THE REGION IN THE FACE OF SECURITY GLOBAL CHANGES

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Introduction

In 2015, the Institute of International Studies (IDEI) of the Pontifical Catholic University of Peru, with the support of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation (KAS), established the Security Policy Network, which is made up -in addition to the IDEI- by scholars and specialists from universities in Peru’s five neighboring countries, namely, from the Universidad Mayor de San Andrés de Bolivia, the University of Brasilia, the University of Chile, the Pontificia Universidad Javeriana de Colombia and the Instituto de Altos Estudios Nacionales del Ecuador.
This network’s purpose is to spread and strengthen knowledge on security in our respective countries, as well as to make proposals to collaborate in designing and implementing security public policies.

In 2019, its fifth year since it was founded, the Network produced a new publication entitled The region in the face of global security changes, which analyzes how changes occurring in the international scene will have an impact on our countries’ security agenda and also on the policies they will assume in the face of such transformations. It is therefore an interesting and current theme, in which the Security Policy Network again seeks to contribute and offer its contribution. A brief summary of the studies that make up the aforementioned work is presented below.

2 South America in the face of international security challenges. Perspectives from Brazil

Antonio Ramalho
Juliano Cortinhas

In the face of intense and accelerated changes in the global geopolitical context, President Bolsonaro’s management has brought profound transformations in the conduct of Brazilian foreign policy and public security policy. Since the beginning of 2019, Brazil redefined its international insertion in the field of security, stressing regional aspects of its defense and internal security policies. Such changes do not tend to improve the action of the Brazilian State in these fields.

Internationally, the growing instability among global powers, coupled with the dismantling of multilateralism, are negative phenomena for South American countries. In addition, these powers have been expanding their influence on the continent in the political, economic and geo-strategic fields. The issue is so serious that there is already open talk about the possibility of a proxy war in Venezuela.

Inadequate options at regional level also contribute to increase insecurity in South America, especially the decision to abandon the most successful experiment of regional cooperation in security matters so far: UN-ASUR. Just when the global context became more dangerous, unstable and risky, when it was more necessary to expand the capacity for joint action, South American governments have been carried away by ideological convictions and immediate electoral interests, wasting the opportunity to maintain the region relatively isolated from global geopolitical tensions.

The Venezuelan crisis was itself the result of a mixture of omission and absence of regional leadership. By leaving the forum that had been constituted precisely to promote dialogue, cooperation and political consultation for regional security, the South American countries’ governments...
have exempted themselves from their responsibilities for maintaining the tradition of peace and cooperation associated with the region. Political differences that could have been arbitrated have been radicalized.

Even worse, there is a possibility that this crisis will continue for a long time, with the risk that violence might spread and generalize in Venezuela and its neighboring countries. The frustration of the Colombian people over the impossibility of meeting the expectations created by the peace agreement, together with the reorganization of transnational crime in a vacuum created by the absence of the FARC, will bring even more complex threats, which are already beginning to move to neighboring countries.

Faced with these challenges, the radicalization of the South American governments' positions shows a growing polarization in the region. As a result, more and more, the solution of this crisis is in the hands of the US, Russia and China, with the possible interference in this process of actors such as Turkey, Syria and Iran. Obviously, for them this is just an opportunity to realize their own interests, which will make of us some kind of token, perhaps a toy, in their interactions.

Brazil seems to ignore the complexities and opportunities present in this context. The Bolsonaro government has promoted changes that generate fear in neighbors and diminish the Brazilian capacity to contribute to regional peace and stability. Its foreign policy gradually wastes a credibility and trust heritage built by the Brazilian State in the last 100 to 150 years and loses a great opportunity: at a time of attacks on multilateralism and return to realpolitik, Brazil’s diplomatic expertise was ideal for the country to defend the equality of states before international law and contribute to an international order based on norms and institutions. In addition to being ethically appropriate, the defense of multilateralism can also serve the interests of the country, strengthening its position in the concert of nations.

In relation to internal security, the changes are also negative. Cooperation with neighbors was dismantled and regulatory changes are promoted that do not address the issue in a systemic way. Proposed solutions are insufficient to solve the problem.

In fact, the feeling of insecurity profoundly affects the Brazilian population. In absolute terms, Brazil is the country where there are more violent deaths in the world; thus, in proportion to its population, it occupies position 13. In 2017, the official numbers registered more than 60,000 homicides, that is, there were more deaths than in any international conflict at present.
In addition to the inefficient distribution of competences among constituted authorities, low per capita income, social inequality, high proportion of young people in the population, insufficient police forces, high incarceration rates, widespread dissemination of illicit drugs, alcohol and firearms, and public resources mismanagement are among the different causes for the high violence rates.

Obviously, any public policy only based on repression and which does not consider offering better social conditions will be insufficient, and may fall into populism. The authorities are not grounding the solutions they propose in an examination of the root causes of the feeling of insecurity among the Brazilian population; they prefer to say that the threat of penalizing criminals with increasing rigor will make them give up crime. So far, this has contributed more to aggravating than to solving the problem. According to the current political orientation, this does not matter. The message is clear: if violence has not worked so far, it is because it has been little.

The president’s policy is consistent with candidate Bolsonaro’s promises. In his election campaign, he proposed an increase in repression as a solution and that the people should have greater freedom to acquire weapons. The candidate managed to create the impression of being the most apt to face the problem.

Violence statistics improved marginally, as a consequence of the policies implemented in the Temer government, but Bolsonaro government’s security proposals are far from what could be considered a multidimensional and effective policy regarding this issue. Evaluations made and proposed solutions do not start from a clear conceptual basis and, if implemented, can aggravate violence in society.

The risk that an increase in arm circulation can bring to the Brazilian people’s security is difficult to measure, but it is well known that the State’s repressive activities are focused on poor communities. The tendency is that population groups that suffer the most from violence are also the most negatively affected by easing demands for possession of weapons. It is also true that in the face of police violence, the victims’ response can strengthen organized crime, as it happened with the PCC.

