febrero, 2023.

No. 8 "Economía Experimental Aplicada. Programación de experimentos con oTree". Ricardo Huamán-Aguilar. Febrero, 2023

No. 7 "Modelos de Ecuaciones Simultáneas (MES): Aplicación al mercado monetario". Luis Mancilla, Tania Paredes y Juan León. Agosto, 2022

No. 6 "Apuntes de Macroeconomía Intermedia". Felix Jiménez. Diciembre, 2020

No. 5 “Matemáticas para Economistas 1”. Tessy Váquez Baos. Abril, 2019.

No. 4 “Teoría de la Regulación”. Roxana Barrantes. Marzo, 2019.

No. 3 “Economía Pública”. Roxana Barrantes, Silvana Manrique y Carla Glave. Marzo, 2018.

No. 2 “Macroeconomía: Enfoques y modelos. Ejercicios resueltos”. Felix Jiménez. Marzo, 2016.

No. 1 “Introducción a la teoría del Equilibrio General”. Alejandro Lugon. Octubre, 2015.

Departamento de Economía - Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú
Av. Universitaria 1801, San Miguel, 15008 – Perú
Telf. 626-2000 anexos 4950 – 4951
https://departamento-economia.pucp.edu.pe/