In short, multi-polarity has made the international environment more unstable and dangerous. Traditional threats have become more intense and risky, following as a result the great powers’ adoption of unilateral and nationalist policies. We returned to the world of realpolitik, which is now felt in South America. In this context, the deployment between an international order marked by deep socio-economic interdependence and progressive deterioration in global governance conditions generates growing tensions among governments. In turn, organized criminal gangs
have been able to integrate systematically and effectively, by using new technologies and income resulting from illegal activities.

This context makes it more relevant and urgent to strengthen international cooperation instruments in South America. However, in recent years we have walked in the opposite direction and the initiatives of the new Brazilian government in its first months, point in the sense of deepening and strengthening the movement in this wrong direction.

Regarding internal security, there seems to be no systemic and coordinated vision to promote solutions based on a strategy that combines socio-economic development and the generation of opportunities for social inclusion with mechanisms to disincentive crime and repression respectful of the dignity of citizens. The emphasis is placed exclusively on the most violent punishment of criminals: a bet in which fear must dissuade other individuals from following the same path.

**Recommendations**

Our recommendation is that both policies must be changed:

a. At regional level, a position closer to non-intervention traditions combined with intensifying dialogue and cooperation with South American neighbors must be adopted. This serves Brazilian interests in the field of security and defense more than the apparent unconditional alignment with Trump’s administration.

b. With regard to promoting internal security, proposed regulatory changes will only be effective in the long term in a context marked by a more prosperous and respectful environment for human rights and socio-economic inclusion concerns.


Eduardo Pastrana Buelvas
Diego Vera Piñeros

This document proposes a discussion on how the Colombian State has oriented its security agenda between the governments of Juan Manuel Santos and Iván Duque.

Colombia has tended to combine multilateralism, a relative adherence to international law and the search for bilateral and sub-regional cooperation against common security problems, such as drug trafficking and transnational organized crime (COT, in Spanish). However, the security diplomacy has tended to become politicized and made more informal by the presidential perception of the Venezuelan crisis. Several internal phenomena continue to become prioritized amid pressures by the Donald Trump administration against illegal crops (coca, poppy), although in
a situation of US material and political decline, which prevents it from offering incentives as under the George W. Bush government and Plan Colombia.

During Duque's administration, some differences have been delineated regarding Santos in a global environment of increasing turbulence and multi-polarization. Frictions have been increasing during the Trump administration and have ended up being reflected in the western hemisphere, notoriously, in the positions of some countries in the face of the Venezuelan crisis. The weakening of multilateralism in the UN is exacerbated by the White House's foreign policy, which attacks its own allies, appeals to unilateralism and plays dangerously with the idea of military intervention.

Deterioration of Latin American regionalism is added with the virtual end of the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) and the inability of the Organization of American States or another regional organization to contribute to mitigate the political and migratory crisis, and more importantly, growing tensions between Venezuela and Colombia. In some aspects, they are emerging as triggers for an interstate conflict. Interference of countries such as Cuba, Russia and China, main partners of Caracas, as well as the alleged links between officials of the United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV) and illegal armed groups of Colombia are complex. It is not a return to the “Cold War”, but rivalry of powers, the PSUV's international positions and problems of post-conflict construction in Colombia have increased regional instability.

This scenario is negative for Colombia considering that it faces difficult problems, such as:

a. increase of Russia’s military presence in Venezuela,
b. drastic increase in Venezuelan migration,
c. increased presence in Venezuela of the National Liberation Army (ELN) and its violent actions in Colombia,
d. "relaunching" from Venezuela of the Revolutionary Armed Forces 2.0 (FARC) or the defection structure of the transitional justice process for peace,
e. increase of national drug production, linked to recidivist structures or that stemmed from demobilization, disarmament and reintegration of various armed groups (EPL, FARC, AUC) and new, very decentralized, mafias operating in networks with Brazil, Venezuela, Peru and Mexico, and,
f. high impact generated by illegal mining and logging and human trafficking in connection with COT networks.

Santos sought an externalization of the Military Forces roles and the formulation of a new security agenda by exporting experiences and
knowledge in the fight against the COT, with US support. It also initiated an exchange of standards with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and made the country’s military resources available to participate in maritime surveillance operations with the European Union (Atalanta) and United Nations peacekeeping. This issue received a high priority in foreign policy budgetary execution, over others such as the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, drug trafficking or even migration.

His domestic and international positions regarding the revision of the frontal combat approach to the problem of illegal drugs gave Colombia some freedom against Washington’s parameters in the framework of the Colombian peace process with the FARC. They sought partial harmonization between internal and external security agendas thinking of a possible post-conflict situation. In this way, it tended to make part of the strategy against illegal drugs to not depend only on security matters, without eliminating forced eradication, and to de-narcotize a large range of foreign policy.

However, it maintained a militarization optic concerning the COT problem and admitted defense directives that blur the distinction between insurgent groups, COT and other criminal armed structures. They are directives that allow the use of conventional war strategies, such as aerial bombardment, in situations of socially complex phenomena that pervade the civilian population. He also left a substitution program of illicit crops with design problems and large budgetary constraints.

For the moment, Iván Duque's government has tried to give continuity to a diplomacy of security and defense cooperation, military offensive and search for joint actions against the COT, as well as to a comprehensive perspective concerning the drug strategy, combining repressive instruments and socioeconomic stimuli. It has preserved voluntary substitution and construction of better institutional, infrastructure and market conditions for the most vulnerable populations and territories, although in a situation of reduced economic growth (decline in commodities), a very limited budget and monetary weakness in the face of sudden changes in the dollar (US-China trade war).

However, he has been adopting positions that go back to emphasizing security, including police persecution of consumption and pressures to the Constitutional Court to allow the return of large-scale aerial spraying, discussed for its alleged harmful effects on food crops, water sources and populations. There is attachment to multilateralism and international law, but from a more ideological and confrontational perspective, such as the anti-drug approach, the human rights situation in Venezuela, the historical mediation of Cuba against armed groups or the Russian presence in the continent.
Although Santos had opened the door to an ad hoc multilateralism and hardened part of its foreign policy through the Lima Group, suspension of participation in UNASUR and collective search for actions against President Nicolás Maduro, Iván Duque has made his positions more radical against the Venezuelan government. Including the creation of PROSUR to restore democracy and appreciation for the free market in South America, and direct support for disruptive opposition strategies in Venezuela, although it has dismissed military interference and tried to avoid arbitrary measures against migration.

Washington’s pressures on coca eradication and the Colombian initiative to request a more determined US intervention about Maduro -driven by activities of PSUV opponents from Colombia- are inducing greater vulnerability in the country, a counterproductive alignment and a greater weight of the Venezuelan and narcotics affairs in the security and foreign policy agenda. Such alignment does not seem to correspond to a significant increase in Washington’s annual economic and military aid or, for the moment being, to the transfer or sale of dissuasive capabilities -in case of conflict with Venezuela- and which also attracts unnecessary frictions with Moscow and Beijing. The latter are main powers with which Colombia has failed to cooperate in an assertive and lasting manner. An eventual purchase of combat aircraft (e.g. to the US or Sweden) could be justified based on the need for updating, but the question remains as to whether it is a way to feed the security dilemma with Venezuela.

More dangerous than those external powers and the “export of Cuban or Venezuelan socialism”, are the extreme environmental degradation caused by illegal -but also legal- mining, labor and sexual exploitation of people, especially of Venezuelan migrants -some joining criminal networks- the proliferation of illegal (and legal) weapons for ordinary citizens and the frequent killings of social leaders. Many perceive that the main challenges for national reconciliation are the presidential objections to the transitional justice system, the obstacles put by the main government party -the Democratic Center- and the persistent context of political polarization regarding peace with the FARC, despite advances recognized by the UN Security Council. In addition, there are historic weaknesses in State and market development in most of the national territory.

Finally, the growing conflict over the territory, in areas such as the department of Cauca in the south of the country and the sub-area of Caturamo near the border with Venezuela to the east, is an issue that is not receiving due attention beyond reactive police and military measures, raising tensions and risks in military-civilian relations. Unfortunately, the pressure for military results and the difficulties in protecting the demobilized are being used by some sectors to argue for the “return of ex-
trajudicial executions” and the lack of government commitment to peace. While there is more rhetoric than evidence, it does considerable damage to institutional legitimacy.

**Recommendations:**

a. Raise protection measures for demobilized and social leaders and press for full clarification of crimes against them.
b. Promote a broad dialogue with civil society actors and especially those of the receiving communities that are adjacent to areas of illicit crops and to areas for the reintegration of demobilized persons, focused on anti-drug strategies and on the implementation progress of the Peace Agreement with the FARC.
c. Strengthen and increase resources aimed at programs for alternative substitution of illegal crops.
d. Maintain and support the presence of UN agencies to verify the status of human rights in Colombia and the implementation of the Peace Agreement.
e. Avoid all military escalation of political-diplomatic conflicts with Venezuela and look for some contact channels with current government officials, Police and Military Forces, at least to share intelligence on Colombian illegal armed groups in that country.
f. Support international efforts to seek dialogue between Venezuelan government and opposition.
g. Complement the new migration policy with bilateral and regional agreements and diverse international cooperation resources for the integral and shared attention of migrants from Venezuela.

The agency of countries in the region vis-a-vis the international security and defense architecture problems. The case of Chile

Jaime Baeza Freer
María Cristina Escudero Illanes

Chile actively participates in the multilateral order. This participation makes it as a secondary power, that is, Chile is one of those countries that are in the second level of hierarchy vis-à-vis the regional power, considering its material and demographic capacities. Given these characteristics, the country is capable of having an identity that generates its own role when negotiating with global power, exerting influence beyond its geographical size and material capacity, which is recognized by the great powers, although not seen as an equal.

In the current international order, the great powers do not act in solitary together with smaller states as mere recipients of the political center’s decisions. On the contrary, changes in global conditions require the participation of more actors, who may have higher levels of independence,
protected in the multilateral arena. On the other hand, the State ceased to be the only international actor with the potential to impact international security systems with its own dynamics and which affect the final framework. These changes occur in a context of an increasingly established international society that allows, in part, to overcome hierarchical differences between States in pursuit of relations based on higher levels of equality.

In this structure, the multiplicity of factors that make up the international framework allows Chile to maintain, on the one hand, a critical independence to act in a US-led order and relate, at the same time, to powers that challenge this leadership without fear of reprisals. The best example of this was the visit to Chile by the US Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo in 2019 where he, in an address to more than three hundred guests, urged Chile and the rest of the region to not strengthen ties with China or Russia. However, Chile balances its relations between the eastern giant and the US leader, without affecting its ties with any of them. Despite wanting to stop the Chinese and Russian advancement, Washington’s interest is low in the Southern Cone compared to Central America and Colombia. This allows Chile more freedom to deploy its own strategies independently. While there are normal relations with Russia, they are not particularly strong. On the contrary, with China, trade relations are so.

However, it is a complex reality. On the one hand, Chile is a country that is politically close to the US in its approach to the region and in its perspective regarding the rest of the world. That has not prevented it from showing itself in a critical friendship in a number of actions that have involved the region. The great example was the Chilean refusal to support the war in Iraq in 2003. Although it meant an important tension, it did not prevent the approval of the bilateral Free Trade Agreement a year later. However, in other areas such as military matters, there has been harmony with Washington. Despite informal approaches in the first decade of the century, there is no interest from the different governments or the Chilean Armed Forces to buy war material of Russian origin and even less so Chinese. In this sense, the Book of Defense of Chile includes the ministerial decision made in 2006 to adopt the planning methodology of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and even more, cataloging of all the Chilean material according to the standard of this organization. This is consistent with the particularly close history of joint work with the countries of the European Union on military matters. Indeed, there is a long cooperation with the region, particularly with Germany, Spain and France. A case to highlight is the close collaboration between the Chilean Navy and its British counterpart, which dates from the very foundation of the South American republic. For the USA, this relationship with Europe is not a problem since it does not see them as competitors, but as allies.
But the defense of Chile’s interests is not diversified in the world only because of military cooperation, but in the defense of its commercial opening options. This is particularly true if we observe the type of relationship that Chile establishes with different world sectors. This is how the three-thirds policy was established in the past, that is, an equal share of exports would go to the US, Europe and Asia. However, today 32.4% is aimed at China, which together with Japan reaches 41.2% of the total Chilean shipments. On the other hand, Europe recorded 11.4% (in 1991 it was 34.3%) and the USA, 14.2%. That is, regardless of pressures that can be exerted on Chile, its trade diversification leads it to have transversal networks to defend its interests. It is also interesting that today Chile is the fourth world user of the Panama Canal, (it was the third until 2016), being only surpassed only by China, USA and Japan. With this panorama, Canal and presence in the Pacific Ocean protection is a central role.

This means that Chile participates in a global architecture with a certain western space, where the US still has a central role. We have seen that there is the possibility of a Chinese interest in a hegemony that counters American power. However, we maintain that it has not arrived in Chile, since there is no intention to advance in the field of military cooperation nor to extend the Chinese presence in the country outside commercial issues. That is, Chile is interested in reaching an agreement on security and defense in the region, but faces challenges and threats for which they do not have the capacity to act alone. To carry out its work, the country affirms itself in international society as a concept of support, which allows it to at least partially overcome the asymmetries of power with the central countries, maintaining a critical friendship with them, which means, for example, not having foreign troops in the national territory. As a country, it works in peace-keeping under the eaves of the United Nations and also participates in a number of initiatives to protect its global interests, including work in the Panama Canal and Asia Pacific.

Chile participates in international organizations, particularly in the Latin American region and seeks the development of a multi-lateral security and defense architecture. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the country maintains a pragmatic and somewhat individualistic attitude, driven by the weight of the economic principles in its development model and does not mix its commercial interests with the political ones where security and defense issues are addressed. Hence, facing the global order, Chile faces a complex reality, as does the rest of Latin America. However, as long as China continues to maintain a pragmatic attitude towards the US, it will not be a problem for Chile, either since it does not have extra-commercial relations with the Asian giant and its relations with Russia are not so close. On the other hand, it maintains a loyalty to the principles that govern global governance, led by Americans. This translates in-
to a close relationship on security and defense issues, as can be seen from the presented data.

In a nutshell, Chile is committed to international cooperation and its Armed Forces work as part of its foreign policy—through United Nations-regulated peace operations, aimed at generating the conditions for maintaining peace where there has been conflict; it is also committed to respecting the instances of international conflict resolution and supports initiatives that tend to eliminate mistrust that overshadows each country's defense policies. With this type of action, defense adds to the effort made to show Chile's commitment to the international order conceived in the promotion of living standards based on democracy and peace. From the regional point of view, the country is an active participant of the OAS in the face of an effectiveness deficit in other additional political and strategic coordination bodies. Orientation towards Asia Pacific has not implied that Chile would abandon its inclination to favor its membership in global multilateralism embodied by the UN and leadership in everything that does not contradict its commercial interests. In addition, despite the failure of UNASUR, the country continues to support sub-regional agreements as part of a variable geometry of relations, in the understanding that they are complementary multilateral architectures.

**Recommendations**

a. We believe it is important for Chile to continue to maintain its participation in the multilateral field. In this sense, to persevere in a Chilean foreign policy architecture of variable geometries allows to be at the same time in the global and hemispheric order, Asia Pacific, South America and in sub-regional contexts such as the Southern Cone or the Andean region.

b. Lead the insertion of the continent in Asia Pacific together with the rest of the Alliance built with Peru, Colombia and Mexico.

c. Chile must maintain the best possible relationship with both the US and with China. However, the community of values and cooperation areas are higher with both the Americans and the European Union. That is why while trade ties with China must go on in the current direction, the strategic priority must remain the West.

**Global security problems in Ecuador. A reflection on global, regional and local voids and tensions**

*Daniela Céleri Endara*

*Diego Pérez Enríquez*

Between 2017 and 2019 it has become clear that Ecuador needs to adapt its security and defense institutions, given that the country faces an unusual scenario: different demands arise from those that traditionally guided its strategic visions, while the State’s decision structure is insufficient
to solve the problems, in their dimension, urgency and nature. The traditionally military approach to security problems -in force since the first moments of the republic- must be rethought in the 21st century because conditions change dramatically.

Despite changes, it is evident that the Armed Forces maintain a predominant role in the construction of security policy in Ecuador. Police incidence, however, has tended to strengthen since the nineties of the twentieth century. The ideological tension between them is evidenced in the way in which the dividing line between security and emphasizing security is observed, as follows:

a. Such divide is due to the political possibility of establishing that a given issue is subject to “normal” attention by security agencies, or establishing that something is an “existential threat” to the State, and, if so, all the necessary measures to contain or eliminate it shall be applied.

b. The historical track record of the Armed Forces, as the central institution of the Ecuadorian political system, has the capacity to pose a particular agenda vis-à-vis other actors of that system, especially with regard to the definition of the sector’s agenda. Such capacity came into tension for a decade, and after that, it has returned to a dynamic that leads one to think that institutionality will depend on its track record.

c. Among the arguments presented by Ayoob (1995), there are three elements that mark the security agenda of a country: susceptibility to conflicts (in this case interstate conflicts are considered), dependence on third parties to achieve economic and social development conditions, a marginal position in the predominant international security agenda and economy, and, permeability to external actors.

d. In the Ecuadorian case, the emphasizing security on issues is verified when the institutions linked to decision-making in matters of security have to address issues that had not previously appeared on the agenda, and in the face of uncertainty the predominant tendency is to address them reducing the applicability of rights to maximize security conditions.

Additionally, the ability to determine risks and threats to the State can determine priorities and how to address them. Hence, making such delimitation allows us to establish which concern to recognize and how to address it from State perspective. In the Ecuadorian case, the first response arises in a context of strong influence from external factors, while the second is marked by institutional path dependence. At this intersection, Ecuador faces the following problems in 2019, which operate intertwined and overlapping in its territory:
a. Intra-regional international migration has become an important phenomenon in the Andean countries. In recent years, Ecuador became the destination of Venezuelan migration (as previously it was for Colombian and Peruvian migratory movements). The policy of promoting “free mobility” inserted in the 2008 constitution - and thought rather in a country that was an exporter of migrants - allowed the numbers of immigrants, especially from Cuba, Venezuela and Colombia, to increase. At the juncture of political, economic and social crisis in Venezuela, migratory flows increased significantly: UNHCR estimates that more than 220,000 Venezuelan migrants have arrived in Ecuador, and there are 96,525 regularized people.

Given the lack of official information, the academy sought to discern who these migrants were. Thus, in the north of Quito, there is a migration linked primarily to labor reasons (38.3%) and the search for new opportunities (30.2%), it makes an economic contribution of 87% of its income to local economies.

There is a lack of public policy planning that guarantees labor access for immigrants. At the same time, a number of bureaucratic procedures distort the precept of "universal citizenship", established constitutionally since 2008. A restriction cycle followed one of sheer opening under equivalent conditions.

Given the Venezuelan migration situation, the State reaction was to promulgate of a number of ministerial decisions, between August 2018 and February 2019, focused on the restriction of entry that was confronted with legal actions that sought the guarantee of rights to free mobility. This dispute was characterized by the strengthening of a discourse that associated migration with insecurity. The narrative built upon this in the National Defense Policy is clear:

[...] Irregular migratory flows, caused by social and economic insecurity in the place of origin of affected population, as a consequence of natural or anthropic factors, oblige the State to direct unplanned resources for the attention of said groups, with the risk of an eventual social confrontation, outbreak of epidemics, emergence of illegal activities and other inconveniences brought by this phenomenon (Ministry of National Defense, 2018, p. 53).

b. On the other hand, it should be considered that there are different levels of regional and international policy influence on Ecuadorian security policy.

Following the primary focus on the Ecuador-Peru binational relationship until 1998, Colombia moved to the first priority for the country’s foreign and defense policy. Initially, a distant position had been adopted because
it was considered an internal conflict with limited overflows to the Ecuadorian side. Along with the start of the Colombian peace process, however, a number of actions were observed by irregular dissident FARC groups, which at the end of 2017 and during the first half of 2018 triggered a number of tension events in the northern border, the murder of five Ecuadorians and a profound rearrangement in the management of foreign policy, and of security and defense.

On the other hand, "although Ecuador reestablished diplomatic ties with the US - its most important trading partner - in 2012, it also deepened his ties with Iran, Syria, Cuba and China, among other countries" (Polgahecimovich, 2013, p. 142). An agenda of this nature produced a series of incidents during the Correa government, and an effort to achieve “diversification of economic dependence” (Gamso cited by Vera Rojas and Llanos-Escobar, 2016, p. 154). The ambivalent record in this relationship generally strained both discourse and practice, generating difficult resolution scenarios. This trend was extended to security issues, and since 2017, measures have been taken to re-approximate the relationship between the two countries through revocation of asylum to Julian Assange, resumption of work of gathering information and monitoring on activities related to drug trafficking, authorizing the operation of US airplanes on national territory, cooperation activities in technology, training, humanitarian aid and resources for the purchase of war material.

In relation to China, one of the Correa government’s postulates had been untying the FFAA of the sphere of US influence. Then, an unusual line of cooperation on military issues was formalized, which made cooperation official for defense industry strengthening, acquisition of war material, and a broader commitment to “maintain strategic coordination on international and regional issues in order to preserve the rights and interests of the two countries” (Correa and Jinping, 2015). The main relationship area was economic, and it is evident that Ecuador’s debt to China has grown to 6.468 billion dollars, making this country Ecuador’s main creditor. In connection with the categories cited by Ayoob (1995), it is inevitable when considering the problems of security dependence on more powerful economies. It should be considered that China’s objectives, in terms of cooperation on military security, seek to develop omni-directional foreign military relations, promote pragmatic military cooperation and fulfill international responsibility and obligations.

c. The country must be reflected upon from a geopolitical perspective with reference to international organized crime. Ecuador maintains an extensive maritime territory that, added to its location in the region, places it at the center of a series of routes for carrying out illegal activities, of which drug trafficking is the main one. The large amount of resources that this activity mobilizes, and its transnational character, puts pressure on the territorial control capacity that Ecuador can exercise. Control of the territory -whether partial or intermittent- allows generating illegal clusters of activities that drive the “diversification” of businesses and involve a wide range of local and national level actors. The reflection then goes from regional to local factors, generating the question about the type of action that the State needs to unleash to contain the phenomenon and protect those who are in a situation of greater vulnerability. On the other hand, the evidence of investigations on the trafficking and exploitation of migrants, and quantitative information on the characteristics of Venezuelan migrants and their vulnerability conditions, added to journalistic data on trafficking networks and sexual slav-
ery of women in the Northern Border, emphasizes the need to think in complex, integral terms that link multiple actors, at different levels of action. In addition, if we add the analysis of the structure that pervades the security system and also the thoughts, which are incomplete for the moment being, to apprehend the realities of a phenomenon that cannot be thought of or attended to only from the local perspective, as is the case of those that currently threaten security, we will show the urgent need to articulate international security and migration debates.

d. At regional level, the plethora of existing organizations reveals a substantial political weakness to coordinate countries’ decisions in the face of common tensions. The recent de-structuring of UNASUR and regional migration dynamics should invite to reflect on the prevailing security perspectives among national, regional and global institutions. Their weakness and / or strength generates worrisome effects in the way security decisions affect citizens, particularly those in conditions of grave vulnerability. There are at least two major threats to regional security: reactivation of Colombian internal conflict actors and the link they maintain with international criminal organizations, and the Venezuelan internal political process that has generated a migratory flow in the previously described conditions.

Bibliography


6 Global changes, power balances and security problems at a time of imbalance. An interpretation from Bolivia

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Introduction

Globalization processes, their impacts and the need to better interpret the anarchic set of international relations in Latin America, trigger a number of reflections on two aspects.

First, the progressive decline of the US hegemonic leadership and that of the European Union itself, deeply affected by a financial crisis and the absence of durable solutions that facilitate the operation of a harmonious global order. Facing this continental challenge, the USA has readjusted its National Security Strategy, identifying Russia and China as the main threats to security and peace in Latin America and the world. These uncertainties opened the way for Russia and China to try to conquer a diplomatic and economic-military space in terms of global struggles, based on a multipolar rearrangement in Latin America. USA has lost space but, simultaneously, seeks to recover a hegemony that is questioned for its failed military interventions in Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya and Syria.

There is a resurgence of nation states that seemed to have disappeared with the commercial and technological influences of globalization; however, powers such as India, China and Russia try to expand their global strength, in parallel to claiming their nationalism and territorial borders. The collapse of US hegemony opened the way for global security problems such as climate change, migration, terrorism, inequality and rapid technological change that increase insecurity, along with the return of populism and authoritarianism.

Second, some economies have emerged in a horizon of new power balances, such as the Pacific Alliance and the Forum for Progress of South America (PROSUR) that includes Brazil, Chile, Argentina, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Paraguay, overshadowing UNASUR even more.

Problems that drive reflection and skepticism

Three fundamental factors trigger an analysis on how to modify foreign policy and security policies in times of globalization, with the aim of fostering new cooperation and solidarity structures to face the most important problems in the second decade of the XXI century.

The first factor relates to the tragic evolution of Haiti after the earthquake in early 2010. The impressive devastation immediately mobilized millions of dollars and commitments to solve the suffering of thousands of citizens, as well as to rebuild a country in ruins, without basic protection of Haitians in their political, economic, social and human rights. It is for these reasons that the axis of security problems in Latin America lies once again in programs subject to conditions.
It is here that the Bolivian experience becomes a second factor of analysis, since it emerged as a rare example of relative market reforms success and, subsequently, as a resistance and condemnation phenomenon against the effects of neoliberalism in Latin America. President Morales disseminated an international strategy called "diplomacy of the peoples", through which he supported the doctrine of 21st century socialism, aligning with the presidents of Venezuela, Cuba and Nicaragua. In this way the left turn materialized, which represented a rejection of liberal democracy, in the name of socialism. This position was expressed as an anti-imperialist vision that defended sovereignty within the Organization of American States. Bolivia ambiguously supported the Inter-American Democratic Charter, thus reinforcing the anti-democratic leftist criticisms that were beginning to penetrate deeply into various sectors of civil society.

The third factor of problems and international anarchy has to do with the balance of power logic developed by China, India, USA, the European Union and Russia in the field of nuclear weapons control. None of these countries do anything definitive to moderate the risks of a crisis and military confrontation, especially when the conflicts between North and South Korea, Syria, Iraq, Iran or the permanent military tensions in Ossetia are analyzed. Conflicts in Venezuela have caused China to strengthen its satellite tracking facilities in the Captain Manuel Ríos Air Force base. Additionally, Russia also has cyber technology installed at the Antonio Díaz Ban-di Naval Base in La Orchilla, an island north of Caracas.

The destabilizing effect that emanates from Venezuela is coordinated with Nicaragua, Cuba and Bolivia. In fact, the Bolivian situation is key in supporting Venezuela, both for the strengthening of an ideological discourse that identifies the United States as the sole cause of the Venezuelan economic-political disaster, as if to attract the influence of other powers that compete with American hegemony. Bolivarian countries claim an apparent anti-imperialist idea to rethink the problems of dependence, from the point of view of an inalienable sovereignty of the Latin American states.

When confronted with the US, Bolivia coordinated its power balance with China, Russia, Venezuela and Cuba, although it was not clear how much it could effectively earn in economic, military and security terms. Trade exchanges are minimal but anti-Western and anti-American ideologization has been growing, along with the deterioration of institutionalized democracy.

In the Andean area, Bolivia tends to be the country that has somehow enabled a more noticeable presence of China and Iran. The objective is to weaken US hegemony, rather than the possibility of building a new network of multipolar cooperation and integration. The anti-American dis-
course favors the reduction of any influence for controlling coca leaf crops, as well as a challenge to the presence of Europe and the West, qualified as a neo-colonialist. Bolivia managed to exploit trade relations with China, Iran and Russia very well, but only to limit US influence in the war on drugs to a maximum.

The same can be said of the Bolivian actions within the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (ALBA) and UNASUR, where an ideological approach to the defense of the 21st century socialism and, subsequently, to the protection of Venezuela and Chavismo, as a political structure to preserve the power balance struggle.

**Bolivia and its maritime demand before the International Court of Justice, ICJ**

The complaint before the ICJ filed by Bolivia was a strategic decision that intensely mobilized Bolivia and Chile, because it showed that it was possible to take the historical conflict to an international level. The ICJ ruled in favor of Chile and left Bolivia with a bitter pill, unable to react to unequal power balances.

As neighboring countries, Chile depends on Bolivia, just as Bolivia depends on Chile. Therefore, the vision should focus on addressing the conflict from the perspective of recognizing mutual international responsibilities. The ICJ ruling in favor of Chile forces us to look at the long-term and at historical responsibilities for the new generations, in terms of doing justice and exercising equity between two democracies that will peacefully negotiate solutions. Among these, the probable territorial exchange and mutual interdependence are still alive so that Bolivia and Chile can complement each other.

The process before the ICJ opened a new era for relations between Bolivia and Chile, something that these countries will no longer be able to change and, therefore, they should be ready to demonstrate to the international community that a mature and historically emblematic solution is possible to end a secular conflict that will inevitably have to be solved in the 21st century.

**Globalization and persistent insecurity**

Currently, power balances are isolating Bolivia, whose economy is so small that investments and projects with China or Iran are characterized by exploitation and abuse of the labor force, as well as by the erosion of state institutions, due to corruption. China, after learning about the ICJ ruling against Bolivia, preferred to use absolute realism, choosing Chile as a hub to start businesses, investments and opening large-scale markets throughout Latin America.
The international struggle to knock out the US is inevitably linked to the war on drugs. Although a consensus grew around the failure of this strategy, Bolivia generated important agreements to decriminalize the coca leaf, qualified as an ancestral symbol and resource that deserves to be protected from forms of neo-colonial domination. By expelling the US DEA, Bolivia secured the cooperation of the European Union, an agency that has not been as demanding or violent as the US forces.

**Uncertain reforms and post-neoliberalism in Latin America**

Many of the political reforms, especially those designed to profoundly change the Judiciaries, improve cooperation between the Executive Branch and Congress, as well as all efforts to implement social policies to alleviate poverty with universal impact criteria, lost the possibility of becoming change catalysts. In most cases, bureaucracies were generated that manipulated reform projects, thinking only on electoral objectives.

Political system democratization and political party and electoral system modernization meant a huge investment throughout Latin America. However, constant explosions of violence in civil society show that different social classes, indigenous peoples and other stakeholders did not appropriate legitimately an agenda of democratic modernization.

Countries such as Bolivia, Venezuela, Ecuador and Argentina had serious problems that were expressed in political and economic crisis, deeply questioning the market economy model. They thus opened the way to the expression of alternatives such as social movements, leftist political parties allegedly anti-system and new leaderships. But the ground was not cleared in terms of a better quality of democracy either.

The Bolivian scenario emerged as a probable post-neoliberal alternative when Evo Morales was elected president in 2005. He immediately changed the Political Constitution and tried to cut at the root the set of free market reforms through nationalization policies of strategic sectors in the economy: hydrocarbons, electricity, mining and telecommunications. The reforms seemed to re-position towards the development of a dense protection network for the poorest social groups, which resulted in a very successful populist regime.

However, inefficiency in the management of public funds, corruption and drug trafficking threats, made this new post-neoliberal political model to also present serious deficiencies and instability. Corruption scandals inside the Bolivian police represent a deep institutional crisis that destroys the best prospects for political reform in a democracy.

Efforts invested to carry out political and economic reforms also faced loss of institutionality in the Armed Forces. In thirty-seven years of democracy (1982-2019), the Armed Forces in Bolivia have had many insti-
tutional problems and lack of commitment to democratic stability. This means that there is a slow process whereby the norms and behaviors of military institutions do not yet recognize or accept the enormous democratic demands in terms of respect for rights and care of political stability in charge of civil power.

No greater legitimacy and recognition of institutional autonomy was achieved with Evo Morales in power (2006-2019) to improve the relationship between armed forces, Constitution defense and respect of civil society towards the military institution as a fully reliable champion of State sovereignty. Although it is nothing surprising, those who more systematically violate human rights and do so with impunity are the military institutions together with the police.

At present there are no proposals for political-institutional reform to identify a set of new military roles and better professionalization of the Armed Forces. Rather, Evo Morales delegated them other functions as controlling smuggling and being part of public security, which does not solve their institutional crisis, but increases their organizational problems, which affect not only the military but also their same functionality within the political system.

There is a serious institutional deficit and problems of modernization within the Armed Forces, especially due to violence practiced in the barracks and abuse of power in the tasks of fighting against the smuggling or drug trafficking. Likewise, loss of institutionality has an impact on the political instability of different governments, generating permanent violence scenarios that destroy the basic values of democracy (Pion-Berlin and Trinkunas, 2010).

Recommendations
a. Continue exploring cooperative, peaceful and democratic initiatives that facilitate building full access to the Pacific Ocean.
b. Strengthen the international human rights system to develop sufficient capacities in countries and populations in situations of poverty.
c. Preserve the sovereignty of the national State in the processes of dialogue and cooperation with governments, international organizations and other international institutions.
d. Update and modernize the Armed Forces legal and regulatory instruments.
e. Design an institutional management system for the Armed Forces and their agencies.
f. Enhance international cooperation to support the States’ development efforts, particularly States with clear development asymmetries.
Peru in the face of a new regional and global security configuration

Sebastien Adins

Over the past few years, global security has been exposed to three main trends: a transition of power (with the relative decline of Western powers and the emergence of southern powers, led by China); a dissemination of power (given the empowerment of various non-state actors, both formal and illegal) and a growing questioning of “globalization”, in its economic, political and socio-cultural manifestations. Compared to other regions of the world, South America has found itself relatively far from the main sources of geopolitical tension in the world and global power shift, for now, only expressed in the economic sphere. The region also has no hypothesis of intense interstate warfare or the politicization of ethnic or religious differences.

Thus, by far the main threats to regional security are organized crime, accompanied by the highest homicide rates in the world (in countries without armed conflict), as well as ecological stress caused by climate change, poor management of natural resources and existence of criminal networks that work against the biodiversity that characterizes the region. It is worth mentioning that the multidimensional crisis in Venezuela is not only bringing an exodus of refugees unprecedented in regional history, but also the "export" of Venezuelan organized crime to neighboring countries and a growing polarization between US interests, historical hegemon, Russia and China.

As for Peru, it is one of the South American countries that invests the least in defense, with a military expenditure of less than 1% for the year 2018; clearly an effect of the historic peaceful resolution of their territorial disputes with Ecuador (1998) and Chile (2014). The establishment of multiple bilateral and trilateral security management mechanisms with neighbors also results from these dynamics.

The US continues to stand out regarding the interaction that the country has with global powers in terms of security. Although, Washington has drastically reduced its military and police assistance to the country since 2008 -a clear trend throughout the region- Peru is the third largest recipient in Latin America. Both at the level of military and police training and in the field of military (mostly naval) exercises, a "unipolar" logic still prevails -in contrast to the commercial-economic "multi-polarity."- In general, this policy of political alignment towards the US and even, in aspects such as the fight against drugs, results from the conservatism that has guided Peruvian foreign policy since the early 1990s. On the other
hand, the limited willingness of other powers to "replace" the hegemon in the field of security also contributes to this fact.

The Russian Federation stands out among the extra-hegemonic powers that are presented as Peru’s security partners. Since the then USSR became the first armament supplier for the Army and, to a lesser extent, the Peruvian Air Force during the military government (1968-1980), Moscow has maintained a key role in training military personnel, maintenance and / or modernization of weapons and, recently, in the fight against drugs.

With respect to Western Europe, the two main partners are France and Italy, respectively the third and second arms supplier in Peru in the last five decades. These are States with which Peru maintains a fluid military dialogue and several signed agreements concerning security and defense. Despite the emergence of Asian powers in recent decades, for now they are not top-notch partners for Peru in military matters. The recent cooperation between the country and South Korea, which became a "strategic partner" in 2012, is highlighted with the purchase (and local assembly) of training planes and patrol cars from the Asian nation. With respect to China - Peru's first trading partner - military cooperation is still limited to periodic donations of non-lethal military goods.

Despite the apparent crisis that multilateralism has been going through for a few years, Peru continues to focus on security governance within the framework of the UN, the OAS and, at least on a discourse level, the various mechanisms of cooperation and sub-regional concertation. Commitment to the United Nations system is expressed, for example, through its contribution to various peacekeeping operations - it is presented as the fourth contributor in South America - and its two-time participation as a member of the Security Council so far in the 21st century (2006-2007 and 2018-2019). Regarding the inter-American system, and in accordance with its policy of alignment with the US, Peru is one of the most active South American members, both in its political dimension (through the OAS, for example before the Venezuelan crisis), as in issues related to security. Regarding the latter, it should be noted that the 2005 National Defense of Peru White Paper fully coincides with the new conception of international security approved by the members of the OAS during the Mexico Summit (2003). In contrast, the two main sub-regional organizations with a security agenda, the CAN and UNASUR - both involved in a very deep crisis - have not received the same priority from Lima.

After having been a country of emigration for several decades, the deep Venezuelan crisis has turned Peru into the second recipient of migrants and refugees from the Caribbean country. Thus, according to the National Superintendence of Migration, in September 2019, approximately 870
thousand Venezuelans were residing in Peru, 84% of them in the Peruvian capital. This trend, unheard of in national history, results from several factors, the most important being: the combination of sustained economic growth and informality (and, as such, permissibility) of the labor market; the solidarity shown by the Peruvian government towards Venezuelan migrants maintained until the end of 2018 (in clear contrast to its neighbors); and, in recent months, the “snowball” effect, with the entry of relatives of Venezuelans already residing in the country. The massive influx of migrants not only caused a growing concern among population and authorities regarding their institutional capacity to respond to this reality, but the growing activity of Venezuelan criminal gangs in Peruvian territory has resulted in sporadic expressions of xenophobia and a growing application of security measures to the dossier, partly driven by some media.

Drug production and illicit trafficking (as the second largest cocaine producer in the world), trafficking in persons and various environmental crimes (among others: illegal gold mining, logging of tropical forest and extraction of protected maritime species) are among the main challenges and threats to security in Peru. All these are expressions of organized crime interconnected with each other, with transnational links, and equipped with huge economic resources, which nourish continuation with corrupt practices. Although Peru does not share the rates of epidemic violence in most Latin American countries yet, organized crime has clearly contributed to the upward trend in homicides in the country (7.9 per hundred thousand people in 2017). On the other hand, it is clear that the proliferation of the aforementioned challenges results from the persistence of “brown areas” throughout the Peruvian Amazon and Andes -several of them located in border regions- in combination with the growing socio-technological interdependence that characterizes the world nowadays and the economic boom experienced by the country since the last decade.

**Recommendations**

a. Beyond the huge advances shown over recent years in terms of cooperation between Peru and its neighbors, non-traditional security challenges and threats can become an opportunity to deepen trust between States and thus consolidate South America as a security community.

b. To achieve this last purpose, the existing network of bi- or trilateral security mechanisms and agreements is insufficient, and South American security governance should be rebuilt, based on the modest progress generated in the (currently dismantled) Union of South American Nations (Unasur), learning from their mistakes and avoiding duplication of efforts with other (sub-) regional or hemispheric organizations.
c. Considering the transition to an increasingly multi-/heteropolar and post-western international system, the Peruvian State should consider the potential benefits, for example at the level of strategic autonomy and opportunities, of deepening security cooperation with still emerging non-Western powers.

d. At domestic level, the only way to deal effectively with new security threats is through an increase in State capacity in the "brown areas", some of them border zones; a non-politicized fight against corruption, not only among the political class, but also the business community and other non-governmental actors and; a development model more oriented to sow opportunities and development in the historically marginalized areas of Peru. Not only would it increase the security of Peruvian citizens, but it would also generate a higher level of State legitimacy.